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ABSTRACT
Nowadays, online social networks (OSNs) have become a mainstream cultural phe-
nomenon for millions of Internet users. Social networks are an ideal environment for
generating all kinds of social benefits for users. Users share experiences, keep in touch
with their family, friends and acquaintances, and earn economic benefits from the
power of their influence (which is translated into new job opportunities). However,
the use of social networks and the action of sharing information imply the loss of the
users’ privacy.
Recently, a great interest in protecting the privacy of users has emerged. This situation
has been due to documented cases of regrets in users’ actions, company scandals pro-
duced by misuse of personal information, and the biases introduced by privacy mecha-
nisms. Social network providers have included improvements in their systems to reduce
users’ privacy risks; for example, restricting privacy policies by default, adding new pri-
vacy settings, and designing quick and easy shortcuts to configure user privacy settings.
In the privacy researcher area, new advances are proposed to improve privacy mech-
anisms, most of them focused on automation, fine-grained systems, and the usage of
features extracted from the user’s profile information and interactions to recommend
the best privacy policy for the user. Despite these advances, many studies have shown
that users’ concern for privacy does not match the decisions they ultimately make in
social networks. This misalignment in the users’ behavior might be due to the complex-
ity of the privacy concept itself. This drawback causes users to disregard privacy risks,
or perceive them as temporarily distant. Another cause of users’ behavior misalign-
ment might be due to the complexity of the privacy decision-making process. This is
because users should consider all possible scenarios and the factors involved (e.g., the
number of friends, the relationship type, the context of the information, etc.) to make
an appropriate privacy decision.
The main contributions of this thesis are the development of metrics to assess privacy
risks, and the proposal of explainable privacy mechanisms (using the developed met-
rics) to assist and raise awareness among users during the privacy decision process.
Based on the definition of the concept of privacy, the dimensions of information scope
and information sensitivity have been considered in this thesis to assess privacy risks.
For explainable privacy mechanisms, soft paternalism techniques and gamification el-
ements that make use of the proposed metrics have been designed. These mechanisms
have been integrated into the social network PESEDIA and evaluated in experiments
with real users. PESEDIA is a social network developed in the framework of the Master’s
thesis of the Ph.D. student [15], this thesis, and the national projects “Privacy in So-
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cial Educational Environments during Childhood and Adolescence” (TIN2014-55206-
R) and “Intelligent Agents for Privacy Advice in Social Networks” (TIN2017-89156-R).
The findings confirm the validity of the proposedmetrics for computing the users’ scope
and the sensitivity of social network publications. For the scope metric, the results also
showed the possibility of estimating it through local and social centrality metrics for
scenarios with limited information access. For the sensitivity metric, the results also
remarked the users’ misalignment for some information types and the consensus for a
majority of them. The usage of these metrics as part of messages about potential con-
sequences of privacy policy choices and information sharing actions to users showed
positive effects on users’ behavior regarding privacy. Furthermore, the findings of ex-
ploring the users’ trade-off between costs and benefits during disclosure actions of per-
sonal information showed significant relationships with the usual social circles (family
members, friends, coworkers, and unknown users) and their properties. This allowed
designing better privacy mechanisms that appropriately restrict access to informa-
tion and reduce regrets. Finally, gamification elements applied to social networks and
users’ privacy showed a positive effect on the users’ behavior towards privacy and safe
practices in social networks.
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RESUMEN
En la actualidad, las redes sociales se han convertido en un fenómeno cultural domi-
nante para millones de usuarios de Internet. Las redes sociales son un entorno ideal
para la generación de todo tipo de beneficios sociales para los usuarios. Los usuarios
comparten experiencias, mantienen el contacto con sus familiares, amigos y conocidos,
y obtienen beneficios económicos gracias al poder de su influencia (lo que se traduce en
nuevas oportunidades de trabajo). Sin embargo, el uso de las redes sociales y la acción
de compartir información implica la perdida de la privacidad de los usuarios.
Recientemente ha emergido un gran interés en proteger la privacidad de los usuar-
ios. Esta situación se ha debido a los casos de arrepentimientos documentados en las
acciones de los usuarios, escándalos empresariales producidos por usos indebidos de
la información personal, y a los sesgos que introducen los mecanismos de privacidad.
Los proveedores de redes sociales han incluido mejoras en sus sistemas para reducir los
riesgos en privacidad de los usuarios; por ejemplo, restringiendo las políticas de pri-
vacidad por defecto, añadiendo nuevos elementos de configuración de la privacidad, y
diseñando accesos fáciles y directos para configurar la privacidad de los usuarios. En el
campo de la investigación de la privacidad, nuevos avances se proponen para mejorar
los mecanismos de privacidad la mayoría centrados en la automatización, selección de
grano fino, y uso de características extraídas de la información y sus interacciones para
recomendar la mejor política de privacidad para el usuario. A pesar de estos avances,
muchos estudios han demostrado que la preocupación de los usuarios por la privaci-
dad no se corresponde con las decisiones que finalmente toman en las redes sociales.
Este desajuste en el comportamiento de los usuarios podría deberse a la complejidad
del propio concepto de privacidad. Este inconveniente hace que los usuarios ignoren
los riesgos de privacidad, o los perciban como temporalmente distantes. Otra causa
del desajuste en el comportamiento de los usuarios podría deberse a la complejidad
del proceso de toma de decisiones sobre la privacidad. Esto se debe a que los usuarios
deben considerar todos los escenarios posibles y los factores involucrados (por ejem-
plo, el número de amigos, el tipo de relación, el contexto de la información, etc.) para
tomar una decisión apropiada sobre la privacidad.
Las principales contribuciones de esta tesis son el desarrollo de métricas para eval-
uar los riesgos de privacidad, y la propuesta de mecanismos de privacidad explicables
(haciendo uso de las métricas desarrolladas) para asistir y concienciar a los usuarios
durante el proceso de decisión sobre la privacidad. Atendiendo a la definición del
concepto de la privacidad, las dimensiones del alcance de la información y la sensi-
bilidad de la información se han considerado en esta tesis para evaluar los riesgos de
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privacidad. En cuanto a losmecanismos de privacidad explicables, se han diseñado uti-
lizando técnicas de paternalismo blando y elementos de gamificación que hacen uso de
las métricas propuestas. Estos mecanismos se han integrado en la red social PESEDIA
y evaluado en experimentos con usuarios reales. PESEDIA es una red social desarrol-
lada en el marco de la tesina de Master del doctorando [15], esta tesis y los proyectos
nacionales “Privacidad en Entornos Sociales Educativos durante la Infancia y la Ado-
lescencia” (TIN2014-55206-R) y “Agentes inteligentes para asesorar en privacidad en
redes sociales” (TIN2017-89156-R).
Los resultados confirman la validez de las métricas propuestas para calcular el alcance
de los usuarios y la sensibilidad de las publicaciones de las redes sociales. En cuanto
a la métrica del alcance, los resultados también mostraron la posibilidad de estimarla
mediante métricas de centralidad local y social para escenarios con acceso limitado a
la información. En cuanto a lamétrica de sensibilidad, los resultados también pusieron
de manifiesto la falta de concordancia de los usuarios en el caso de algunos tipos de in-
formación y el consenso en el caso de la mayoría de ellos. El uso de estas métricas como
parte de los mensajes sobre las posibles consecuencias de las opciones de política de
privacidad y las acciones de intercambio de información a los usuarios mostró efectos
positivos en el comportamiento de los usuarios con respecto a la privacidad. Además,
los resultados de la exploración de la compensación de los usuarios entre los costos y
los beneficios durante las acciones de divulgación de información personal mostraron
relaciones significativas con los círculos sociales habituales (familiares, amigos, com-
pañeros de trabajo y usuarios desconocidos) y sus propiedades. Esto permitió diseñar
mejores mecanismos de privacidad que restringen adecuadamente el acceso a la in-
formación y reducen los arrepentimientos. Por último, los elementos de gamificación
aplicados a las redes sociales y a la privacidad de los usuarios mostraron un efecto pos-
itivo en el comportamiento de los usuarios hacia la privacidad y las prácticas seguras
en las redes sociales.
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RESUM
En l’actualitat, les xarxes socials s’han convertit en un fenomen cultural dominant per
a milions d’usuaris d’Internet. Les xarxes socials són un entorn ideal per a la generació
de tota mena de beneficis socials per als usuaris. Els usuaris comparteixen experièn-
cies, mantenen el contacte amb els seus familiars, amics i coneguts, i obtenen beneficis
econòmics gràcies al poder de la seva influència (el que es tradueix en noves opor-
tunitats de treball). No obstant això, l’ús de les xarxes socials i l’acció de compartir
informació implica la perduda de la privacitat dels usuaris.
Recentment ha emergit un gran interès per protegir la privacitat dels usuaris. Aquesta
situació s’ha degut als casos de penediments documentats en les accions dels usuaris,
escàndols empresarials produïts per usos indeguts de la informació personal, i als caires
que introdueixen els mecanismes de privacitat. Els proveïdors de xarxes socials han in-
clòs millores en els seus sistemes per a reduir els riscos en privacitat dels usuaris; per ex-
emple, restringint les polítiques de privacitat per defecte, afegint nous elements de con-
figuració de la privacitat, i dissenyant accessos fàcils i directes per a configurar la pri-
vacitat dels usuaris. En el camp de la recerca de la privacitat, nous avanços es proposen
per a millorar els mecanismes de privacitat la majoria centrats en l’automatització,
selecció de gra fi, i ús de característiques extretes de la informació i les seues interac-
cions per a recomanar la millor política de privacitat per a l’usuari. Malgrat aquests
avanços, molts estudis han demostrat que la preocupació dels usuaris per la privacitat
no es correspon amb les decisions que finalment prenen en les xarxes socials. Aquesta
desalineació en el comportament dels usuaris podria deure’s a la complexitat del propi
concepte de privacitat. Aquest inconvenient fa que els usuaris ignorin els riscos de pri-
vacitat, o els percebin com temporalment distants. Una altra causa de la desalineació
en el comportament dels usuaris podria deure’s a la complexitat del procés de presa de
decisions sobre la privacitat. Això es deu al fet que els usuaris han de considerar tots
els escenaris possibles i els factors involucrats (per exemple, el nombre d’amics, el tipus
de relació, el context de la informació, etc.) per a prendre una decisió apropiada sobre
la privacitat.
Les principals contribucions d’aquesta tesi són el desenvolupament de mètriques per a
avaluar els riscos de privacitat, i la proposta de mecanismes de privacitat explicables
(fent ús de les mètriques desenvolupades) per a assistir i conscienciar als usuaris durant
el procés de decisió sobre la privacitat. Atesa la definició del concepte de la privacitat,
les dimensions de l’abast de la informació i la sensibilitat de la informació s’han con-
siderat en aquesta tesi per a avaluar els riscos de privacitat. Respecte als mecanismes
de privacitat explicables, aquests s’han dissenyat utilitzant tècniques de paternalisme
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bla i elements de gamificació que fan ús de les mètriques propostes. Aquests mecan-
ismes s’han integrat en la xarxa social PESEDIA i avaluat en experiments amb usuaris
reals. PESEDIA és una xarxa social desenvolupada en el marc de la tesina de Màster del
doctorant [15], aquesta tesi i els projectes nacionals “Privacitat en Entorns Socials Ed-
ucatius durant la Infància i l’Adolescència” (TIN2014-55206-R) i “Agents Intel·ligents
per a assessorar en Privacitat en xarxes socials” (TIN2017-89156-R).
Els resultats confirmen la validesa de les mètriques propostes per a calcular l’abast de
les accions dels usuaris i la sensibilitat de les publicacions de les xarxes socials. Re-
specte a la mètrica de l’abast, els resultats també van mostrar la possibilitat d’estimar-
la mitjançant mètriques de centralitat local i social per a escenaris amb accés limitat
a la informació. Respecte a la mètrica de sensibilitat, els resultats també van posar
de manifest la falta de concordança dels usuaris en el cas d’alguns tipus d’informació
i el consens en el cas de la majoria d’ells. L’ús d’aquestes mètriques com a part dels
missatges sobre les possibles conseqüències de les opcions de política de privacitat i les
accions d’intercanvi d’informació als usuaris va mostrar efectes positius en el compor-
tament dels usuaris respecte a la privacitat. A més, els resultats de l’exploració de la
compensació dels usuaris entre els costos i els beneficis durant les accions de divulgació
d’informació personal van mostrar relacions significatives amb els cercles socials ha-
bituals (familiars, amics, companys de treball i usuaris desconeguts) i les seves propi-
etats. Això ha permés dissenyar millors mecanismes de privacitat que restringeixen
adequadament l’accés a la informació i redueixen els penediments. Finalment, els el-
ements de gamificació aplicats a les xarxes socials i a la privacitat dels usuaris van
mostrar un efecte positiu en el comportament dels usuaris cap a la privacitat i les pràc-
tiques segures en les xarxes socials.
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1.1 Motivation
Online social networks (OSNs) have become a mainstream cultural phenomenon for
millions of Internet users, being its usage one of the most popular1. Independently of
the context or type of the social network (e.g., professionals, dating, focused on instant
messaging, based on video content, etc.), all of them have a set of common features.
Users2 normally have a (self-constructed) profile that represents their self-presentation
to others and communicationmechanisms that enable users to be pseudo-permanently
“in touch”. The usage of these networks provides users benefits such as influencing
others, increasing their reputation, receiving support, getting brand offers, connecting
with a huge community, etc. These benefits may differ depending on the network type
and the user’s motivations. However, the flip side of using social networks is the loss of
privacy and the potential consequences of it.
According to Alan Westin, privacy is defined as “the claim of individuals, groups, or insti-
tutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated” [278]. However with the emergence of new technologies, new meanings
and broader categories of the term have emerged. These meanings/categories applied
to network domain are based on (i) a security approach that explores the architectures
(P2P vs. Client-Server) and communication protocols of the online social networks to
1https://www.statista.com/statistics/184541/typical-daily-online-activities-of-adult-internet-users/
2Over the course of this paper, when we use user and network concepts, we refer to OSN users and
OSNs, respectively.
3
1.1. MOTIVATION
protect users’ privacy from vulnerabilities and attacks [135, 199]; (ii) the users’ linkage
among different online social networks and how it affects their identity anonymity,
personal space privacy, and communications [135, 90, 199]; (iii) the social network
service providers policies towards the selling and/or sharing of users’ information to
other companies (e.g., third-party applications) [135, 199]; and (iv) the users’ privacy
behaviors towards other users and the privacy policies set via privacy mechanisms [90].
This thesis work is focused on the last privacy category which is related to the privacy
decision-making process (i.e., information disclosure and privacy policy choice).
In the OSN environments, any action that users perform stems from the need for get-
ting social benefit [118] and is always preceded by a privacy decision or a privacy ac-
ceptance that limits the potential costs/risks of the action. This constitutes the privacy
decision-making process, and users make these decisions in social networks millions
of times. Depending on the OSN site, different types of privacy mechanisms are pro-
vided to users to make privacy decisions. These privacy decisions differ in their type
and granularity, e.g., users of OSNs like Instagram manage their followers and decide
whether they want their profiles public or private; but others OSNs like Facebook al-
lows finer granularity with mechanisms to select groups, personalized access lists, or
evenmembers individually to grant or deny the access to the information for each post.
This variability among social networks may be a challenge for users. Furthermore, due
to the complexity of the privacy concept [231] and the number of factors to assess (e.g.,
the number of friends, the relationship type, the context of the information, etc.), users
have difficulty in assessing potential risks of disclosing information [5]. Therefore, they
tend to relax or restrict too much their decisions which finally end up with the post-
ing in a wide audience or the not posting, respectively. In turn, this is translated into
potential privacy risks or loss of benefits [270], respectively.
In recent years, privacy concerns have led to improved privacy mechanisms and poli-
cies in social networking services. Examples of these improvements can be found on
Facebook with the smart access lists and direct access to general privacy settings [238];
on Twitter with private profiles and the possibility of sharing information by directly
selecting the users who are going to receive it. Even so, privacy leaks continue to affect
users’ real lives [270]. For example, job layoffs due to comments or photos shared on
social networks; or the appearance of “stalkers”, people dedicated to spying on others
through social networks. This is because users might not able to understand the dif-
ferent mechanisms they have available to manage their privacy, nor they completely
understand the risks their actions have on privacy. There is still a long way to go to-
wards privacy mechanisms that fully protect users’ privacy and interests, and prevent
privacy leaks.
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Artificial intelligence techniques and feature extraction methods applied to social net-
works are powerful tools to enhance privacy mechanisms. Current research work ex-
tracts characteristics from social networks, user interactions, and user preferences to
develop all kinds of privacy tools, mechanisms, and metrics. Most approaches rely on
automation to calculate privacy policies aligned with user preferences, providing users
with privacy policy recommendations [86, 262, 34, 244]. However, the consideration
of using only the user’s preferences as a reference is not an appropriate approach. The
reason is that users make disclosure actions that then regret because they are not able
to evaluate all possible risk scenarios. As for other works that attempt to focus more
on preserving user privacy [49, 129, 178], these also produce a recommendation for the
user. The problem with both approaches is that the user remains unaware of the reason
for the solution provided, and it is he/she who has to finally accept the recommenda-
tion or not.
Research in business and economic studies has proved that an individual always as-
sesses the cost-benefit when facing a decision [210]. For avoiding the regret of the deci-
sion, an individual needs as perfect information as possible for properly assessing the
cost-benefit of the decision. Real experiments in online social networks have demon-
strated that individuals seldom have perfect information for deciding [5]. To address
the lack of users’ information, promising research lines are working on quantifying the
privacy risks and social benefits produced by these actions, and on designing user in-
terfaces (UIs) to present that information to users. However, the ways users interpret
a piece of information differs, and might be linked to cognitive limitations, so their de-
cisions underlie different biases. For example, the same issue can be expressed through
text or pictures resulting in different perceptions of the content among individuals.
Therefore, it is important how a piece of information, a message, or a set of choices is
presented to users [222].
The discussion above raises several questions that this research is intended to answer:
Q1. Are the current mechanisms/solutions in the privacy decision-making process
good enough for users to make privacy decisions that represent their wishes and
do not cause regrets?
Q2. Which additional requirements should meet the next generation of privacy
mechanisms to ensure the improvement of users’ decisions?
Q3. How can be measured and quantified the privacy risks that a user’s action in
online social networks can cause?
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Q4. Which features empower the users’ scope in a social network and how these im-
pact on the privacy of users?
Q5. Which types of information are most sensitive than others and how can be quan-
tified the information sensitivity of a social media publication?
Q6. Which is the user’s trade-off between cost and benefits when face perfectly in-
formed privacy decisions in social networks?
Q7. What are the best UIs for the privacy decision domain in social networks and
how information should be introduced to users for not limiting their decisions?
Q8. What will be the effects of these explainable mechanisms on users’ privacy deci-
sions in a real environment?
For this reason, we plan this thesis work in the way of improving the metrics to esti-
mate privacy risks, compute privacy solutions, and provide users with understandable
explanations before making privacy decisions.
This work is also motivated by the research lines of the Valencian Research Institute
in Artificial Intelligence (VRAIN), where the Ph.D. student works. Among other areas
of AI, the institute is interested in online social networks, users’ behaviors and inter-
actions, users’ privacy protection, the mining of social information, and the develop-
ment of privacy mechanisms. This thesis work is being developed in the context of
the following national research projects: PESEDIA (TIN2014-55206-R), and AI4PRI
(TIN2017-89156-R).The PESEDIA project proposes algorithms andmetrics for analyz-
ing privacy risks in social networks, and a rapid transfer of the results for customizing
privacy mechanisms, and proactively training people on the value of their privacy. In
the framework of this project and my Master’s thesis [15], the social network proto-
type called PESEDIA was implemented. The outcomes of the PESEDIA project and this
Ph.D. thesis work were materialized in the social network PESEDIA. The second project,
AI4PRI, is intended to the inference of social norms, emotions, and arguments, for de-
veloping a multi-agent system integrated into the social network PESEDIA with which
to improve the control of the user’s privacy. Both projects are aimed at the vulnerable
group of young people who are initiating in social networks and have limited abilities
for self-regulation and complex decision-making.
6
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.2 Objectives
This thesis proposes the design and use of privacy mechanisms that besides considering
the users’ preferences, also considers the users’ privacy-preserving approach and the
informed assistance during users’ privacy decisions. By considering the users’ privacy-
preserving approach, we try to quantify the amount of users’ personal information
that is overexposed in social networks and it is not making a significant benefit for the
owner user. By considering the explainability of privacy decisions, we try to educate
users in a well-informed way about the potential privacy risks of their decisions. The
final goal of this thesis is to improve the current privacy mechanisms of online social
networks for users could choose better privacy policies and reduce the regrets of their
actions. Therefore, this thesis proposes the following objectives detailed below:
• Review of the whole privacy decision-making process in online social networks
and the current privacy mechanisms in order to identify advantages and lacks
in previous approaches.
• Specification of a list of requirements that a privacy decision mechanism and
its solutions would have to meet in order to address the current problems and
reduce the regrets of users’ actions.
• Research into users’ overexposure to social networks and the perception of their
actions to compute users’ privacy risk metrics.
• Development of privacy metrics that assess the risk of re-sharing information in
social networks, taking into account the visibility and importance of users in the
network.
• Development of privacy metrics that assess the sensitivity of users’ information
in social networks, taking into account other approaches and the specificity of
the OSN domain.
• Development of a researchmodel to understand the user’s trade-off between ben-
efit and cost, and his/her choice of the different elements of online communica-
tion during disclosing decisions.
• Development of explainable privacy mechanisms that take into account those
privacy metrics to show users the potential effects of their decisions and educate
them on privacy.
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• Validation of the developed privacy mechanisms, the effect on users’ privacy be-
haviors, and the users’ acquisition of conscientiousness via well-informed mech-
anisms.
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
Considering the motivation and objectives of this thesis, the rest of the document is
structured as follows:
• Part I. Introduction and Objectives: In this part, the motivation and objectives
of this thesis, as well as the structure of the document are presented. Moreover,
this chapter also stresses the projects that supported the research of this thesis
work and all the contributions that were produced in the context of it.
• Part II. Selected Papers: This part presents a selection of the most representative
articles supporting this thesis objectives (set in Section 1.2) which were published
in conferences and journals.
Chapter 2 (under review state in the ACMComputing Surveys journal) presents
in detail the current problems of users’ privacy from the perspective of the pri-
vacy decision-making process in the social network domain. The paper identi-
fies from those problems a list of requirements that privacy mechanisms have to
meet in order to reduce users’ privacy problems and potential regrets. From the
requirements, we make a review of current advances from OSN providers and
researchers in privacy mechanisms and we highlight the open challenges that
could improve users’ decisions.
Chapter 3 (previously published in [11]) proposes a privacy metric for assessing
the privacy risk score that a user of a social network has. The metric is based on
epidemic models to estimate the user’s risk of reaching other users. This paper
takes information from network centrality properties (closeness, betweenness,
etc.) and previous information flows (usually emerged from intimacy among
users, time spent on the network, etc.). In this regard, we test the validity of
approximating the privacy risk scoremetric with centralitymetrics. This privacy
metric differs from other proposals because takes into account the daily users’
activity (dynamic metric) instead of the profile items (static metric).
Chapter 4 (previously published in [13]) proposes an extension of the privacy
metric with new metrics that estimate the depth and width of users’ dissemina-
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tion power. In this case, these metrics can be adapted to users’ privacy concerns
and perceptions.
Chapter 5 (previously published in [14]) details the review of all the tries to com-
pute/quantify the sensitivity value of information, especially personal informa-
tion. In this work, the inclusion of information sensitivity from the social net-
work approach is also discussed, which is related to users’ reputation. As a result,
a sensitivity metric is proposed that it is the mean of all other approach proposal
values. The paper also includes a study of the empowerment of users and the ef-
fects on privacy decisions by knowing the sensitivity value of their publications
during those decisions.
Chapter 6 (under review state in the Internet Research journal) proposes a re-
search model of users’ cost-benefit trade-off for disclosure actions in social net-
works. This research work evaluates the relationships between the elements of
online communication (especially the channel, the message, and the receptor),
the personal information disclosure, and the privacy trade-off in the social net-
work context. As a result, our model is able to explain a considerable percentage
of the relationship between the considered factors during users’ information dis-
closure action.
Chapter 7 (previously published in [12]) presents different kinds of privacymech-
anisms based on soft-paternalistic mechanisms (i.e., nudges) that inform users
about the potential consequences of their privacy decisions. In this work, the pri-
vacy mechanisms are developed and integrated into the social network PESEDIA
and are finally tested in a study with real users. The study is carried out during a
one-month course about social networks where users had complete access (24/7)
to the social network PESEDIA to interact among them. The study validates the
significant effect of customized nudge mechanisms on users’ behavior.
Chapter 8 (under review state in the IEEE Transactions on Learning Technolo-
gies journal) presents the advantages of integrating gamification elements in a
social network in order to educate on social networks and raise awareness of
users regarding their privacy. In this work, two configurations (with and with-
out gamification) of the social network PESEDIA are tested with 387 teenage par-
ticipants for one month. The comparison of both configurations highlights the
advantages of applying gamification in the users’ common activity in networks,
empowering their capacity to make privacy decisions.
• Part III. Discussion: This part presents a final review and discussion of published
work and results, as well as future directions for further research.
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Abstract
Personal information contained in online social networks (OSNs) is governed by the
privacy policies chosen by their owners (i.e., the uploader users) besides the policy
statement from the OSN providers. Users make these privacy decisions using pri-
vacy mechanisms but regrets and privacy problems are being documented from the
beginning of users’ usage to the present days. This paper investigates and reviews cur-
rent privacy mechanisms and solutions. For this purpose, we deconstruct the whole
privacy decision-making process into the different elements of online communication.
We identify potential requirements by analyzing the regrets and privacy problems re-
lated to those communication elements and their factors, and we compare them with
the current advances. This study is a revision of the OSN privacy from the user’s deci-
sion approach that presents the current advances made and provides research lines for
trying to improve them.
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2.1 Introduction
Online social networks (OSNs) have become a mainstream cultural phenomenon for
millions of Internet users, being its usage one of the most popular1. There are different
types of online social networks (e.g., professionals, dating, focused on instant messag-
ing, based on video content, etc.), but they all have a common set of properties that
allow users to interact with others. Users2 normally have a (self-constructed) profile
that represents their self-presentation to others and communication mechanisms that
enable users to be pseudo-permanently “in touch”. The usage of these networks pro-
vides users benefits such as influencing others, increasing their reputation, receiving
support, getting brand offers, connecting with a huge community, etc. These benefits
may differ depending on the network type and the user’s motivations. However, the
flip side of using social networks is the loss of privacy and the potential consequences
of it. Therefore, the suitable usage of social networks is the one that balances the user’s
social benefits with the potential risks.
Privacy problems associatedwith digital communication and network technologies are
constantly reported [290]. In online social networks, each action users do represents a
personal action due to can be linked to personal data3 (from fulfilling a profile field
or sharing a new photo to joining a group or liking a publication). All these actions
have a visibility/access component on the network that, in some aspect, is decided by
users via a privacy policy4. It is here where privacy issues may appear and might be
translated into regrets and real consequences for users [270, 88]. Those privacy policy
choices are made using a privacy mechanism, which is a tool with some kind of user
interface where users choose or accept a privacy policy.
AlanWestin defined privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine
for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated” [278].
Even so, in the online social network domain, there are broad categories for the pri-
vacy concept. These categories are based on (i) a security approach that explores the
architectures (P2P vs. Client-Server) and communication protocols of the online social
1https://www.statista.com/statistics/184541/typical-daily-online-activities-of-adult-internet-users-
in-the-us/
2Over the course of this paper, when we use user and network concepts, we refer to OSN users and
OSNs, respectively.
3Personal data is information that can be linked directly or indirectly to an individual and can specif-
ically identify him/her.
4A privacy policy is a statement or a legal document (in privacy law) that discloses some or all of the
ways a party gathers, uses, discloses, and manages a user’s data. It fulfills a legal requirement to protect
a user’s privacy.
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networks to protect users’ privacy from vulnerabilities and attacks [135, 199]; (ii) the
users’ linkage among different online social networks and how it affects their identity
anonymity, personal space privacy, and communications [135, 90, 199]; (iii) the social
network service providers policies towards the selling and/or sharing of users’ infor-
mation to other companies (e.g., third-party applications) [135, 199]; and (iv) the users’
privacy behaviors towards other users and the privacy policies [90]. In this article, we
focus on the last privacy category which is related to the privacy decision-making pro-
cess (i.e., information disclosure and privacy policy choice). Our review work differs
from others [32, 135, 90, 199, 266] because it takes notice of all the decisions that users
make during the whole privacy decision-making process and reviews the mechanisms
proposed in the literature to aid users to make these decisions. As a consequence, this
article produces the following contributions: (i) a detailed description of all the de-
cisions that users make during the whole privacy decision-making process in online
social networks; (ii) a representation of the potential problems arising from each of
the decisions of the online communication elements; (iii) the identification of a set of
essential requirements for the design of privacy mechanisms to address these potential
problems; (iv) a review of the current advances on privacymechanisms; and, finally, (v)
a discussion of the open challenges in designing and implementing privacymechanisms
and some tips for addressing them.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the complex-
ity and problems of users’ privacy policy decisions, remarking the factors that produce
those problems and providing a series of possible requirements for the design of future
privacymechanisms. Section 2.3 reviews the current advancesmade in each of those re-
quirements. Section 2.4 discusses the future lines to deal with the open issues detected.
Finally, Section 2.5 presents some concluding remarks.
2.2 Privacy decision-making process
Any action that users perform in a social network environment stems from the need for
getting social benefit [118] and is always preceded by a privacy decision that limits the
potential costs/risks of the action. These privacy decisions are classified into two kinds:
1) the acceptance of a predefined privacy policy or 2) the choice of a specific privacy
policy. For the case of the first kind of privacy decisions, the acceptance of predefined
privacy policies, some of these are established in the general privacy policy statement
by the OSN service provider (e.g., the profile picture on Facebook that is compulso-
rily public nature). By joining a social network site, users have to accept the general
privacy policy statement and they face their first decision by providing their personal
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information and accepting the predefined privacy policy for these data. Once their
social account is created, they have several privacy decisions on their privacy settings
that variate among the different social networks. Privacy options not included in the
privacy settings, like possibly the visibility of mentions or tags, are part of the prede-
fined privacy policies of the social network. We can find them in the general privacy
policy statement or sometimes are summarized on informational pages provided by the
OSN service providers (e.g., Facebook Help Centre5, and Instagram Help Centre6). In
other cases depend on the privacy decision made by other users. For example, when a
user comments on another user’s posts on Facebook or Instagram, the commenter user
is accepting the privacy policy that the other user chose for the post. Depending on the
social network, the number of predefined privacy policies changes, so users can make
more or fewer privacy decisions. In all of these cases, if the user wants to complete the
action, he/she is required to accept these conditions. It is usual that users accept them
either by ignorance/unconsciousness (i.e., a lack of knowledge about these predefined
privacy policies) or by unconcern (i.e., they do not think about the consequences). For
the case of the second kind of privacy decisions, that are the rest of the actions in social
networks, these actions require the users’ choice of a privacy policy via privacy mecha-
nisms for the content that they share. Independently of the privacy decision type, both
cases have the same elements as traditional communication: a transmitter (the user),
a message (the publication), a channel (the social network), a receiver (the audience),
and feedback (likes, comments, etc.). It has been proved in business and economic
studies that an individual always assesses the cost-benefit when facing a decision [210].
For avoiding the regret of the decision, the individual should have as perfect informa-
tion as possible for properly assessing the cost-benefit of the decision. So, the privacy
choice should consider the influence of the online communication elements in the es-
timation of cost-benefit. In addition, this cost-benefit should be aligned with the user
goals or intentions (i.e., reach as many users as possible, share information only with
trusted users, etc.). However, users do not have perfect information and/or a full un-
derstanding of all the possible risks [5]. Next, we introduce an example of a scenario to
illustrate the problematics and complexity of privacy decisions. Figure 2.1 depicts the
whole privacy decision-making process map of a user split by the individual decisions
of communication elements, the problems raised from these choices, and the factors of
the elements that are involved.
Step 0: Desire to share something. “Bob wants to share a piece of information (e.g., an
opinion about some topic, a lived experience, etc.) for getting a social benefit. Users’ benefits
5https://www.facebook.com/help/
6https://help.instagram.com/
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are diverse and may be motivated by influencing others, increasing their reputation, receiving
support, getting brand offers, connecting with a huge community, etc.”
The transmitter-user, who owns and decides to share the message, is who retains full
responsibility for his/her actions in the OSN, even if multiple users own it. The risks are
usually generated by his/her wrong decisions in choosing the other communication el-
ements. The personality of the transmitter, his/her grade of concern about privacy issues,
and his/her motivation for using social networks [248] are the basis for understanding
the relationship with the other elements towards the assessment of the cost-benefit re-
lationship. For example, people with a high value of openness are positively correlated
with the number of users’ likes, group associations, status updates, and they express
emotions more frequently. However, they are negatively correlated with dense social
networks (i.e., they tend to have friends who are more disperse socially) [19]. That is be-
cause their benefit is related to these kinds of actions. Conversely, there are users that
are more aware of and thus more jealousy about their privacy. Therefore, they prefer
to disclose their information only with close friends or, as other research works state,
they do not disclose it because they are jealous of their privacy and they do not trust
privacy mechanisms [240, 216]. The other factor of the transmitter is his/her usage mo-
tivation. It has been detected several usage motivations on social networks (enjoyment,
self-presentation, relationship building, keep up with people and news) [151]. Depend-
ing on the transmitter’s motivation, some actions could reportmore or less cost/benefit.
So, it is important to consider all of these aspects of the transmitter or be able to re-
member them to the transmitter for avoiding possible future regrets of his/her privacy
decisions.
Step 1: Choose a channel. “Followed by Bob’s desire for social disclosing. The first decision
Bob has to make is choosing the channel.”
The channel is the environment where the information is going to be transmitted (see
Figure 2.1, step-1 column). In this work domain, it refers to an online social network
but also the communication way within the network, i.e., a user’s wall publication, a
story, a direct message, etc. The choice of this element is mainly motivated by popu-
larity (i.e., if Bob’s friends are in the social network) and trust (i.e., Bob’s trust towards
the social network) [151]. A nice indicator of a social network’s popularity may are
the number of active users that use it, or from the users’ perspective, the number of
their friends and acquaintances that are on it. Regarding trust on a social network, it
usually involves behaviors such as protection and usage that the social network does
towards users’ information (i.e., their privacy). Privacy risks such as unauthorized ac-
cess [207] are caused by vulnerabilities in the social network and/or by human errors
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Figure 2.1: Privacy decision-making by steps, highlighting the involved communication elements, their
factors, and their potential privacy risks.
of the social network provider. Others are related to the treatment of personal data
and how third-party companies have access to them [159]. However, the only indica-
tors of social network mistrust are the news about information leakages, attacks, or
company bad behaviors, and not all this information reaches common users. To rem-
edy this situation, user-friendly metrics should be developed that objectively evaluate
the behavior of social network providers. Even so, as we stated in Section 2.1, this ar-
ticle does not focus on analyzing privacy aspects that involve privacy and security of
systems, so we assume that channel decision is already made and we just consider the
users’ perceptions toward the social network. For example, trust as an indicator of us-
age. The higher the user’s trust in the social network, the higher the user’s participation
and engagement to the social network [151].
Step 2: Compose the message. “Once the channel is decided, Bob has to choose the specific
piece of information to disclose. This piece of information may be personal information (in several
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ways and sensitivity grades) and it can be related to Bob; or related to other users, which makes
the privacy decision harder. In addition, Bob has to give it a format (text or graphics) to compose
the final message that will be shared (i.e., a social network post).”
The message is an important and (in turn) complex element in online communica-
tion (see Figure 2.1, step-2 column). The message may contain sensitive information
and that information usually remains permanently online until the owner decides to
delete it. Generally, this information refers to personal data about the transmitter and
sometimes about other users (co-ownership), e.g., in party photos or group selfies, which
increases the complexity of sensitivity estimation. Other users could have different
perceptions of their privacy or other goal motivations, so the trade-off between social
benefits and privacy costs have to be made and combined with all users involved. Fur-
thermore, the sensitivity of a piece of information has, for some kind of information,
an ambiguous value and depends on the user’s interpretations and socio-cultural fac-
tors [221]. For example, religion is highly sensitive in areas where there is a high degree
of sectarian conflict. Most of the privacy risks and privacy regretted decisions are re-
lated to the sensitivity of the message or to the context associated with the information
[270, 88]. When users share too much information about themselves to others or the
information is too sensitive, there is a risk of privacy loss with potential consequences
for users as relationship breakouts, bad reputation, loss of job/educational opportuni-
ties, etc. Other risks available online associated with the information contained in the
message are potentially related to stalking [170], identity theft [33], and the misuse of
personal information [104]. All of these risks could be reduced with a lower exposition
in social networks (i.e., reducing the details about the information disclosed).
Moreover, the persistence of information over time is another remarkable factor. Gen-
erally uploaded information is online indefinably and that can cause privacy issues
because users forget their items with time and later new relationships could have access
to them. It has been shown that posting old memories in social networks has gener-
ated privacy conflicts [242]. Fading privacy policies, i.e., reducing the final audience
or even hiding the content completely (only accessible for the owner) could be a good
alternative. In fact, a newway of disclosing information has raised in popularity in the
last years in all the social network services, the Stories. Stories are effectively another
news feed, but one that relies on visual rather than written information. Once posted,
a story stays viewable for 24 hours, which allows users to break the idea of posting only
perfect information. After that, the story disappears.
Step 3: Choose the receivers. “At the time Bob is going to disclose the post, the social network
requests Bob to choose a privacy policy using the social network privacy mechanism. Most com-
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mon and used privacy mechanisms are based on social circles with the following options: Public,
Friends, Specific friends/lists, and Only me. In this step, Bob’s decision will be about the receiver
users who will have access to the Bob’s message.”
In this case, the receiver is another important and complex element in social networks
due to online communication usually is directed to multiple receiver-users (see Figure
2.1, step-3 column). Decidingwhich privacy policy to set up for amessage implies decid-
ing which receivers will have access to the publication in social networks. Nowadays,
social network users manage a huge number of user’s relationships. On Facebook, the
average number of friends is 3387. According to Dunbar’s theory [78], an individual is
cognitively able tomanage a limited number of people with whom he/she canmaintain
stable social relationships. Dunbar proposed a number of 150 stable relationships. This
huge difference between real facts and the user’s cognitive possibility may be a cause
of privacy problems. Moreover, relationships might be of different nature and strength.
Dunbar proposed an explanation for this difference with a relationship hierarchy of
concentric groups (based on the strength tie): relations that exceed the 150 stable re-
lationships refer to acquaintances or unknown people; the group formed by the 150
refers to the tribe of the individual (casual friends); around 50 of these are identified
as the individual’s clan, people the individual would consider his/her close friends; the
following 15 refers to very good friends and family with whom the individual might
spend his/her free time; while the first 5 refers to the best and more intimate relations.
Regarding the receiver-users, once they interact with the others’ messages, they give
them visibility. The scope of a receiver-user might extend too much the information
of the transmitter (especially due to re-sharing actions), losing the transmitter’s pri-
vacy and/or reaching an unexpected audience. To have influencing characteristics—
whether personal attributes like credibility, expertise, or enthusiasm, or network at-
tributes such as connectivity or centrality—are advantages in the information dissem-
ination process [11]. Influential users can initiate and conduct the dissemination of a
sharing action more efficiently than “normal” users [20]. Therefore, influential users
in networks are normally more responsible for large cascades of information diffusion
and contribute to increasing the privacy risk. Even so, the transmitter has to assess the
privacy decision for each receiver-user in his/her list of contacts and for each message
he/she decides to disclose on the social network. That requires matching the factors re-
garding the receiver such as their relationship and the receiver’s actions scope/visibility
with the factors regarding the message such as sensitivity, ownership of the informa-
tion, and persistence. Bad matches of receivers and messages could facilitate privacy
issues as exposed above (stalking, identity theft, and misuse of personal information).
7https://www.brandwatch.com/blog/facebook-statistics/
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This is a very hard and heavy task for social network users because of the number of
required assessments and their complexity.
Another aspect of deciding the receivers of a publication is related to the privacymech-
anisms provided by most of social networks. They are based on social circles and con-
texts concepts for determining the audience, i.e., which users will receive (have access
to) the owner’s post (Bob in our case). The borderline that defines and isolates them
is more clear in offline communications than in online communications. Due to the
excessive simplification of privacy mechanisms of social networks, these mechanisms
have biases that generate that users usually have only one social circle (Friends on Face-
book, Followers on Instagram, etc.). These social circles are predefined by the social
network (via user acceptance of relationship connection), are created by users that se-
lected each of their members, or are automatically generated by relationship-inferring
techniques [181, 165] (Facebook Smart Lists8). The most common biases of privacy
mechanisms of nowadays social networks are the context collapse and the imagined au-
dience. The context collapse is produced by the default social circles provided by social
networks [68]. Examples of these social circles are the “followers” audiences on Insta-
gram, the “friends” social circle on Facebook, and the “followers” (users) on Twitter,
where users from family, work, and friendship contexts (even unknown users) are in-
side them. The context collapse occurs when different social groups with their own rules
and routines of information merge with each other in a default group. A potential
example of this problem is when a user decides to share a picture on social networks
of her/him-self on a party smoking or drinking some alcoholic beverage and uses a
default social circle. This picture might be potentially accessible by the user’s family,
coworkers, acquaintances, friends inside the party context, and other friends outside
to the party context. This scenario may generate the following risks: legal risks, in the
case that the user does not have enough age for alcohol consumption; family issues, in
the case that his/her family do not accept the user smoke habit; relationship break-
ing, in the case that a friend was not invited to the party; etc. An opposite example
of this problem is that users known the context collapse bias and they share nothing to
avoid potential risks, losing also the opportunity of making benefits. Therefore, if users
would have biases-free privacymechanisms, they couldmakemore suitable privacy de-
cisions. Another bias produced is known as invisible audience or imagined audience [31].
This bias is slightly related to context collapse. It refers to the audience the user is not
aware of, or the user did not know they could see his/her publications [176]. Previous
works have shown that users are not capable to remember or identify all their social
network friends [65], and they think that the privacy policy chosen for sharing an item
8https://www.facebook.com/help/153715971383754?helpref=faq_content
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matches their desired audience (imagined). However, the imagined audience does not
actually fit with the privacy policy chosen, and other undesired users are included in
it. Moreover, prior work has shown that privacy mechanisms are often difficult to un-
derstand and use, and users do not have full knowledge and enough time to evaluate
all potential scenarios [5].
Step 4: Assess feedback. “Once Bob made the privacy decision, he starts to receive feedback
from other users in the form of likes, comments, supports, or regrets if someone does not agree
with Bob’s post or Bob has violated another’s privacy.”
The feedback/responses received by the transmitter’s contacts is an element to take into
account because it provides real facts about the social benefits and/or privacy risks of
the transmitter’s decisions made (see Figure 2.1, step-4 column). Nowadays, social net-
works provide more facilities to express positive feedback and support to others than to
express negative feedback or conflicts among them. In addition, users avoid expressing
these negative feelings until there are serious conflicts [270]. Therefore, some content
could have a cost for the users andmight not be detected by current social network indi-
cators. New indicators for estimating the effect of a message in a social network could
help users to balance the cost-benefit trade-off offering them more complete informa-
tion about the privacy decision-making process. These indicators could be estimated
from previous actions on social networks as indicators of potential benefits or costs.
Furthermore, these indicators could also provide to the users’ privacy decisions greater
explainability of their adequacy to users’ interests.
Repetition. “Bob repeats this cycle each time he wants to interact in social networks.”
A recent report about social media9 (2019) shows that users generate a huge amount of
traffic of personal data, around 18 millions of text posts and 2 millions of media posts
per minute. Therefore, users are confronted a lot of times per day with the privacy
decision-making process without having perfect information or understanding fully
all the possible risks of their decisions. Additionally, privacy is a complex and messy
concept for social network users due to all the involved factors [231]. Most of users
perceive the privacy risks as being abstract and psychologically distant, and more re-
lated to the distant future. For these decisions regarding privacy, the social network
services do not provide any support for them, which produces users to put privacy in
the background. Whether social network providers facilitate users with clear and un-
9https://www.statista.com/statistics/195140/new-user-generated-content-uploaded-by-users-per-
minute/
24
CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF PRIVACY MECHANISMS FOR SOCIAL NETWORK
SERVICES
derstandable information about privacy, users could better make their decisions about
privacy. Social network providers have tools for identifying others on pictures, sensi-
tive content onmessages such as nude photos, offensive text but they do not use them to
aid on users’ decisions, they just use them for banning specific content. An interesting
(and maybe needed) point of view might be the combination of metrics and human-
computer interfaces to depict and thus complete the information needed for users to
make a non-regrettable decision regarding privacy. This could be particularly inter-
esting for vulnerable or novice/amateur users such as teenagers who are initiating in
their usage and have limited abilities for self-regulation and complex decision-making
[10]. Furthermore, research works such as [179] have shown that most of the time users
regret a message seconds later of sharing it (immediately or later during the conversa-
tion). Therefore, the information provided could give users enough time to reflect on
the privacy decision.
From the whole privacy decision-making process in online social networks, we have
summarized in Table 2.1 for each of the above steps all the potential problems includ-
ing the relationship of identified factors that raise them and the expected requirements
that should be addressed by privacy mechanisms. We refer factors as the properties of
the online communication elements that in some way promote and/or are responsible
to produce the problems and regrets of users’ privacy decision-making. Regarding re-
quirements, we refer them as the properties that privacy mechanisms and privacy pol-
icy solutions should be fulfilled to reduce and/or minimize the problems and regrets of
online social network users.
2.3 Advances on privacy mechanisms
This section reviews the most relevant privacy models proposed for online social net-
works. In each subsection, we focus on one of the above identified requirements (see
Table 2.1) to introduce the advances made by previous works.
2.3.1 Preferences-centered requirement
Each time users share a photo, comment on a post, give like to some content, inter-
act with another user, etc. they do it by their interests [151]. These interests variate
in a wide range (self-presentation, maintaining a relationship, building new relation-
ships, influencing others, reputation, enjoyment, etc.) and a huge number of factors
could be involved in a permit/denial action for a user and a specific piece of infor-
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Step Problematics Factor → Requirement
#0 Differences on users’ moti-
vations
Transmitter’s motiva-
tion
→ Preferences-centered
#1 Unauthorized access Channel’s behavior → (out of the work scope)
#2 Privacy loss, Stalking,
Identity theft,
Relationship breakout
Message sensitivity → Sensitivity inferring
Message co-ownership → Multi-user privacy
Message persistence → Message-fading
#3 Stalking, Identity theft,
Context collapse,
Imagined audience, Misuse
of personal information
Rel. nature & strength → Relationship inferring
Receptor’s scope → Scope inferring
Audience biases → Fine-grained
#4 Lack of negative indicators Feedback biases → Privacy risk inferring
Rep. Complexity of privacy
decisions, Differences on
users’ perceptions,
Non-privacy-expert users,
High repetition
Transmitter’s burden → Automation
Transmitter’s privacy → Privacy-preserving
Transmitter’s under-
standing
→ Explainable
Table 2.1: Summary of the requirements identified in the privacy decision-making process considering
the factors of the communication elements and reported problematics.
mation. This information is collected or estimated by some research works as users’
preferences. There is no consensed way to collect this kind of information. Some works
such as the Yang et al. [288] work uses the users’ preferences as a weighted parameter
of their model that customizes the utility function calculation. There is no information
about how these preferences are defined or estimated. They use them to balance the
users’ perception of their social benefits and privacy concerns. However, other research
works (as those based on rule-systems [49, 147]) consider the knowledge and the derived
rules as the users’ preferences. Another way of representing the users’ preferences is by
assessing personal features like the stubbornness and the comfort of users when shar-
ing information to negotiate a privacy policy as in the case of Rajtmajer et al. [212]
work. However, there is not a comparative work that tested which users’ character-
istics better represent their preferences or the effect they have on users’ information
disclosure.
Finally, other research works like [93, 241] use the social circles/privacy groups of tra-
ditional privacymechanisms as users’ preferences (i.e., Private, Friends, Friends of Friends,
or Public). This perspective allows their metrics to be more precise because they mini-
mally modify users’ privacy decisions. Despite that, the privacy mechanisms that pro-
vide recommendations do not consider adaptative or agreed-on results with the user.
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They just present the solution to users who finally accept or reject it. These solutions are
mostly based on a computed recommendation that maximizes the user’s social utilities.
However, as Hu et al. [117] state, these proposals may not always work well in prac-
tice, as they do not capture the social idiosyncrasies considered by users in the real-life
and users’ behavior is far from perfectly rational as these game-theoretic approaches
assume. We only found in the literature the work of Fogues et al. [94] where they con-
sider several iterations for the recommendation. In each iteration, new features are
taken into account to improve the current and future recommendations but this sce-
nario is just considered for multi-party decisions and users only can accept or reject
the recommendation (they do not propose). It could be interesting that privacymecha-
nisms could not only recommend, but also adapt the recommendation to specific user
demands via user’s proposals. Moreover, by providing indicators and explainability
about privacy solutions, users will have more sense of this agreed-on solution.
2.3.2 Sensitivity inferring requirement
Privacy issues emerge mainly by disclosing personal information. The identification
of the individual is a strong requirement to talk about personal information, without
his/her identification, it is more difficult to link that information to a physical person.
However, the identification is possible with some specific anonymized personal infor-
mation [188], so, any information is still valuable if it is linked to other information
and it is possible to deduce or extract new data. In the online social network domain,
identification is usually a common feature because it maximizes the benefits that social
networks provide (communication, support, self-presentation, influence, etc.). There,
users become identifiable by sharing their real names and photographs. Until recently,
social network services did not put too much interest in developing message sensitivity
inferring mechanisms for users. Social networks developed tools for detecting offensive
or sexual content, but they just used them for banning specific content. These tools are
mainly internal and are not available to users. In the case of Flickr, the popular so-
cial network for photo sharing, users have the possibility of tagging their content and
define different privacy policies based on these tags, but no one intelligent mechanism
is provided to them to protect their personal information. In the last year, only In-
stagram introduced an advisor tool10 for preventing content that can support bullying
activities.
With the new features of data mining and the interest in social networks and privacy,
10https://instagram-press.com/blog/2019/07/08/our-commitment-to-lead-the-fight-against-online-
bullying/
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new (and still scarce) approaches on feature extraction have been applied to analyze
the sensitivity of users generated content. Some of these approaches estimate the emo-
tions or stress that produces the shared content to determine its sensitivity, while more
interesting ones (we will focus on them) distinguish personal from non-personal in-
formation. All of these works converge to a clear premise: not all of the personal
information has the same value. Legislation such as the GDPR11, NIST12, or UKAN13
(which emerged from the need to protect users’ data) distinguishes different levels of
data sensitivity. Companies that buy, sell, and exchange users’ data as an economic
resource also consider different values for data based on the kind of information pro-
vided and whether they can link it to other data [172]. Companies have included data
as part of their business model in a data-driven economy. However, all the attempts to
estimate a sensitivity value of information (by companies, researchers, and legislators)
had the next issues. On the one hand, there is no agreement about the sensitivity value
that each piece of information has. Furthermore, new questions arise such as which
value has a piece of information if it is linked to another piece? or how should be ex-
pressed this value of sensitivity? On the other hand, users are not completely aware
of the value or sensitivity of their data. Moreover, they have different perceptions of
sensitivity for their personal data depending on socio-cultural factors [221]. For this
reason, most works request the sensitivity of data as an input of their models, while a
few works make simple approximations of the sensitivity value of data for automati-
cally recommend privacy policies or for warning users about the information they are
going to share.
We have reviewed relevant works that made some advances in this field, highlight-
ing their strengths and weaknesses. Table 2.2 summarizes these works based on the
techniques used to infer the sensitivity of the information and the properties of the
sensitivity value solutions. Misra and Such [182, 183] built an agent for recommending
personalized access controls in single andmulti-party privacy conflicts considering the
content of a publication to make a privacy decision. In these works, they highlight the
difficulty of the content analysis automation due to is still far in terms of accuracy. For
this reason, they use user-generated tags about their content (which reveal topics and
contexts about information). The authors’ agent uses them to deny or allow access for
each potential information receiver. The approach adopted by the authors is similar
to Flickr, where the popular social network for photo sharing employs users to classify
their pictures according to their type. The authors’ work could be able to sometimes
deduce sensitive information and allow access only to trusty users if this were the reg-
11European General Data Protection Regulation
12National Institute of Standards and Technology
13UK Anonymisation Network
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Research works
[182, 183] [261] [50] [120, 263] [291]
Sensitivity inferring way
- user’s intervention 3
- ML techniques 3 3 3 3
- information content 3
- text analysis 3 3
- image analysis 3
Sensitivity properties
- binary value 3 3 3
- categories 3 3 3
- continuous value 3
Table 2.2: A comparison of research works focused on the detection of personal information and its
sensitivity, remarking the detection technique and the properties of the computed solution.
ular user’s behavior. However, this perspective lacks personal information detection
and cannot always protect users’ privacy.
There are other works that useMachine Learning (ML) text categorization techniques to
detect sensitive content. For instance, Vanetti et al. [261] propose an automatic gener-
ated rule system that analyzes the shared textual information to filter wall messages.
They automatically assign categories of personal information for each publication.
Specifically, they distinguish between personal and non-personal information. In ad-
dition, for the personal information, the authors distinguish violence, vulgar, offensive,
hate, and sex categories. The accuracy of their classifiers makes their system a reliable
one. Therefore, using these categories plus relationship information among user’s con-
tacts improves the protection of the user’s privacy in social networks. However, their
categories are not enough wider, so, users could share highly sensitive information such
as his/her health condition, credit card number or passport number without any re-
sponse of the system. Another example is from Caliskan et al. [50], they developed a
more complex and wider textual detector of personal information also based on ML
techniques. They combine topic modeling, named entity recognition, privacy ontol-
ogy, sentiment analysis, and text normalization to represent privacy features. In this
way, they are able to detect a wide range of categories and information topics that
they finally converge to the following 9 categories: location, medical, drug/alcohol,
emotion, personal attacks, stereotyping, family/association details, personal details,
personally identifiable information, and neutral/objective. Moreover, they make one
more distinction in these categories distinguishing between self or other users related
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information. The detector was used to provide privacy scores about social network
users comparing the proportion of personal messages with the total of their posted
messages. This promising application only was used (to the best of our knowledge) to
depict their users’ population, while it could be easily extended for advising users about
the sensitivity of their publications or for recommending privacy policies that balance
privacy risks and social benefits. Furthermore, a distinction of sensitivity values for
these categories could be done. Weights could be used to assess better the privacy risks
for disclosing this kind of information. Still, their work can be continued because they
released their software and ML models to the community without restrictions.
Information Content (IC) theory, which measures the inverse of the appearance prob-
ability of a term in a corpus, has been also used to distinguish between general and
specific terms. This idea was used in [120, 263] to propose a system for automatic se-
mantic annotation by using knowledge bases and linguistic tools. Their system is able
to make distinctions between values of the sensitivity of the information. The premise
of this theory is that most general terms appear more times than specific ones and, in
turn, these have less sensitivity value. A simple example is the disease term, this term
provides a less informative value than a specific disease like cancer and, in turn, than
a specific type of cancer like the carcinoma. Despite the specificity that this approach
provides in terms of sensitivity assessment, it lacks weighted categories (as the previ-
ous work [50]) that specify the maximum and minimum sensitivity value for this kind
of information. Besides, another problem emerges because this approach requires a
“perfect” textual corpus, that means an updated, free of biases, and balanced corpus.
Taking into account the popularity of multimedia content generated in social net-
works, the analysis of sensitivity has been also applied to images. Yu et al. [291] ad-
dress the privacy protection of this kind of content via the analysis of images. Using
deep multi-task learning techniques, they detect the underlying privacy-sensitive ob-
jects to applying a blurring filter to them. This work considers any object in an image
and then classifies the objects in categories where finally distinguishes between sen-
sitive and non-sensitive objects. Even so, it needs a strong support of which objects
have more sensitivity value than others and a formal definition of other factors related
to the privacy decision-making process (e.g., about the potential audience, user’s pref-
erences, etc.). Another factor that this work as well as most works do not take into
consideration is the suggestion of privacy policies. Most works recommend policies
based on previous users’ decisions and preferences. However, many users do not make
a proper use of the mechanisms provided by social networks to establish their privacy
policies [5]. Therefore, it is required also privacy-centered instead of mechanisms only
transmitter’s preference-centered.
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2.3.3 Multi-user privacy requirement
One of the requirements for current privacy mechanisms is the management of the
privacy settings of items shared among users of the social network that affect the in-
timacy of several individuals. This requirement has become indispensable due to each
time more media content where several individuals appear is shared and their privacy
is also involved (e.g., group photos). At present, OSNs leave the responsibility of set-
ting the proper privacy policy for the shared item on the hands of the item’s owner.
This decision may suppose a threat to the privacy of the other involved users. In this
subsection, we review the advances taken on providing support for choosing the appro-
priate privacy policy to publications in which content is co-owned by more than one
user.
As Such and Criado [240] state, multi-party privacy is a very complex problem because
it requires (i) identifying the users whose information is related to them in some way,
(ii) negotiating a privacy solution that satisfies all of the parts before sharing the item,
and (iii) solving conflicts emerged from discrepancies on users’ preferences. The iden-
tification of users involved in some way with the information has been not addressed
yet in the literature. There are only a few research works [126, 242] that have analyzed
which kind of multi-party privacy conflicts are given online in order to find out the
ways users are involved in a co-owned publication. In all of them, they concluded that
the understanding of co-ownership is crucial to design tools for managing co-owned
items. For example, Such et al. [242] performed an empirical study to analyze which
kind of conflicts are produced on multi-party privacy situations. Through this work,
they found out new ways of multi-party privacy conflicts such as (i) uploader-users
being co-owners of the publication in spite of not being themselves in the photo, or
(ii) co-owners who were not in the photo themselves but something of them was in the
photo (their car, house, room, pet, etc.) or someone they felt responsible for (e.g., their
children). These findings, in turn, reveal that the co-owners identification may be a
more difficult task than one might think at first.
Conversely, most research works have focused their efforts on providing multi-party
privacy solutions based on recommendations with automatic negotiations and poten-
tial conflicts solving. For instance, Mester et al. [178] developed a framework where
agents interact to reach a consensus before publishing a post. A user agent is aware of
the privacy concerns, expectations, and friends of the user. When the user is about to
post new content, its agent reasons on behalf of the user to decide which other users
would be affected by the post and contacts with their users’ agents. The authors’ pro-
posal was focused on fulfilling the following properties: automation, which is minimiz-
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ing the number of interactions with users; fairness, by maximizing the users’ satisfac-
tion with the reached agreement; concealment, that refers to not exposing the reasons
of the disagreement; and protection, which means not allowing access to the informa-
tion until an agreement is reached. However, these properties were just validated by
case-based scenarios without real user experimentation, so this study lacks a realistic
validation. Furthermore, they do not mention how the user’s preferences are collected
or estimated and neither how the co-owners of a publication are identified. They do not
also explain how their proposal can be adapted to new changes or user’s preferences,
which have shown a high variability [117]. Another example of multi-party privacy
solutions based on recommendations with automatic negotiations is proposed by Ra-
jtmajer et al. [212]. They propose a privacy evolutionary model where all the users
involved in a publication negotiate for allowing or denying the access to users of the
potential audience. Authors characterize the users’ properties with a set of features
(such as their comfort and stubbornness towards a solution) and the content sensitiv-
ity. Using the well-known game-theoretic solution concepts such as the Nash equi-
librium, they compute an iterative solution, that converges to a balanced risk-benefit
value for all the involved users. This solution reduces all users’ interests into two fea-
tures: communicative motivation and stubbornness. This approach lacks validation
of these features for the user’s daily privacy decisions in the social networks domain.
Moreover, the users’ representation is too vague and may not represent all the social
idiosyncrasies considered by users in the real-life [117]. Another remarkable example
of multi-party privacy solution is the proposal of Such and Criado [239]. Their pro-
posal consisted of a mediator that detects privacy conflicts based on users’ preference
vectors and resolves the conflict. For that, the mediator estimates the item sensitivity,
the relative importance of the conflict, and the user’s willingness. Finally, it suggests
a solution according to three main principles that combine the users’ traditional and
well-known multi-party coping strategies: the uploader overwrites, majority voting,
and veto voting. The main issue of work is that they are just focused on the transmitter
preferences to compute the solution (i.e., transmitter preferences-centered approach)
instead of also promoting solutions that preserve users’ privacy (i.e., privacy-preserving
approach).
Finally, there are interesting solutions that propose argued negotiations and recom-
mendations of privacy policies. These solutions provide some kind of explainability to
the computed solutions. On the one hand, Kokciyan et al. [147] propose an argumenta-
tion approach for solving privacy disputes in online social networks. They model users’
preferences and privacy constraints as semantic rules. This proposal is based on a pre-
vious work [178], where authors also assessed the properties of persuasion, in a way that
a user can question and rebut a specific claim of another user during the negotiation;
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and external consultation, that allows agents to consider rules from other agents to
extend their knowledge base. However, the evaluation of this proposal has been done
through interviews and scenario-based cases. Therefore, as the majority of works, they
lack integration of their privacy mechanism in a social network where the real effec-
tivity of their proposal is assessed with users’ interactions. On the other hand, Fogues
et al. [93] propose also the use of argumentation, in addition to the traditional fea-
tures considered relevant for privacy decisions such as context of the information and
the relationships, user’s preferences, and information sensitivity. In this case, they use
four argumentation schemes for the negotiation that consists of arguments from good
consequences, bad consequences, an exceptional case, and popular opinion. However,
they just consider three possible privacy policies in their approach (i.e., share with all,
common, themselves) which limits the capabilities of their proposal in real scenarios
and has a high risk of biases like context collapse.
2.3.4 Relationship inferring requirement
Online social networks try constantly to differentiate between users and the nature of
their relationships. However, users are usually either friends or strangers, there are no
intermediate or specialized relationships between them. This approach does not faith-
fully reproduce the real human relationships. Some social networks such as Facebook
have mechanisms to distinguish communities or groups through users’ profile informa-
tion, e.g., users who studied in the same high school, users who lived in the same place,
etc. This information is usually used to organize contacts in access lists, which can be
used by users to set the privacy policy for their posts. Furthermore, a user can also
make different specializations for their contacts from acquaintances to best friends
which bring his/her contacts different access permissions to his/her activity registry.
This feature allows users to define new contexts and setting, in a discrete way, the tie
strength of a relationship. The main problems of this approximation are the following:
(i) it just uses the group/community detection feature for allowing or denying access
without considering the tie strength betweenmembers; (ii) it requires users to complete
their profiles; and (iii) these features are not very well-known, understandable or easy
to use, so, only experienced users are able to use and configure them in their benefit.
In this research field, there are a lot of works that have explored ways to esti-
mate/compute the relationship strength and type between users of a social network.
Most of them take information from the users’ interactions [130, 91] and consider users
who are similar in socially significant ways (i.e., homophily) [282, 91]. On the one
hand, it has been shown that the higher the number of interactions between users, the
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Research works
[130] [282] [91, 92] [289] [262] [233] [261] [182, 183] [287]
Relationship inferring way
- interactions metadata 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
- homophily 3 3
- blacklists 3 3
- network structure 3 3 3 3 3
- text analysis 3
Relationship properties
- tie strength 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
- multiple relationship types 3
- community 3 3 3 3
- trust loss 3
Table 2.3: A comparison of research works focused on relationship properties detection for managing
privacy decisions, remarking the detection technique and the properties of the computed solution.
stronger the relationship. On the other hand, homophily states that the more two peo-
ple have in common (job, friends, hobbies, etc.), the more likely it is that these two
people have a strong relationship. Moreover, homophilic information is also used for
context detection in relationships. Although the estimation accuracy is moderately
high, these works do not differentiate the kind of interaction, i.e., whether the inter-
action among users is a neutral, an irritating or a pleasant communication. Some
works explore new ways of computing relationship properties that extend the tradi-
tional ones, mainly based on analyzing the user-generated content [289]. This point of
view turns out interesting by the popularity of social networks centered in graphical
content (e.g., Instagram), by exploring the features of graphics that could provide new
(and potentially relevant) information. Nowadays the works that address the image
analysis use graphic features directly and in a simplistic way for tagging graphical
content with a default privacy policy [46, 253, 142].
Once the users’ relationship properties are inferred, the privacy mechanisms proposed
by research works make different approximations combining them with other factors
to compute the best audience. Below, we highlight the most relevant works that use
users’ relationship properties. A summary of these works is also included in Table 2.3.
First, we highlight the work presented by Vidyalakshmi et al. [262]. They introduce
a framework for calculating a privacy score metric considering users’ personal atti-
tudes towards privacy and communication information. This work uses the relation-
ship data as the input of a cubic bezier curve function with four points represented
as (i) the origin point stated at zero coordinate, (ii) the user’s privacy attitude, (iii)
the user’s communicative attitude, and (iv) a threshold point. However, authors just
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compute the relationship property as an approximation of the frequency of user inter-
actions without considering more relationship features. The work proposes the use of a
function as a balance between users’ benefits and privacy risks. Even so, it is not clear
the meaning of the privacy score value given to the user’s contacts. Second, another
interesting work is the PriMa framework for users’ privacy protection introduced by
Squicciarini et al. [233]. The work includes a very complete formalization where the
relationship properties are used to compute an access score as the balance between
these relationship properties and a risk score for the action. The relationship proper-
ties used are composed by the type of relationship (represented as a common weight)
and a trust/reputation value. The main problem of this approximation is that the rela-
tionship definition is too vague and, to the best of our knowledge, the framework was
not finally tested. Third, we reviewed a proposal of Vanetti et al. [261] of an automatic
generated rule system. The system analyzes shared textual information, relationship
properties, and previously privacy decisions made to filter wall messages. An inter-
esting approach of this work is that the authors use not only the relationship type
and the tie strength value, but also the distance between not connected users to infer
more complex relationships. However, we consider their approach is limited because
little knowledge is taken from the publisher user, who has high variability in his/her
motivations and his/her behavior is far from perfectly rational [117]; and because no
relationship context is considered, which can distinguish different friend groups. More-
over, the evaluation made on their system lacks a final user’s validation. Fourth, the
proposal of an agent for recommending personalized access controls is presented by
Misra and Such [182, 183]. The agent extracts information mainly from relationships
(types and strength), blacklisted contacts, and tagged content (which reveals topics
and contexts about information). In these works, they used a well-tested algorithm to
detect overlapped communities in social networks, the Clique Percolation Method (CPM).
However, that algorithm does not give clues about the context of these communities
or social contexts. Therefore, users must indicate them. Finally, Xu et al. [287] provide
a new trust evaluation point of view oriented to multi-party privacy scenarios. They
consider that relationships could have negative values. At themoment, the other works
had considered only positive interactions between users to measure their tie strength.
In their work, Xu et al. consider interactions among users with negative intentions or
results. These negative interactions are mainly based on privacy issues and conflicts
generated by the uploader user with the rest of the co-owned users. The last two re-
search works propose interesting privacy management mechanisms, but we consider
that they do not cover some of the requirements highlighted in this work such as the
adaptation to the user’s interests, and the explainability of the solutions.
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2.3.5 Scope inferring requirement
The sharing-action of information implies indirectly the loss of control of that piece
of information. In offline communication, information dissemination is produced by
mouth-to-mouth which sometimes may generate a loss of details. Nevertheless, in on-
line communication, users can re-share the original user’s post and, thanks to the fa-
cility of technology, it can spread rapidly and become viral [56]. Most social networks
provide users with mechanisms to re-share information, but they do not check if the
action produces a privacy violation. Current research works focused on social media
behaviors and information dissemination analyze which are the factors and the spe-
cific conditions that cause this behavior [39, 162], but only a few researchers analyze
that behavior from a privacy point of view and propose solutions. Below, we review
the most relevant research works.
Yang et al. [288] present a privacy recommender system that computes a trade-off
between users’ privacy risks and social benefits. In their metric computation, they as-
sociate the re-sharing action, the low trust values, and the potential values a user’s in-
formationmay have (i.e., if someone posts a selfie, then the gender values that could re-
veal are male or female) as an indicator for predicting information leakages. Their risk
estimation metric computes as an important factor for assessing the privacy risks of
the action. Specifically, they adopt the information-theoretic framework [224] (based
on the entropy principle) which is widely used to measure the amount of information
leaked in secure systems. For that, the authors use the amount of all the possible in-
formation values in a publication, the probability of performing a re-sharing action,
and the relationship strength toward a specific user to quantify the information that a
sharing action leaks. This computation has limitations because each piece of informa-
tion could have an infinite range of values. Conversely, Squicciarini et al. [233] present
the PriMa framework for users’ privacy protection, where they used another way to
measure the users’ scope. In their work, authors also use the scope as an indicator of
the privacy risk of the action. In this situation, the scope is measured using a centrality
metric which reflects the number of reachable users and also measuring the visibility of
previous interactions. Then, the algorithm compares the difference between the post’s
author scope value and the potential receiver’s scope value to estimate if there is a pri-
vacy risk. However, this proposal has not been proved on simulations or via real users’
usage, so there is no data about its performance in real scenarios.
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2.3.6 Fine-grained requirement
Fine-grained privacy policy solutions consist of providing different audiences for dif-
ferent kinds of messages and different transmitter intentions. Nowadays, this require-
ment is not fulfilled by current social network privacy mechanisms due to the high
number of users’ contacts and the documented biases on current privacy mechanisms.
Regarding advances proposed by researchers, this requirement is theoretically fulfilled
by themajority of works analyzed in this survey. This requirement is achieved as a con-
sequence of fulfilling other requirements such as automation, relationship inferring,
etc. where the audience is automatically computed and individually assessed. How-
ever, we put a note of emphasis on the “theoretically” adverb because none of these
previous works have actually tested this requirement in a real social network environ-
ment.
2.3.7 Automation requirement
The privacy decision-making is a burdensome and complex task for users, and they
have to make it several times per day with the use of social networks. It is natural
that emerge solutions (from research works and social network services) that try to
partially or completely solve the privacy decision-making in an automatic way, thus
reducing the burden of users and helping them to protect their privacy. Most of the
research works included in this survey study provide some kind of automation. In this
subsection, we review the most relevant works that use automation splitting them into
three groups depending on the base of their automation: rule-check, machine learning,
and utility functions. Moreover, we also classify them depending on the result of the
automation: an indicator value or a recommendation; and on the source of knowledge
extraction: what others do, user’s previous behavior, or principles and tested theories.
Table 2.4 depicts the classification of the reviewed research works into these categories.
Rule-based automation
This kind of research works uses the rules specified by users and the automatic gener-
ation of rules to check which users have access to specific information. Current work
examples that use this kind of automation are Calikli et al.[49] and Kokciyan et al.
[147]. The first work presents Privacy Dynamics, an adaptative architecture that learns
users’ privacy norms. Their system acts as a middleware layer between the OSN plat-
form and the user, analyzing all the information (relationships, history of sharing ac-
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Research works
[49] [147] [86] [225] [164] [262] [288]
Automation type
- rule system 3 3
- ML techniques 3 3 3
- utility function 3 3 3
Automation based on
- user’s pre-behavior 3 3 3
- what other do 3 3 3
- principles & assumptions 3 3 3
Automation for
- metric evaluation 3 3 3
- feature extraction 3 3 3 3 3
- recommendation 3 3 3 3 3
Table 2.4: Acomparison of researchworks focused on the automation of some part of the privacy decision-
making process.
tions, content analysis) to infer norms that detect and prevent conflicts. So, it learns
from previous sharings’ actions made by users. Finally, the solutions of their system
are introduced to users in the way of a recommendation. The second work proposes an
argumentation approach for solving privacy disputes in online social networks based
on semantic rules. They model users’ preferences and privacy constraints as semantic
rules, differentiating them as inference rules and privacy rules, respectively. However,
they do not focus on how the semantic rules are specified or how new ones are inferred.
Their work is also dependant on an ontology that properly represents the knowledge.
Themain limitation of rule-based systems lies in the knowledge representation and the
generation of new rules. These systems require a perfect representation of the knowl-
edge with a complete ontology and systems capable to infer and generate new types
of rules. Currently, rule-based systems are far from that utopia, their representation
is usually incomplete and/or may generate inconsistent norms.
Machine learning automation
Most research works that use machine learning techniques use them to learn from pre-
vious experiences (i.e., datasets of publications labeled with a privacy policy) or to
extract features from users’ posts (mostly text and photos features). Fang and LeFevre
[86] present a privacy wizard that suggests privacy policies to users for different items
of their profiles such as real name, address, and birthday. They consider the previous
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labeling process of friends as the input for their classifier. Then, the wizard infers labels
for the other remaining friends. Since their proposal is based on supervised learning,
users’ participation is needed. Besides using machine learning for the classifier, they
also use it for feature extraction, especially for the detection of communities and other
profile data. Authors consider mutual friends as a community feature, while hobbies
or fan pages that a user likes are activity features. With a feature-vector represen-
tation, they learn the privacy policy for a specific user. The main idea of this work
is that users label a low portion of privacy decisions, and the wizard does the rest of
privacy decisions. Their evaluation results show that the wizard behaves better when
only communities are considered. The main restriction is that their proposal is just
applicable to profile data, not being considered the content of publications (text and
photos) neither activity interactions like comments and likes. So, other elements such
as images or videos are also excluded. That requires to enhance the wizard system to
consider new features of items. Shehab et al. [225] propose an approach based on the
assumption that similar or nearby users should have similar privacy permissions. Sim-
ilarity is computed using both the users’ profile attributes and social network metrics.
Authors use an iterative semi-supervised learning technique to provide privacy pol-
icy recommendations. This machine learning technique requires users to label a small
set of their friends and privacy policies for facilitating the labeling propagation. They
modeled the privacy labeling problem as a two-class classification problem giving each
user an allow/deny label for each item. This solution make the labeling automation in
a fine-grained way. However, accessing not only to their information but also to their
privacy policy decisions for that information could be considered a privacy violation
of the own individual. Conversely, other research works focus on using machine learn-
ing techniques to extract features of information, users, and relationships as the works
reviewed in subsections 2.3.4, 2.3.2, and 2.3.5.
Utility-function-based automation
Finally, other research works base their automation on the computation of self-
developed utility functions which assess relevant aspects for the privacy decision-
making, measuring and balancing also the potential social benefits of the action. For
instance, Liu and Terzi [164] developed mathematical models and algorithms for com-
puting the privacy score of users in online social networks. The mathematical models
are created on the support of premises like “the more sensitive information a user re-
veals, the higher his/her privacy score”. Authors estimate the score according to the
sensitivity of information users’ reveals and the visibility that the information has in
the social network. To estimate sensitivity and visibility values, they use concepts from
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ItemResponseTheory (a psychometric theory evaluationmethod). This work is mainly
focused on the analysis of users’ profile items to compute their privacy score, while pri-
vacy issues related to daily activities such as status updates, likes or comments are not
taken into account to compute the users’ privacy score. Even so, this is a clear example
of a research work that uses utility functions to automatically assess a privacy-related
concept. Another example is the work of Vidyalakshmi et al. [262]. They present
a framework for calculating a privacy score metric considering users’ personal atti-
tudes towards privacy and communication information. They estimate a Privacy Index
(PIDX) which is offered as a service to help users on privacy decisions. The PIDX values
range from 0 to 100 and are also computed using the IRT (Item Response Theory) for
the profile data and the user’s ego-subnetwork (i.e., the subnetwork composed by the
root user, their contact users, and their relationships). With all this data, they apply
a function based on a cubic bezier curve to draw a smooth curve where data is repre-
sented as points and a final privacy score is resultant of this function. Finally, they
tested the proposal with a synthetic experiment. From experimental results, we can
deduce that estimating the different factors included in the utility function is not easy
and the distribution of the real values could do not match with the used cubic bezier
curve. An interesting utility-function design that assesses the social benefits and the
privacy risks of social network decisions was proposed by Yang et al. [288]. For defin-
ing privacy risks, they consider two assumptions: (i) the more sensitive information a
user shares, the greater its privacy risk, and (ii) the more information is predicted to be
leaked to unintended recipients and untrustworthy friends, the greater the user’s pri-
vacy risks. For defining social benefits, they consider the following aspects: (i) a user
gains social benefit if his/her information is seen by his/her selected social circles, and
(ii) the social interactions emerged by an action or decision also increase the user’s ben-
efit. The design of this utility function was validated through experiments, although
not reliable results can be extracted because they made the experimentation via sim-
ulated data and assuming normal distributions. Finally, the usage of this function is
focused on producing recommendations of privacy policies, including the users who
could access to a piece of information (i.e., access lists). Although the above automa-
tion works evaluate privacy management from a more privacy-related perspective via
metrics which are mainly based on principles and basic assumptions of social networks
and communication, they did not test the combination of these principles and basic
assumptions on users’ real behavior. For example, the general principle “the more sen-
sitive information a user reveals, the higher his/her privacy score” could be not right if
a user shares a sensitive content with intimate contacts.
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2.3.8 Privacy-preserving requirement
As we stated, users’ privacy refers to determining when, how, and to what extent in-
formation about themselves is communicated [278]. A great number of research works
take as data sources previous sharing behaviors [86, 225] and users’ preferences [93, 241]
to compute/recommend privacy solutions. However, it has been shown that users do
not always choose suitable privacy policies. Following the above definition, any users’
accepted privacy decision is valid in privacy terms. Despite the definition, it has been
shown that users regret their own privacy decisions because they have make them
with incomplete or unknown information. Furthermore, users perceive privacy risks
as abstract and psychologically distant, and more related to the distant future, which
makes users do not consider all possible consequences during their privacy decision-
making process [109]. Because of these reasons, research works have focused on defin-
ing new metrics for assessing the privacy-preserving attitude of an OSN user and/or
the privacy-preserving level of a specific privacy solution [266].
Some approaches like the Liu et al. [164] work proposes a model to estimate both the
sensitivity and the visibility of information items. The model computes the privacy
score as a combination of the partial privacy scores of each one of the user’s profile
items. The privacy score considers the privacy settings of users with respect to their
profile items as well as their positions. This approach can be considered as privacy-
preserving because it computes privacy-related aspects such as sensitivity and visibility
of information that can be used to provide users with full information to face privacy
decisions. A similar approach is presented by Nepali and Wang [189]. They propose
a social network model, SONET, for privacy monitoring and ranking. The authors
consider a privacy risk indicator that is used to describe an entity’s privacy exposure
factor based on the sensitivity and visibility of the attribute. Another work is the
proposed by Talukder et al. [249]. They developed a service called Privometer that
computes the privacy-risky of a user’s account of social networks. It reviews all the
user’s information and his/her privacy policy considering the sensitivity of data and
suggests self-sanitization actions to regulate the amount of leakage. It also considers
thatmalicious apps installed in the user’s friends profiles could be trying to gather user’s
information. All these proposals seem interesting in reviewing periodically the users’
accounts, but none of these have considered being included in privacy mechanisms to
assist in the users’ privacy decision-making process.
Other approaches [263, 120] have considered preserving the users’ privacy through the
sanitization of the content shared. These research works use machine learning tech-
niques to analyze textual posts, extract features of them, compute their sensitivity
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value, and sanitize the text changing the sensitive words for less specific and descriptive
words. They adapt the normalization taking into account the tie-strength and type of
relationship of the owner towards the potential information receiver. Although these
works try to preserve users’ privacy, it seems too complex that users set up different
levels of sensitivity for different types of audiences or at least reach an agreed-on solu-
tion.
Regarding research works where recommendations are made based on the privacy-
preserving statement, just a few works meet this requirement. On the one hand, the
privacy solution of Squicciarini et al. [233] computes an access score function for dis-
closing the user’s traits with his/her contacts. Each user has a threshold that determines,
using the access score value, which users are or are not allowed access to a publication.
Theway their solution preserves user’s privacy is through the assessment of the contact’s
visibility compared to the owner besides of the assessment of the spreading capacity
of a user based on his/her structural centrality metrics (this assessment is a part of
the access score computation). On the other hand, Yang et al. [288] designed a set of
metrics grouped into metrics for predicting social benefits and metrics for predicting
privacy risks. The metrics that predict benefits consider the potential positive social
interactions that can be caused. Conversely, the metrics that predict privacy risks
consider three relevant aspects: the sensitivity of the information, the probability of a
re-sharing action, and trust towards the information receiver. In their solution, they
balance both metrics (benefit and risk). If the result is positive (i.e., there are more
reasons to share) the recommendation is to share with those contacts, otherwise the
recommendation is not to share. The analyzed works [288, 233] consider the transmit-
ters’ preferences (preferences-centered approach) but also the users’ privacy (privacy-
preserving approach). However, both lack a strong validation of their proposals with
real users, sharing information and interacting with other users.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, no one privacy-preserving solution was found
for multi-party privacy cases except by Xu et al. [287] work. They provide a trust met-
ric that considers negative values for relationships. At the moment, the other works
had considered only the positive interactions between users to measure the tie strength
among them. In their work, authors consider interactions among users with negative
intentions or results. These interaction problems are mainly based on privacy issues.
Moreover, their proposal of privacy management that uses the trust metric is collabo-
rative. The proposed trust metric can be used to asses a trade-off between data sharing
and privacy-preserving.
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2.3.9 Explainable requirement
Agreat drawback that users findwhen deciding the privacy policy on online social net-
works is the difficulty of having a complete view to take a suitable solution. Sometimes
they do not know how or what personal information is disclosed through online social
networks. This can be caused by internal (e.g., the user’s contacts, the user’s personal
information) and external factors to the user (e.g., others’ reactions) that are usually
considered in the decision and users do not have enough resources to do it. In fact, the
internal factors that are more closely related to users such as their contact list should
be easier to be assessed by users during privacy decisions, but it has been shown that
they normally do not even remember the users that compose their contact list [65].
Among the proposed solutions reviewed, we remark the following by its interesting per-
spective. Lipford et al. [160] explore the role of interface usability in current privacy
settings. For that, they propose a new interface for Facebook called AudienceView that
offers users the possibility to observe how their profiles are seen in the third person (i.e.,
from a perspective of search, network, and friend). Their proposal was evaluated by
16 participants that commented it helped them to understand better the actual conse-
quences of their privacy settings. This approach was included on Facebook (View As
Public) but only the network perspective. Mazzia et al. [177] present PViz, an inter-
face that is focused on helping users understand the visibility of their profiles. PViz
depicts the social structure of the user’s contacts in a graphical way. Contacts are au-
tomatically grouped in communities using the idea of modularity optimization. The
higher levels of the hierarchy have groups of users that are loosely connected and share
fewer attributes, the lower levels of the structure represent groups of users that share
many common friends, tastes, and demographic data. The authors empirically evalu-
ated PViz comparing it with AudienceView [160] and the Facebook standard interface.
Their results showed that participants preferred PViz over the other two options; some
participants even suggested that a combination of AudienceView and PViz could cre-
ate a better solution. However, this kind of solution was not designed for helping users
during privacy decision-making, but to give them attention marks. These tools are
only useful for sparking the users’ concerns in privacy and make them doubly check
their decisions about privacy to avoid potential regrets. Moreover, there is a huge dis-
tance between users’ concerns and their final privacy behavior (known as the Privacy
Paradox) as it has been shown in [24].
New approaches focused on informing users about privacy for privacy decision-making
have recently raised popularity. Mostly focused on nudging about privacy and secu-
rity, they use these mechanisms to improve decision-making processes where a lack
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of information or cognitive overload may unfavorably affect user privacy [21]. These
mechanisms are known as soft paternalistic interventions (i.e., nudges). They attempt
to influence decision making to improve individual well-being, without actually limit-
ing users’ ability to choose freely (because of all options are still available), thus, pre-
serving the users’ freedom of choice [7]. In a 6-week experiment with 28 Facebook users,
Wang et al. [273] present their results with nudge mechanisms. They introduced three
types of nudges: audience nudge (contains textual and visual information of the audi-
ence), timer nudge (introduces a visual delay of 20 seconds after a user clicked the “post”
button before publishing the submitted post), and the combination of the two. The re-
sults concluded that participants that use Facebook to post personal opinions perceive
the nudges as being more beneficial than those who use it to broadcast news articles
or for commercial purposes. Moreover, the users that have experience in the configu-
ration of privacy settings considered that the nudges could be more useful for people
without experience in social networks. However, in the case of the audience mecha-
nism the privacy risk that a user could have if the expected audience re-share the user’s
publication is not considered. This information could provide him a broader view of
the potential reachability of his publication. The results of the experiment suggest that
these mechanisms can be useful for people who are starting to use social networks (e.g.,
children and adolescents). A similar 12-day experiment with 21 participants was car-
ried out by Wang et al. [272]. The authors propose different nudging mechanisms to
be integrated into Facebook. The first mechanism audience nudge provides images of
the audience that could see the post. Similarly to the audience mechanism proposed
in Wang et al. [273], this mechanism also does not take into account the potential
audience in the case of a user with permissions re-shares the publication. The second
mechanism timer nudge includes a time delay before a user posts a message on the social
network. The third mechanism sentiment nudge consists of an estimation of the senti-
ment associated with the post that the user is going to publish. The authors analyzed
the data collected from the experiment (i.e., number of changes in online privacy set-
tings, number of canceled or edited posts, post frequency, and topic sensitivity) and
the data of a questionnaire after the experiment. They found clear evidence of changes
in posting behavior for some of the participants. The participants mentioned that the
audience nudge was useful for thinking about customized groups. For the timer nudge,
the users mentioned that the mechanism provided them the opportunity to stop and
think about the publication. In general, the sentiment nudge was perceived as being a
less useful nudge than the others. The authors mention that the reasons could be as-
sociated with the sentiment algorithm that was used. Indeed, as this kind of works
seems to work well in the privacy domain, other research works have been done to in-
crease the effectiveness of nudges personalizing them to users [222, 218]. Even so, all
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these works converge to the same conclusion: providing users with customized nudge
messages could increase further their effectiveness. Therefore, we think that combining
nudge mechanisms with indicators (of privacy risks) and factors (about users’ scope,
information sensitivity, etc.), that are currently assessed by some research works, could
provide argued explanations to users about privacy that, in turn, they would improve
the explainability of privacy solutions.
2.4 Open challenges
Although works reviewed in this survey cover some of the requirements that privacy
mechanisms and their privacy solutions should have, we have identified possible lines
of future research to improve the current proposals. In this section, we discuss these
possible future directions in the research field of users’ privacy decision-making in on-
line social networks. Addressing the following research lines could shed light on users
privacy understanding and be used as a valuable support for privacy decisions, thus
reducing the probability of regretting their decisions. In addition, this will train users
towards safer and/or more specialized decisions, which could lead to an increase in
their participation in online social networks.
2.4.1 Privacy-related metrics
Aswe highlight in the review about privacy requirements and solutions, most of the an-
alyzed research works follow a transmitter preferences-centered approach were factors
of trustworthiness and transmitter preferences are assessed for setting privacy policies.
Just using these factors is not the only thing to consider due to (i) users do not al-
ways remember the audience who compose their contact list or the information they
shared, (ii) users are not always able to evaluate all the possible scenarios because they
work with incomplete or unknown information, and (iii) users perceive privacy risks
as an abstract problem, psychologically distant, and more related to the distant fu-
ture. Other factors must be taken into account, factors related to the other elements
involved in the communication. For this reason, privacy-related metrics should be de-
signed as indicators of potential privacy issues. In this survey, we have remarked some
proposals that try to cover this problem. However, they could be improved and refined
providing clear and understandable information to users during the privacy decision-
making process. Moreover, none proposal following the privacy-preserving approach
was proposed formulti-party privacy scenarios. Among the factors that couldmeasure
potential privacy risks in online social networks, we find the following: the user’s per-
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ception of sensitivity towards information, and the user’s exposition, scope, influence
level, and identification level. However, these ones depend on better estimators of in-
formation sensitivity and users’ scope capacities. Below, we discuss some improvements
that can be made to enhance these estimators.
Information sensitivity
Currently, we have found several ways (from the literature works) to estimate infor-
mation sensitivity. These approaches are mainly based on: (i) laws and regulations,
referred to which types of users’ information require more protection than others by
companies that stores them [256]; (ii) market valuation, referred to the value of data
from indicators such as the market revenues obtained per data record, the market
prices for data, the cost of a data breach, and data prices in illegal markets [196, 172];
(iii) individuals’ valuation, referred to individual’s willingness to pay to protect data
[217, 221]; and (iv) linguistics, referred to words-level analysis and frequency of ap-
pearance [263, 120]. The comparison and implementation of a model that provides
a combined approach of sensibility (adapted to online social networks domain) for
the different information types could help to define better risk indicators. But this is
not enough because the publications shared in social networks are composed of sev-
eral types of personal information. Therefore, deep analysis and discussions about the
sensitive value of information when several pieces of information appear together are
required. For example, knowing that Bob is male is probably worth less than knowing
that Bob is a male, 27-year old living in Valencia and he is interested in climbing, trav-
eling, and movies. To the best of our knowledge, no one has analyzed exhaustively this
property for making a serious proposal.
Scope of the user in the social network
Regarding the users’ power of dissemination, there are a lot of factors that influence
the visibility of their actions on the network. Some works were based on the privacy
policy given to specific profile items [164], others on re-sharing probabilities [288], and
others on users’ time spent on social networks [56]. Current researches in the field of
information dissemination are focused on detecting these users for strategic marketing
proposes [131]. They merge social network factors with epidemic models to estimate
the information spreading [276]. An interesting research line could be to use them as
a tool for determining the risk a user has when share (or re-share) a personal piece of
information due to the user may give too much visibility to the information. Metrics
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based on measuring, the depth and width of cascades caused by re-sharing actions
could help users to understand the potential risks regarding privacy.
2.4.2 Validated model for automation
Automation has been used in many privacy research works reviewed in this survey.
On the one hand, some works collected information about users’ behaviors to replicate
them. However, this could not be the most suitable solution due to the Privacy Paradox
(i.e., users’ attitudes and concerns about privacy do not match their actions). On the
other hand, other works use some basic principles such as “the more sensitive informa-
tion a user shares, the greater her privacy risks” and/or “the user gains social benefit if
her information is seen by information receiver” to design their metrics. However, the
designed functions do not consider factor combinations and they do not follow any
reasoned or validated psychological behavior. For this reason, we reviewed works in
the psychological field focused on self-disclosure in online social networks to find any
works that consider the online communication elements (transmitter, receptor, mes-
sage, channel, and feedback) and how they influence privacy aspects. However, all of
them were made following the users-centered approach without analyzing the poten-
tial information receivers or the message properties. Therefore, we consider interesting
to work in a research line centered on analyzing the psychological behavior of users to
validate the individual’s reasoning model during online communication. This would
allow researchers to create a complete model that considers the influence of online
communication elements in privacy and could be used for automating the computa-
tion of the trade-off between users’ social benefits and privacy costs/risks.
2.4.3 Explainable, argued, and reflective privacy policy solutions
Nowadays, privacy mechanisms provided in online social networks tend to be basic
and include biases that (i) are responsible for causing privacy issues by disclosing in-
formation with silent listeners (i.e., users out of the imagined audience) and (ii) decrease
the users’ disclosure by the incapacity to specify the desired audience (context collapse).
So, many of the researchworks analyzed try to automatically compute the best privacy
policies for the users, decreasing the users’ burden and trying to improve their interests
(e.g., self-presentation, relationship maintenance, creating new relationships, privacy
protection, etc.). All these works mainly offer recommendations to users who finally
decide to accept or not accept them. However, some of these recommendations (i) are
not translated into an understandable format or language for users and (ii) the reasons
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why the recommendation excludes/includes a user into the audience are not provided.
Therefore, we consider that explainable, argued and reflective privacy solutions could
facilitate the users’ understandability of privacy mechanisms proposed and the tran-
sition between the recommendation and the final privacy policy decision. There are
some research works that already considered nudging mechanisms as a way to educate
and make users reflect about privacy decisions, but they were only applied to current
social network privacy mechanisms. Moreover, no one included information about
privacy metrics considered to compute the recommendation. This information could
be useful to nudge users and make them reflect on their priorities. Hence, we think
that new research on the explainability of privacy decisions considering also ethics
and other users’ privacy preferences, and consequently decreasing regrets by privacy
decisions.
2.4.4 Adaptation to user’s modifications
Based on the works analyzed, we observed that most of them offer closed recommenda-
tions, i.e., users have to accept or reject them without the possibility to modify them.
We believe that this requirement is needed due to users have different interests and
motivations that could change, being the users’ behavior far from perfectly rational
[117]. Therefore, future research should consider variations in users’ privacy policy rec-
ommendations linking them to explainable characteristics. This new approach could
provide better privacy mechanisms.
2.4.5 Co-privacy
For addressing the co-privacy issue, we already mentioned that huge advances have
been done in the way of detecting and solving multi-party privacy conflicts. However,
these solutions are mainly centered on balance users’ preferences instead of considering
privacy metrics that protect all’s privacy. Furthermore, another important point could
be preventing multi-party privacy conflicts instead of solving them. To address the
prevention of these conflicts, the analysis of nudgingmechanisms about others’ privacy
could shed light on ways of prevention.
2.4.6 Content-fading solutions
There is content published on social networks that were appropriate in a certain con-
text but over time it may not be as appropriate as it used to be. The problem is that
48
CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF PRIVACY MECHANISMS FOR SOCIAL NETWORK
SERVICES
users forget that they published it and keep it accessible. When these users create new
relationships, there is a chance that these new contacts can access these previous post-
ings. Hence, we consider that it would be interesting that users have the possibility to
provide an expiration date to their content or that privacy mechanisms, depending on
the risk of the publication (taking into account the sensitivity of the content, the target
audience, etc.) recommend associating an expiry datewith the publication. Nowadays,
there is no enough research on the users’ old publications or the effect/benefit of new
mechanisms such as Instagram Stories that fade their content. Researches about this
requirement could be an interesting research line for improving privacy mechanisms.
2.5 Conclusions
The possibilities of interaction and social benefit that online social networks offer have
raised their popularity. Any application or service of the lasts years has been designed
following a social approach, usually linked to other online social networks. In this con-
nected world, controlling which information and who has access to it is of paramount
importance. The current mechanisms of online social networks to control the users’
privacy could be improved, and the privacy solutions provided lack mainly on explica-
bility. Hence, privacy mechanisms that fulfill the lack of current approaches remarked
in this survey work will be the subject of future research during the next years.
In this survey work, we have explored the privacy decision-making process highlight-
ing the drawbacks and the current issues of privacy mechanisms, in addition to the
potential privacy problems that could emerge. To improve privacy mechanisms, we
proposed several requirements that arise as a result of potential problems during the
privacy decision-making process. Some of these requirements are almost fulfilled, but
others related to the explainability, privacy-preserving, adaptation, and co-privacy
still need deeper research. Above all, we understand the complexity of the design of
a privacy mechanism that fulfills the entire set of requirements. For that reason, we
need to produce clear and convincing results to attract the attention of online social
networks to develop new privacy mechanisms. We think that this approximation may
need a redesign of the user layer to include advanced and explainable/understandable
privacy management.
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Abstract
Users are not often aware of privacy risks and disclose information in online social
networks. They do not consider the audience that will have access to it or the risk that
the information continues to spread and may reach an unexpected audience. More-
over, not all users have the same perception of risk. To overcome these issues, we pro-
pose a Privacy Risk Score (PRS) that: 1) estimates the reachability of an user’s sharing
action based on the distance between the user and the potential audience; 2) is de-
scribed in levels to adjust to the risk perception of individuals; 3) does not require the
explicit interaction of individuals since it considers information flows; and 4) can be
approximated by centralitymetrics for scenarios where there is no access to data about
information flows. In this case, if there is access to the network structure, the results
show that global metrics such as closeness have a high degree of correlation with PRS.
Otherwise, local and social centrality metrics based on ego-networks provide a suit-
able approximation to PRS. The results in real social networks confirm that local and
social centrality metrics based on degree perform well in estimating the privacy risk
of users.
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3.1 Introduction
The popularity of mobile devices and applications that are related to online social
networking has changed the way we communicate. People now share their opinions,
ideas, photos, etc. in online social networks (OSN) [74, 60]. When sharing information,
users are not often aware of who will or will not have access to what they have just
published. This uncertainty creates a risk in the privacy of the user, which in some cases
may have negative consequences if the scope of the publication reaches people who
were not in the original audience. Applications related to OSN offer the possibility
to configure options that are related to the privacy profile of users. However, this
is often a tedious task and is usually focused on protecting the information related
to the user profile and not to the privacy of the user’s publications [164, 189, 225].
Some works try to address these issues with the automation of privacy settings [86, 262,
34, 244]. However, these proposals usually require an initial intervention by the user
and do not solve the problem of increasing privacy awareness. Other approaches deal
with the improvement of the awareness of users regarding the misalignment of users’
expected audience with the actual audience [49, 129, 178]. However, these approaches
do not deal with the problem that a publicationmight produce if the expected audience
performs sharing actions among their contacts. Assuming this scenario, there is still a
potential privacy risk that should be considered.
The topological location of a user in a network is one of the main factors that influ-
ences the scope that a certain sharing action can reach [101]. The scope of a shar-
ing action can be seen as the effect of a diffusion process. In the area of Com-
plex Networks, spreading processes such as epidemics or information diffusion have
been analyzed [153, 163, 71, 66]. Several works have studied spreading dynamics and
influential or relevant individuals in these processes based on structural properties
[205, 277, 169, 226, 25]. From the point of view of determining the privacy risk as-
sociated to a user’s sharing action, it is interesting to determine if there are influential
users in the path that information follows who increase the privacy risk score if they
perform a re-sharing action. Influential users can initiate and conduct the dissemi-
nation of a sharing action more efficiently than “normal” users. Therefore, influential
users in networks are normally more responsible for large cascades of information dif-
fusion and contribute to increasing the privacy risk. Traditionally, centrality metrics
such as degree [201], pagerank [169], k-core [141, 205], closeness [41], or betweenness
[97, 96, 158, 98] have been used to detect these relevant users in networks [38, 226, 156].
Not all users have the same perception of risk [185, 61, 237]. On one hand, there are
some users who aremore comfortable with the possibility that their information can be
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seen by others and are even interested in achieving that effect. On the other hand, there
are users that have greater privacy concerns and prefer not to disclose information
that could be seen by users beyond their direct friends [89]. Depending on the users’
concerns, different levels of risk perception should be considered.
In this article, we propose a Privacy Risk Score (PRS) for measuring the privacy in
social networks, which provides the following major contributions:
• The privacy is oriented to the reachability of a user-sharing action instead of be-
ing focused on the misalignment of the users’ expected audience with the actual
audience.
• The measure provided is not only global, but it is also adjustable to the risk
perception of each individual.
• The PRS does not require the user to provide information explicitly since it takes
into account the paths that the publications follow in the social network.
• We provide an estimation of this measure for those scenarios in which informa-
tion related to flow paths is not available. This estimation is based on an analysis
of the relationship between global, local, and social centrality metrics and the
proposed measure.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents previous approaches
that are related to privacy score metrics. Section 3.3 exposes the privacy risks in social
networks with an example of scenario and proposes a solution. Section 3.4 describes the
concept of friendship level and presents the PRS. Section 3.5 describes a set of global,
local, and social centrality metrics to estimate the PRS. Section 3.6, presents a set of
experiments that were performed to evaluate the suitability of centrality metrics to
estimate the PRS in synthetic and real network topologies. Finally, Section 3.7 presents
conclusions.
3.2 Related work
In the literature, there are works that try to tackle the problem of improving the aware-
ness of the effect of communicative actions from different perspectives. Table 3.1 pro-
vides an overview of relevant contributions in this area, which are classified according
to the dimensions of focus.
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There are approaches that provide wizards to facilitate the management of privacy
profile settings. Liu et al. [164] propose a mathematical model to estimate both the
sensitivity and the visibility of information items. The model computes the privacy
score as a combination of the partial privacy scores of each one of the user’s profile
items. The privacy score considers the privacy settings of users with respect to their
profile items as well as their positions. A similar approach is presented by Nepali et al.
[189]. They propose a social networkmodel, SONET, for privacymonitoring and rank-
ing. The authors consider a privacy risk indicator that is used to describe an entity’s
privacy exposure factor based on the known attributes (the sensitivity and visibility of
the attribute). Shehab et al. [225] present a privacy policy recommendation approach
that is based on the idea that nearby users should have similar labels (permissions). The
approach requires users to label a small set of their friends. These labels are propagated
over the social network to provide users with privacy policy recommendations. Fang et
al. [86] present a privacy wizard that considers previous labelling processes of friends
as the input for their classifier. The wizard then infers labels for the other remain-
ing friends. Vidyalakshmi et al. [262] present a framework for calculating a privacy
score metric considering users’ personal attitude towards privacy and communication
information. Bilogrevic et al. [34] propose an information-sharing system that decides
(semi-)automatically whether to share information with others. They consider a vec-
tor that encodes whether or not the information is shared based on user decisions, and
then a logistic classifier makes the remaining decisions. These approaches require user
intervention and assume that users are privacy aware of the consequences of their de-
cisions. They are focused on a local view of the social network and do not evaluate
other collateral effects such as information diffusion processes.
Some approaches focus on providing information about which people have or may
have received information that was not addressed to them initially. These works help
them to increase their privacy risk awareness and better define their social groupsmore
carefully. Calikli et al. [49] propose an adaptive architecture that provides sharing
recommendations to users as well as assisting them to re-configure the users’ groups.
Their proposal is based on social contexts and conflicts. This approach depends on the
provision of accurate user’s social contexts and conflict rules. Kafali et al. [129] provide
an approach that is based on model checking that checks whether certain properties
hold. The system uses as input privacy agreements of the users, user relations, the
content they upload as well as some inference rules. The system specifies whether the
property of interest can or cannot be violated in a given social network. Mester et.
al [178] developed a platform where agents interact to reach a consensus on a post to
be published. The agent is aware of the user’s privacy concerns, expectations, and the
user’s friends. When a user is about to post new content, the agent reasons on behalf of
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Type of information
User
intervention
Privacy
risk
estimation
Profile
items
Actions
Audience Reachability
Liu et al. [164] ✓ ✓
Nepali et al. [189] ✓ ✓
Shehab et al. [225] ✓
Fang et al. [86] ✓ ✓
Vidyalakshmi et al. [262] ✓ ✓
Bilogrevic et al. [34] ✓ ✓
Calikli et al. [49] ✓
Kafali et al. [129] ✓ ✓
Mester et al. [178] ✓
Yang et al. [288] ✓
Our work ✓ ✓
Table 3.1: Overview of approaches related to privacy in social networks. We considered three main fea-
tures: (i) the type of information considered to evaluate the user’s privacy risk (i.e., the user’s profile items
or actions). In the case that the approach considers actions, the goal can be to determine if the informa-
tion shared was received by the intended audience or to estimate the reachability of the information; (ii)
if the approach requires user intervention as input for the privacy risk estimation; and (iii) if the approach
provides a privacy risk metric to the user.
the user to decide which other users would be affected by the post and contacts those
users’ agents. However, the privacy concerns of a user should be predefined. Yang et
al. [288] present a privacy metric of user i sharing information with a neighbor j as a
trade-off between user i’s concerns and incentives of sharing information with j. They
present privacy risk as an individual metric, without considering other potential users
that might re-share information.
From our point of view, privacy risk does not only concern the problem that informa-
tion might reach people who were initially not expected to receive it. Assuming that
people who received the information are part of the target audience, it must also be
taken into account that there is still a problem if one user of this intended audience
re-shares the information. Then, the original user loses control over the scope of the
information. For this reason, it is important to consider the privacy problem from a
network perspective instead of individuals alone. The audience that is allowed see the
information that a user publishes is influenced by the structure of the social network.
Network models that mimic the patterns of connection in real networks (i.e., Erdös-
Rényi [81, 257, 37], Barabási-Albert [22, 48], andWatts-Strogatz [274, 51]) facilitate the
analysis of the implications of those patterns [190]. Small-world, Scale-free, and Ran-
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dom models are very common structures in social networks. The Small-world model
is characterized by the transitivity in strong social ties and the ability of weak ties
to reach across clusters. The Scale-free model exhibits a power-law degree distribution
where there is a small set of vertices with a degree that greatly exceeds the average. The
random model assigns equal probability to all graphs with exactly the same number
of edges.
In this paper, we deal with this problem with the proposal of a Privacy Risk Score
(PRS) that is focused on the risk of potential re-sharing actions from the expected and
unexpected audience that might receive the message. The main contributions of this
work are the following: (i) the proposed PRS metric considers the paths that infor-
mation follows as a result of sharing actions without the user’s intervention; (ii) the
calculation of the PRS metric for different users’ risk perceptions; (iii) we provide and
evaluate a set of centrality metrics to estimate PRS values in scenarios where there is
a lack of a global view of the network and/or data about the users’ sharing activity.
3.3 Privacy risk scenario
Privacy risk not only concerns the problem that information might reach people who
were initially not expected to receive it, but it also involves the problem of losing control
over the scope of the information. In Figure 3.1, we describe this privacy risk problem
in online social networks.
The social network is structured into nine communities (see Figure 3.1a). Nodes rep-
resent users and the node color corresponds to a community. Gray nodes represent
isolated users (i.e., they do not belong to any community). In Figure 3.1b, the user
represented by the node encircled in red shares a message on his/her wall. The user
determines the audience depending on his/her selected privacy policy (e.g., friends).
Therefore, only their friends can see the message (see Figure 3.1c, nodes encircled in
green). If a node encircled in green performs a sharing action, the message could reach
other communities causing a privacy problem.
The Privacy Risk Score metric proposed in this paper deals with this problem by pro-
viding information about the potential privacy risk of an action. The PRS aims to
increase the users’ awareness about the reachability of their publications in the social
network even though they have restricted the visibility of their publications. Figure
3.2 shows the workflow phases for calculating the PRS. First, the activity in the social
network is monitorized (specifically, the path followed by user messages). This infor-
mation is used to establish the reachability of the actions performed by each user and
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(a) A social network structured into communities. (b) Sharing action initiated by the node encircled in red.
(c) Potential audience in level 2.
Figure 3.1: Example of a potential privacy risk in online social networks.
to calculate the PRS value. Then, when a user is going to post amessage, the PRS values
analyzed until that moment are shown to the user. The PRS of a user would provide
him/her with an estimation of the visibility of an action at different levels of friendship
or in general. By taking into account their privacy risk perception and their PRS, users
could make better decisions about sharing or not sharing a message on their walls.
3.4 Privacy Risk Score (PRS)
To define how our proposed PRS metric works, first we are going to explain some im-
portant concepts. We assume that there is a social network G that consists ofN nodes,
where every node ai ∈ {a1, ..., an} represents an agent (i.e., a user of the social net-
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Monitor	and	collect
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about the visibility of	
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Risk Score	(PRS)	of	
each user
Activity in	the
social	network
Figure 3.2: Flow chart of the phases for calculating the PRS in a social network.
work). Agents are connected through links that represent friendship relationships and
correspond to the edgesE ⊆ N×N of G. We assume that friendship links are bidirec-
tional, and, therefore, the social network is undirected. We define the adjacencymatrix
A to represent these links. Given two agents ai and aj , if there is a link between these
agents, we represent this as Aai,aj = 1 and Aai,aj = 0 if there is not a link. Consider-
ing an agent ai, we define a level L as the subset of agents whose shortest distance to
ai is l:
Lai(l) ⊆ N, ∀aj ∈ Lai(l) : d(ai, aj) = l ∧ ∄d′(ai, aj) < d(ai, aj)
We define the Privacy Risk Score (PRS) for an agent ai that performs a message dif-
fusion action (i.e., publishes a message m on its wall, comments on an existing post,
shares a post, etc.) as an indicator of the potential risk of this message to be diffused
over the social network (i.e., potential visibility). The higher the PRS value, the higher
the threat to agent ai’s privacy.
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3.4.1 Calculation of the PRS metric
In a social network G, there is a set of paths that messages follow more frequently
than others [39, 115]. If an agent is in these paths and performs a diffusion action, it
has a higher privacy risk than another agent that is out of these paths. Therefore, an
agent’s position in the network is relevant to the privacy risk. Furthermore, not all
users have the same view of risk when sharing information. As an example, some users
may consider that sharing information with friends of friends might be risky, while
others may consider that the true risk is at the next level of friendship. Therefore, the
estimation of the PRS for an agent ai should be provided in friendship levels in order
to deal with different levels of risk perception.
In addition, according to the information diffusion model SIR (Susceptible, Infected,
and Removed) [277], the time instant in which a diffusion action of a message is per-
formed is also important for measuring the privacy risk. This model states that the
privacy risk related to the diffusion of a message is higher during the initial stages
than when the message has already been diffused through the social network. In other
words, the diffusion risk of a message is higher when an agent diffuses a new message
since no other agents have viewed it yet. Therefore, the calculation of the PRS also in-
cludes the stage of the message in which an agent ai interacts as a diffusion action. To
represent this, we define T = {1, 2, . . . , n} as the stages of the message, which are the
product of the diffusion process of the message. This variable is represented for each
message and indicates the number of steps from its creation. The value of the variable
T (and also of the variableL) is limited by the network diameter. Therefore, if its value
is not too high, the network diameter is a good approximation of T andL. For the sake
of simplicity, we assume that an agent can carry out a single message diffusion action
(i.e., re-share a message, comment on a message, etc.), allowing other agents to see this
message at that time instant.
Considering the above two factors (friendship level and risk of initial stages), we define
a T × N reachability matrix γi associated to each agent ai to represent the number
of messages that an agent ai has diffused in a certain stage t and have been seen by
other agents. The rows of this matrix represent the diffusion actions that ai carries
out over messages in the same stage, while columns represent the agents of the social
network. We use γit,aj to refer to the entry in the tth row and ajth column of γi. Thisvalue represents the number of messages diffused by ai in stage t that were seen by aj .
Note that the aith column of each row t (γit,ai ) represents the messages diffused by aiin stage t that were seen by ai (i.e., all of the messages published by ai in t).
Given a stage t and a set of agents of level l, we define p(ai, t, l) as the average number
59
3.4. PRIVACY RISK SCORE (PRS)
of agents of this level that saw a message published by ai in stage t:
p(ai, t, l) =
∑
aj∈Lai (l)
γit,aj
γit,ai
(3.1)
Taking into account the above value, we estimate the PRS for an agent ai at level l as
the percentage of agents of that level that potentially see a message published by ai at
any stage. This can be calculated as:
PRS(ai, l) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
(
p(ai, t, l)
|Lai(l)|
)
(3.2)
In a general view, by taking into account the whole population of the social network
G, we can estimate a general value of PRS for an agent ai as the percentage of agents
of the social network that potentially see a message published by ai at any stage. This
can be calculated by combining Equations 3.1 and 3.2:
PRS(ai) =
1
T
T∑
t=1

∑
aj∈N
γit,aj
γit,ai · |N |
 (3.3)
Figure 3.3 shows a scenario where the privacy risk score is calculated for agent a1 in a
social network. This scenario represents an example of a social network with interac-
tions between agents. We assume that all of the agents inG have the privacy policy that
only their direct friends can see their walls. As indicated in the definition above, the
maximum value for parameters T and L cannot exceed the network diameter. There-
fore, for this example of PRS calculation, we use the value 3 for parameters T and
L.
The message diffusion actions performed in this scenario are the following. (1) Agent
a1 publishes a messagem1 on its wall. Therefore, agents a2 and a3 can see the message.
Since the interaction of agent a1 with the messagem1 is in its initial stage, stage t is
1. The information about the agents that can seem1 is stored in γ1. (2) Agent a3 then
decides to share m1 on its wall. Agents a4, a5, a6, a7, and a8 can see message m1.
As in the previous case, the information about the agents that can see message m1
is updated in γ3. The interaction of agent a3 with message m1 occurs after agent a1
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shares it (i.e., the interaction is produced in the next stage t = 2). Note that the values
of γ1 are updated at t = 1 because agent a1 interacts with the message in this stage,
and in γ1 we are measuring the reachability of the messages when agent a1 interacts
with it. (3) Agent a8 then sharesm1 publishing it on its wall. Agents a3 and a9 can see
it. Therefore, γ8 is updated at t = 3, and γ1 and γ3 are updated in their corresponding
t’s (i.e., t = 1 and t = 2). (4) Agent a1 then publishes a new messagem2 that agents
a2 and a3 can see at stage t = 1. Then, γ1 is updated at t = 1.
With the information stored in the γ matrix, the proposed PRS is calculated for each
agent. In the scenario described in Figure 3.3, we show the values of PRS for agent a1
– PRS metric of agent a1:
p(a1, t = 1, l = 1) = 4/2 = 2
p(a1, t = 1, l = 2) = 5/2
p(a1, t = 1, l = 3) = 1/2
PRS(a1, l = 1) = 1/3 ⇤ 2/2 = 1/3
PRS(a1, l = 2) = 1/3 ⇤ (5/2)/5 = 1/6
PRS(a1, l = 3) = 1/3 ⇤ (1/2)/1 = 1/6
PRS(a1) = 1/3 ⇤ 10/(2 ⇤ 9) = 5/27
a3
a5
a4
a6a1
a2
a9
a7
a8
level 1 level 2 level 3
…
(1) (4) (2)
(2)
(2)
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(3)
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Figure 3.3: Example of social network activity and the PRS calculation process. The activities carried out
on the social network are as follows (in this example, all agents share information with their friends): (1)
agent a1 publishes/shares a message m1 on its wall; (2) agent a3 shares the message m1; (3) agent a8
shares the messagem1; and (4) agent a1 publishes/shares a new messagem2.
61
3.4. PRIVACY RISK SCORE (PRS)
User Layer
User&Group
Management
Privacy 
Risk 
Module
Messaging 
System
Content 
Management
Social 
Network 
Services
OSN Platform Layer
Storage 
System Database
Deliberation process
Contacts
collections
acquaintances
…
Information
types
profile info.
posts
comments
…
Settings
privacy policies
private
friends
public
…
privacy threshold Privacy Risk Module
PRS Metric 
Calculation 
Service
Levels
Stages
User
Matrices 
Management
 i
Figure 3.4: Block diagram of the integration of PRS metric as a service in OSN.
at different levels (i.e., PRS(a1, l = 1), PRS(a1, l = 2), and PRS(a1, l = 3)) and
the general PRS value (i.e., PRS(a1)).
3.4.2 PRS metric in OSN
The integration of the PRS metric in OSN must be done as a service for users. This
privacy service will help users to manage their sensitive and non-sensitive information
and aware its scope, improving their experiences inOSN. In Figure 3.4, we show a block
diagram of OSN where the PRS metric was included as a service in the OSN platform
layer. The diagram is composed of a User layer, OSN Platform layer, and Privacy Risk
Module. The User layer manages user’s contacts, information related to the user (e.g.,
profile info, posts, comments, etc.), and setting parameters to control who has access to
the information when a sharing action is carried out. TheOSNPlatform layer provides
the whole functionality of a OSN (e.g., management of users, messaging system, etc.).
The PrivacyRiskmodule is included as a service of theOSNPlatform layer. This service
is responsible for the PRS metric calculation.
Figure 3.5 shows the workflow to estimate the PRS value of an individual agent when he
performs amessage sharing action in theOSN.The process starts when an agent ai sees
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a publication or when he creates content for a new publication (mj). Then, this agent
evaluates the risk of sharing/publishing mj considering its PRS value (PRS(ai)). If
the value is greater than his individual risk threshold (θai), ai does not perform the
action. Otherwise, ai shares mj , which in turn, could be seen by other agents. In
this case, the matrix γi of ai is updated as well as the matrices of other agents that
previously participated in the sharing process ofmj .
3.5 PRS and centrality metrics
Even though the PRS estimation provides accurate measurements of the privacy risk
associated to a diffusion action, this estimation requires a detailed record of sharing ac-
tivity in a social network. However, the management of this information is not always
feasible in large networks with high activity, and, in some scenarios, this knowledge
is not even accessible. As a result, in certain circumstances, we would require metrics
that approximate PRS values in a feasible way.
Influential users may play a critical role in paths that information follows. If an in-
fluential user sees a publication and performs a sharing action, it is more likely for
the publication to reach more people. It is important to have a reliable and effi-
cient predictor of these nodes based on topological properties. From the area of Com-
plex Networks, there is no consensus on the best metric for predicting this influence.
Researchers have proposed several structural metrics for identifying influential users
[152]. According to the information they used, these metrics can be classified into three
classes: global, local, and social [227].
Global metrics are based on structural properties that require a complete view of the
network structure to be computed. Among the global metrics, we considered the fol-
lowing commonly used metrics: betweenness, closeness, and pagerank. Betweenness
metrics are based on assumptions about the paths that information follows. Shortest-
path betweenness assumes that information is transmitted along the shortest paths. It
is defined as the fraction of the shortest paths between pairs of agents in a network
that pass through the agent of interest [96],
bet-spi =
∑
aj ,ak∈N
σ(aj , ak|ai)
σ(aj , ak)
, (3.4)
where σ(aj , ak) is the number of shortest (aj , ak)-paths, and σ(aj , ak|ai) is the num-
ber of those paths passing through some node ai other than aj , ak .
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Figure 3.5: Flowchart of the PRS calculation process.
Random-walk betweenness was proposed by Newman [191], and, instead of consider-
ing the shortest paths, it considers the number of times a random walk between each
pair of agents passes through the agent of interest. Thus, random-walk betweenness
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can be defined as follows,
bet-rwi =
∑
aj ,ak∈N
σr(aj , ak|ai)
σr(aj , ak)
, (3.5)
whereσr(aj , ak) is the number of random (aj , ak)-paths, andσr(aj , ak|ai) is the num-
ber of those random paths passing through some node ai other than aj , ak .
While betweenness centrality measures represent the degree to which an agent is be-
tween pairs of other agents, closeness is just the inverse of the average distance to other
agents. Closeness is defined as the mean geodesic distance from the agent of interest
to the rest of the reachable agents in the network,
closenessi = |N | − 1∑j=|N |−1
j=1 d(aj , ai)
, (3.6)
where d(aj , ai) is the shortest-path distance between aj and ai, and |N | is the number
of nodes in the network. This metric reflects the efficiency of an agent distributing
information to any agent in the network [41].
PageRank is based on the idea that an agent has a high rank if the sum of the ranks of
its neighbors are high. The ranks are calculated based on the structure of the links of
the agent of interest. Then, pagerank centrality can be defined as follows,
pageranki = α
j=|N |∑
j=1
Aaj ,ai
pagerankj
kj
+ β, (3.7)
where α and β are constants and kj is the degree of node j. This metric implies a rela-
tively low computational complexity and has been used to identify pivotal individuals
in social networks who lead to quick and wide spreading of useful items [169].
Global metrics can be suitable to estimate the risk of a sharing action in the network
since they capture the user’s relevance in the transmission of information and do not
require data about information flows. The computation of a global metric requires
the analysis of structural properties that involve the consideration of the whole social
network. However, in real-world scenarios, these metrics are not always computation-
ally affordable and information about friendship relationships is not always accessi-
ble. Moreover, some social applications do not facilitate access to users’ information to
third party applications; therefore, it is not possible to infer the social network struc-
ture beyond the first level.
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As an alternative, local and social metrics efficiently identify influential agents when
there is no global information about network structure and information diffusion [84].
These metrics are focused on the user’s ego networks. Ego networks consist of a focal
agent (ego) and the agents to whom the ego is directly connected to (these are called
alters) plus the links [175]. Local metrics such as degree and ego-betweenness only use
information from the agent itself to be computed. Degree is the simplest centrality
measure and considers the number of direct neighbors (alters) that the ego is directly
connected to,
degreei =
∑
Ai(ai, aj). (3.8)
Ego-betweenness is an ego-centric method for approximating the betweenness central-
ity [105]. This metric calculates the sum of the ego’s proportion of times that the ego
lies on the shortest path between each part of the alters. Ego-betweenness is the sum
of the reciprocal values A2i (aj , ak) such that Ai(aj , ak) = 0. Thus, ego-betweenness
can be defined as follows,
bet-egoi =
∑
Ai(ai,aj)=0,j>i
1
A2i (ai, aj)
(3.9)
Social metrics use strictly local information and topological information from an
agent’s first and second level neighbors. Social degree and Social ego-betweenness met-
rics consider the sum of the local centrality metrics of neighbors in the first two levels.
We have considered the following four social centrality metrics:
bet-egosumi =
∑
aj∈Lai (1)
bet-egoj (3.10)
degreesumi =
∑
aj∈Lai (1)
degreej (3.11)
bet-ego2sumi =
∑
aj∈Lai (2)
bet-egoj (3.12)
degree2sumi =
∑
aj∈Lai (2)
degreej (3.13)
66
CHAPTER 3. ESTIMATION OF PRIVACY RISK THROUGH CENTRALITY
METRICS
Centrality metrics provide mechanisms to estimate the relevance of users in informa-
tion transmission processes. Influential users play a key role in information diffusion
and therefore in the increase of the privacy risk if they perform a re-sharing action.
For this reason, considering global, local, and social centrality metrics might be ap-
propriate to estimate the proposed PRS when there is no data available about infor-
mation flows. Global centrality metrics can be used if the network structure is known.
If there is no access to this information, local and social centrality metrics based on
ego-networks provide metrics to estimate the relevance of users in information trans-
mission processes.
3.6 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the relationship between PRS values of an agent and its
centrality in the social network. The social networks considered for the experiments
can be viewed in terms of the friendship relationships and the activities carried out by
agents. We analyze the relationship between the structural features of the friendship
layer and the privacy risk resulting from the diffusion actions. We perform a set of
experiments in different synthetic and real networks. For the experiments in synthetic
networks we use a simulation tool to reproduce information flows in the network, and
the proposed PRSmetric tomeasure the individual risk of users. While in real networks,
how there are already real information flows, we only measure the PRS values of users.
3.6.1 Simulation environment
We based our simulation environment on the Elgg engine1 (Figure 3.6). Elgg is a pop-
ular open source engine to build a wide range of social environments. For our pur-
pose, we required to collect message tracing information and manage them in matri-
cial structures in order to calculate the PRSmetric. Therefore, we needed to extend the
functionalities of Elgg in order to fulfill our requirements. Following the Elgg policy,
we extended Social Network Services by means of plug-ins. First, we developed the
Privacy Risk Module following the structure shown in Figure 3.4, which is a plug-in
for PRS calculation according to our requirements. This module was focused on two
different purposes: for being used in simulations and with real users.
Second, we developed the Simulation Tool, which is a plug-in for modelling social net-
works and generating activity. The Simulation Tool was designed to use the services of
1https://elgg.org/
67
3.6. EXPERIMENTS
Social 
Network 
Services
Elgg Platform Layer
User
Management
Messaging 
System
Content 
Management
Elgg core
Simulation 
Tool
Interactions 
System
Privacy Risk 
Module
Others
…
Plugins
Storage 
System
Elgg API
Database
Simulation Tool
Simulation Results
Simulator Core
Input Parameters
Agents’ Behaviors
Deliberations
Diffusion actions
Action probabilities
Privacy threshold
Privacy policies
Model Network 
Generator
small-world
scale-free
…
NetworkX library
#SimulationsGeneral Parameters
User Layer
Deliberation process
Contacts
Collections
acquaintances
…
Information
Types
profile info.
posts
comments
…
Settings
Privacy policies
private
friends
public
…
Privacy threshold
Figure 3.6: Block diagram of the integration of the Simulation Tool developed as a service in the OSN.
the OSN (properly supported by Elgg) such as the creation of users and relationships,
message sending, and social interactions. Users are represented as software agents that
interact among them in the OSN. Agent-based simulation is widely used in different
areas [2]. The Simulation Tool is composed of three main components: Input Param-
eters, Simulator Core and Outputs. As Input Parameters, the simulation tool allows
the definition of the number of simulations, the network model, and the customization
of agent behaviours (i.e., message diffusion actions, probabilities, deliberation pro-
cess, etc.). For modelling social network structures, we used the NetworkX2, which is
a widely tested and recommended library for research purposes in complex networks
[134, 194, 8]. The Simulator Core carries out the simulation according to the input pa-
rameters. Finally, Simulation Results (i.e., Privacy Risk Score values of each agent) are
stored for further analysis. These both plug-ins were integrated into the existing Elgg
engine. Since this engine is open source, these plug-ins will be public available.
2https://networkx.github.io
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Random network Scale-free network Small-world network
Nodes 1000 1000 1000
Edges 6464 5875 6000
Density 0.01292 0.01175 0.012
Maximum degree 32 117 21
Minimum degree 3 5 7
Average degree 12.93 11.75 12.00
Assortativity 0.00077 -0.07481 -0.02096
Triangles 631 1022 1963
Diameter 5 5 5
Table 3.2: Structural properties of synthetic networks.
3.6.2 Settings
Theexperiments carried out using the simulation tool use synthetic networks generated
follow three classic models: Erdös-Rényi [81] (ER, random), Barabási-Albert [22] (BA,
scale-free), and Watts-Strogatz [274] (WS, small-world). The networks are undirected,
have 1000 agents with a diameter of 5, and an average degree of about 12 (see Table
3.2). The number of simulations is 400 per each agent. In each simulation an agent
is randomly selected and the simulation starts if the agent decides to post a message.
Figure 3.7 shows the deliberation process of an agent during the simulation. Each agent
decides whether or not a message diffusion action is carried out (i.e., commenting on
an existing post, sharing a post, etc.) according to his probabilities of performing each
action. If the agent decides to perform a diffusion action, then he selects the privacy
policy for this message. In case that the message was previously received by this agent
or if the agent decides not to carry out a message diffusion action, then, the message
is not diffused by this agent. Each simulation finishes when there is not any message
diffusion action in the OSN.
Simulation parameters are shown in Table 3.3. The #Simulation parameter allows to
define the simulation rounds. Network topology parameter establishes the underly-
ing social network structure (i.e., scale-free, random, small-world). Diffusion action
parameter allows to define the permitted actions in the simulation (i.e., posting a mes-
sage, sharing a message, commenting a post and liking a post). Action probability pa-
rameter establishes the probability of an agent to perform an action. Privacy threshold
parameter specifies the value from which an agent considers that an action is risky for
him. Privacy policy parameter describes the audience of an agent action (i.e., friends).
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Figure 3.7: Flowchart of the agent deliberation process.
Parameters Values
#Simulations 400× 1000 (agents)
Network topology {scale-free, random, small-world}
Diffusion action {publish, share, comment, like}
Action probability uniform
Privacy threshold uniform
Privacy policy friends
Table 3.3: Simulation parameters.
Regarding real networks, we used PHEME dataset3 that is based on the dynamics of
the life cycle of social media rumours on Twitter [297]. The dataset contains 330 con-
versational threads. We analyzed the PRS and centrality values of the 330 users that
initiated a thread through the publication of a message.
To evaluate the relationship between the PRS and structural centrality metrics in syn-
thetic and real networks, we consider message stages from 1 to 4 and also relationship
levels from 1 to 4. The reason for the number of relationship levels is based on the
analysis presented in [101] where it is reported that most of the cascades in reality are
small.
In the next subsections, calculations about agents’ PRS based on information sharing
activities are used to find a relation with centrality metrics. In this way, approxima-
tions using centrality metrics would allow us to calculate agent privacy risks in scenar-
ios where there is no access to data about social interaction, when there is no previous
activity, or when new users join the network.
3https://figshare.com/articles/PHEME_rumour_scheme_dataset_journalism_use_case/2068650
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3.6.3 PRS and global centrality metrics
In this section, we analyze whether or not there is a correlation between agents’ PRS
(i.e., dependent variable) and their global centrality (i.e., independent variable) in
synthetic networks. Real networks were not considered in these experiments since
the global structures of the rumor networks are not available. We considered the
global centrality metrics described in Section 3.4: random-walk betweenness (bet-rw),
shortest-path betweenness (bet-sp), closeness, and pagerank. The values of centrality
properties are normalized in the range [0, 1]. We used analytical regressors to estimate
the dependence relationship between centrality metrics and PRS. We considered the
R2 coefficient to determine how close the data are to the fitted regression line. In this
case, values close to 1 indicate that there is a high correlation between centrality and
PRS values.
Figure 3.8 displays the comparison between PRS and global centrality values. In 3.8, a
centrality metric is analyzed in each row, and a network topology is considered in each
column. The x axis shows the values of the agents’ PRS and the y axis shows the values
of the agents’ centrality metrics. Colors represent the number of agents with certain
values of PRS and centrality. The relationship between PRS and centrality metrics is
also shown by the coefficient of determination (R2). Due to the logarithmic behavior
of the centrality metrics (especially in the case of the scale-free network), a linear-log
filter was applied to all of the data.
First, the results reflect the variability of agents’ PRS depending on the type of network.
The scale-free BA networks (see Figure 3.8 – first column) favor higher values of PRS
(close to 0.5). In contrast, in the small-world WS networks (Figure 3.8 – third column),
PRS does not reach 0.3. It can also be observed that the type of network reflects the
existence of different groups of agents based on their privacy risk. As an example, in
the scale-free BA networks there is a small group of agents with high values of PRS
(i.e., values that range in the interval [0.3, 0.5]), while the rest are distributed between
0.1 and 0.3. In the random ER networks, there is a majority group with relatively high
values (i.e., values between 0.25 and 0.4) and a minority with very low values of PRS.
In the small-world WS network, it can be observed that most of the agents have low
PRS values (between 0.125 and 0.2) compared to other network topologies, and there
are twominorities: one with slightly lower PRS values and another with slightly higher
PRS values.
Second, there is a high correlation between global centrality metrics and the PRS
values (see Figure 3.8). The R2 value is around 0.9 in scale-free networks (Figure
3.8 – first column [bet-sp, pagerank]); 0.93 in random networks (Figure 3.8 – sec-
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Figure 3.8: Correlation between global centrality metrics and PRS for different social network topologies.
ond column [closeness]); and 0.92 in small-world networks (Figure 3.8 – third col-
umn[closeness]). Thus, we can conclude that PRS values can be approximated
through global centrality metrics in scenarios without data about information flows
in the social network.
Table 3.4 shows the relationship between PRS and global centrality metrics for each
level expressed as theR2 coefficient. Level 1 (i.e., direct neighbors) is not shown due to
its irrelevance, since it corresponds to the agent that initiates the activity (i.e., publishes
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Network type Level R
2 score
closeness pagerank bet-sp bet-rw
scale-free (BA)
2 0.82 0.79 0.75 0.66
3 0.38 0.29 0.43 0.32
4 0.82 0.25 0.40 0.18
random (ER)
2 0.93 0.90 0.88 0.83
3 0.80 0.74 0.77 0.74
4 0.95 0.82 0.84 0.78
small-world (WS)
2 0.93 0.73 0.87 0.78
3 0.96 0.74 0.86 0.77
4 0.78 0.49 0.59 0.50
Table 3.4: Evaluation of the relation between global centrality metrics and PRS by levels for different
social network topologies.
a message). As can be seen from the results, the R2 coefficient generally decreases
according to the depth of the target level, except for random ER network topology.
As the results show, the estimation of PRS using global centralitymetrics yields promis-
ing results. However, as we stated in the previous section, global centrality metrics
present several limitations: their calculation requires a knowledge of the whole net-
work structure, and they suffer from performance issues in large networks. Moreover,
a recalculation is needed when the network structure changes (i.e., when a new agent
joins/leaves the network or a relationship is created/removed). Taking into account
these challenges in calculating global centrality metrics, we examine local and social
centrality metrics in the following subsection.
3.6.4 PRS, local, and social centrality metrics
In this section, we evaluate the relationship between local and social centrality and
PRS values in synthetic and real social networks. First, we analyze degree centrality
and the ego-betweenness centrality [105] (i.e., a local approximation of the betweenness
centrality metric). Second, we analyze social degree and social ego-betweenness cen-
trality. These experiments have the same settings considered in previous experiments
(subsection 3.6.2).
Figure 3.9 shows the results of the linear-log regression analysis to determine if there
is a relationship between local centrality and PRS values. Although ego-betweenness
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Figure 3.9: Correlation between local centrality metrics and PRS for different social network topologies.
and degree centrality metrics rely on local data, they provide values in scale-free and
random network topologies that can be used to provide a fitted approximation of the
PRS. Based on agents’ privacy risk, both local metrics detect the same groups of agents
that were detected with global metrics. The R2 values obtained with local centrality
metrics in some cases improve the results provided by global centralitymetrics, or these
results are at least as good as those provided by global metrics.
Nevertheless, there are some situations where the degree or ego-betweenness centrality
of an agent can be misleading for detecting privacy risk. For instance, an agent ai can
be highly connected to other agents with a low degree of connection and ai has a high
PRS value. However, the message diffusion actions that its neighbors may perform
will not have a real risk impact on its privacy. Therefore, it would be interesting to
consider not only the local centrality metrics of an agent, but also the centrality values
of its neighbors. Hence, in the following experiments, we evaluate the relation between
social degree and social ego-betweenness metrics and PRS. Specifically, we examine
four measures in the first and second level: bet-egosum, degreesum, bet-ego2sum, anddegree2sum (see Equation 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, and 3.13). We do not consider further distancesince the majority of diffusion cascades in reality are small [101].
Figure 3.10 shows the results achieved with social degree and social ego-betweenness
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Figure 3.10: Correlation between social centrality metrics (i.e., degreesum,degree2sum, bet-egosum, andbet-ego2sum) and PRS for small-world WS network.
centrality metrics for the small-world WS network. The relationship between social
centrality and PRS values in scale-free and random structures is not shown since the
values obtained were similar to those obtained by using previous centrality metrics.
The correlation between centrality and PRS values in the small-world WS network
improves considerably for bet-ego2sum and degree2sum, while there is not any improve-ment for bet-egosum and degreesum. The reason for this could be that the ability to dis-seminate information in level 2 (i.e., direct neighbors of neighbors) has a great impact
on the final PRS. bet-ego2sum and degree2sum capture this effect better than bet-egosumand degreesum.
When analyzing the relationship between the local and social version of degree and
ego-betweenness and the PRS values by levels (see Table 3.5), we detect that local cen-
trality metrics have a behavior similar to social centrality metrics. In general, if we
compare local centrality with social centrality metrics, we find that the estimation of
the PRS by levels improves for the three topologies, especially for deep levels such as
level 4. Finally, comparing both social and local centrality metrics, degree2sum obtainsa slightly higher degree of correlation with PRS by levels than the other centrality
metrics.
Figure 3.11 shows the results obtained in real networks. Most users have low PRS values
(i.e., values in the range [0,0.2]). Social and local ego-betweenness are not suitable to
75
3.6. EXPERIMENTS
Network
type Level
R2 score
local centralities social centralities
degree bet-ego degreesum bet-egosum degree2sum bet-ego2sum
scale-
free
(BA)
2 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.47 0.63 0.35
3 0.33 0.36 0.42 0.36 0.53 0.63
4 0.28 0.30 0.83 0.90 0.94 0.88
random
(ER)
2 0.91 0.90 0.94 0.88 0.93 0.92
3 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.72 0.79 0.79
4 0.85 0.85 0.91 0.89 0.93 0.93
small-
world
(WS)
2 0.75 0.81 0.81 0.78 0.95 0.93
3 0.77 0.82 0.82 0.79 0.94 0.94
4 0.51 0.53 0.59 0.61 0.71 0.70
Table 3.5: Evaluation of the local and social centrality metrics correlation with PRS by levels for different
network topologies.
distinguish between users with high or low PRS. The degree of correlation is lower
than 0.5 (see Figure 3.11 – second column). However, social and local degree centrality
metrics provide better results. Degree and degreesum show a high degree of correlation(i.e., 0.66 with degree and 0.82 with degreesum). The results are close to those obtainedin synthetic networks, where degree2sum obtained a high degree of correlation withPRS.
The experiments validate the use of centrality metrics to approximate PRS values in
scenarios where there is no information about the activity generated in the social net-
work. In scenarios where there is information about network structure, global metrics
such as closeness show a high degree of correlation with PRS and PRS in levels. In
scenarios where there is only local knowledge, local and social centrality metrics based
on ego-networks also provide good results. Specifically, local centrality metrics pro-
vide results estimating PRS values that are just as good as those obtained with global
metrics or even better in some topologies such as scale-free networks. Social centrality
metrics have also been evaluated and the metrics that consider centrality properties
based on neighbors of neighbors (degree2sum and bet-ego2sum) obtain the best degreeof correlation with PRS and PRS in levels. Finally, we have tested local and social
centrality metrics to estimate PRS values with real data from rumor networks. The
results show that degree and degreesum provide the best approximation to estimate theprivacy risk of an action.
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Figure 3.11: Correlation between local (bet-ego and degree) and social (degreesum and degree2sum) central-ity metrics in rumour social networks.
3.7 Conclusions
Most privacy approaches focus on mechanisms that semi-automatically facilitate the
definition of privacy policies to define the audience that a user expects is going to
receive the information published. However, there is still an open problem of making
users aware of the extent of sharing information on the social network, even if such
information reaches the audience previously defined. In this paper, we have focused
on solving this problem. A measure of the privacy risk of a user-sharing action, PRS,
has been proposed based on the scope of its dissemination in the network with the
following main contributions:
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• The PRS is oriented to estimating the reachability of users’ sharing actions in-
stead of being focused on themisalignment of their users’ expected audience with
the actual audience.
• This measure is provided globally and in levels in order to be able to adjust to
the user’s perception of risk.
• The PRS takes into account the paths that the publications follow in the social
network without the need for the user to have to provide information explicitly.
• Centrality metrics have proven to be good estimators in establishing an ap-
proximation of the PRS in those social networking environments whose detailed
record of the information sharing activity in the social network is not available.
As shown in Section 3.6, despite the topological properties of the network, centrality
metrics can evaluate the user’s relevance in information transmission processes. We
have considered global metrics (i.e., betweenness, closeness, and pagerank) for scenar-
ios where a complete view of the network it is available, and local and social measures
(i.e., degree, ego-betweenness) for scenarios where you only have a local view of the
structure of the network. To evaluate the relationship between these measures of cen-
trality and the proposed measure of PRS, we have performed a set of experiments in
different topologies of synthetic networks and in real networks of rumors. The results
showed that in scenarios where there is information about network structure, global
metrics such as closeness show a high degree of correlation with PRS and PRS in lev-
els. In scenarios where there is only local knowledge, local and social centrality metrics
based on ego-networks provide a suitable approximation to PRS and PRS in levels. The
results in real social networks confirm that local and social centrality metrics based on
degree performwell in estimating a user’s privacy risk and could be integrated in social
network applications that offer limited information access.
As future work, we plan to validate the proposed privacy risk score through experi-
ments in real environments. These experiments will provide feedback about the effect
of the use of PRS on user behavior in social networks. We also plan to evaluate dif-
ferent methods (i.e., numeric values, text messages, color gradient, etc.) to show PRS
values in order to inform the user about the risk of certain actions in the network. We
will also evaluate the inclusion of new parameters (i.e., tie-strength between users, user
personality, type of content posted, etc.) that may influence the privacy risk in order
to obtain more accurate values.
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Abstract
Privacy risk inOnline Social Networks has become an important social concern. Users,
with different perceptions of risk, share information without considering the audience
that has access to the information disclosed or how far a publication will go. Accord-
ing to this, we propose two metrics (Audience and Reachability) based on information
flows and friendship layers that indicate the privacy risk of sharing information, ad-
dressing the posts’ scope and invisible audience. We assess these metrics through agent
simulations in well-known models of networks. The findings show a strong relation-
ship betweenmetrics and structural centrality network properties. We also studied sce-
narios where there is no previous information about users activity or the information
about the traces of the messages cannot be obtained. To deal with privacy assessment
in these scenarios, we analyze the relationship between the proposed privacy metrics
and local centrality properties as an estimation of privacy risk. The results showed
that effectiveness centrality can be used as a suitable approximation of the proposed
privacy measures.
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4.1 Introduction
One of the most common online activities in the European Union in 2014 was partic-
ipation in social networking [83]. According to Eurostat [209] nearly half (46 %) of
individuals aged 16 to 74 used the Internet for social networking (i.e., using sites such
as Facebook or Twitter). In general, the number of social network users is increasing
and it will reach the 2.72 billion in 2019 [245].
There are many users of social networking sites who are not aware of privacy and
often share information without considering who will or will not have access to it [128].
The effect of the lack of privacy awareness led users to negative experiences related to
privacy [270], and in some cases, there are users who consider leaving as a consequence
of inadequate control over their data [99].
Regarding problems with privacy awareness and privacy settings configuration in On-
line Social Networks (OSNs), the provision of metrics and mechanisms that facilitate
the management of individuals’ privacy and enhance the awareness of privacy risks
become an important issue [292, 265]. Applications related to OSN usually provide
mechanisms to configure the users’ privacy profile. Nevertheless, the majority of ap-
proaches focus on protecting the information referred to user profile and not to the
visibility of his/her publications. In the literature we can find proposals that try to
address these issues with the automation of privacy settings [86, 262, 34]. However,
these usually require some intervention from the user and do not solve the problem
of increasing privacy awareness. Other works deal with the improvement of user’s
awareness about the misalignment of users’ expected audience with the actual audi-
ence [49, 129, 178]. These latter works facilitate the alignment between the expected
and the actual audience. However, there is still an open problem. These proposals do
not take into account that users that are part of the target audience might re-share the
published information, losing control over the original publication scope.
The structure of the network is one of the main factors that have influence on the
scope of a sharing action [101]. This scope can be seen as the effect of a message dif-
fusion process. Spreading processes such as epidemics or information diffusion have
been analyzed in the area of Complex Networks [153, 163]. Several works have studied
spreading dynamics and influential or relevant individuals in these processes [205, 277].
In social networks, the concept of influential users are referred to those users strategi-
cally located in the network, which are responsible of information diffusion since they
can efficiently and conduct the dissemination of amessage. Since influential users may
contribute to increase the privacy risk [136], determining if there are influential users
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in the path that a user’s publication follows would be essential to assess the privacy risk
of this publication. Related to this issue, it is widely accepted that structural metrics
such as degree [201], PageRank [169], closeness, or betweenness [97, 96, 158, 98] are
suitable to detect influential users [38].
The perception of risk may be different from one user to another [185, 61, 237]. Some
users are more comfortable with the possibility that their publications can be seen
by others and they may be even interested in achieving that effect. In contrast, other
users prefer not to disclose their information beyond their direct friends [89]. Therefore,
different levels of risk perception should be considered for determining the privacy risk.
Unlike other proposals that present mechanisms to facilitate the alignment between
the expected and the actual audience, in this article we focus on the analysis of the po-
tential reach of a publication in social networks as a consequence of re-sharing actions,
assuming that the publication was received by the expected audience. We present two
privacy metrics: Reachability for measuring the user posts probability to reach certain
depth level; and Audience for clarifying the invisible audience, measuring the percent-
age of users that really will access to posts. The metrics act as an indicator of the
potential risk of user’s actions, and are based on information flows and a friendship-
layered model that provides information about the reachability of a user publication
based on the distance between the user and the potential audience. Finally, to consider
scenarios where third applications cannot have access to the traffic of users’ messages in
online social networks, we analyze if there is a correlation between structural network
factors and the proposed metrics. The results obtained in the experiments conclude
that local structural properties are correlated with the proposed privacy metrics.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents previous approaches related to
privacy score metrics. Section 3 exposes the privacy risks in social networks with a
usual scenario and proposes a solution. Section 4 describes the proposed layered pri-
vacy risk metrics. Section 5 presents the experiments that analyze if there is a correla-
tion between structural properties and the proposed privacy metrics. Finally, section
6 presents conclusions.
4.2 Related Work
As communication through social networks acquires greater relevance in our daily so-
cial interactions, it is important that users understand the effect of communicative
actions using these social tools. Users often see OSN as tools that facilitate commu-
nication that has traditionally been face-to-face [17]. However, communication using
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OSN does not have the same impact as traditional communication. It is important for
users to be aware of the scope of their communicative actions through OSN [234, 114].
Previous works tried to deal with this problem from different perspectives. There are
approaches that provide wizards to facilitate the management of privacy profile set-
tings. Fang et al. [86] present a privacy wizard based on an active learning paradigm.
Users can assign “labels” (i.e., share or not share) to a set of selected friends. Then,
previous labelling processes are used as the input for their classifier. Finally, this wiz-
ard determines labels for the remaining friends of these user that are in the same circle.
However, this approach assumes that friends in the same social circle have show similar
responses of sharing publications. Thus, this approach does not consider that friends
can play different roles. Liu et al. [164] propose a privacy score based on user’s profile
items but without considering the dynamics of how an information item is re-shared
through the social network. The authors also propose a recommendation based on a
comparison between the user’s privacy score and his/her neighbors score. If the score
is below that of his/her neighbors, the system can recommend stronger privacy set-
tings. However, not all users in a social network have the same perception of privacy
risk. Therefore, a recommendation based only on your neighbors could not fit to your
privacy preferences. A privacy score is also proposed by Vidyalakshmi et al. [262].
The authors present a framework for obtaining a privacy score metric from an indi-
vidual perspective. This metric considers users’ personal attitude towards privacy and
communication information. Privacy score is estimated using cubic bezier curve that
integrates: (i) user’s disposition to privacy; (ii) user’s attitude towards communication;
(iii) a ranking of friends according to their privacy attitude; and (iv) the frequency of
communication with friends. The use of a cubic bezier curve facilitates the representa-
tion of different types of users’ behaviors towards privacy. The inclusion of this privacy
scoremetric could imply amanual sorting process of friends based on the personal view
of the user. The proposed score only considers an ego-user view of the social network
and does not evaluate other collateral effects such as information diffusion processes
in the network. Bilogrevic et al. [34] propose an information-sharing system that de-
cides (semi-)automatically whether to share information with others, whenever they
request it, and at what granularity. They consider a vector of 18 features to feed the
classifier. The vector encodes whether the information is shared or not. Initially, users
make n decisions about features to train the classifier, and then a logistic classifier
makes the remaining decisions automatically predicting the users’ sharing decisions.
The approach requires the user intervention and also assumes that users are privacy
aware of the consequences of their decisions.
Some approaches focus on providing information of users thatmay have received infor-
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mation that was not previously addressed to them. These works help users to increase
their privacy risk awareness and to define their social groups/contexts more precisely.
Wang et al. [272] focus on the effects of soft paternalistic interventions over users’
behavior on information disclosure decisions. This proposal uses three mechanisms
that alert users about the risk of sharing information. The mechanisms are: (i) show-
ing images of users that can see the information; (ii) introducing a time delay before
sharing information; and (iii) showing a message if the information contains negative
words. The effects of these mechanisms were analyzed over a population of 21 users.
The authors payed attention to the influence over users’ behaviors depending on how
the privacy risk information was shown to the users. This study concludes that privacy
mechanisms are good to prevent unintended disclosure. However, this mechanisms do
not provide accurate information about the reachability of the information sharing
action.
Other approaches use norms as a mechanism for defining the different of personal
information and reasoning about this information [23]. Calikli et al. [49] propose
an adaptive architecture that provides recommendations for sharing information and
help users to re-configure user’s groups. This proposal is based on two main concepts:
social contexts (i.e., groupmembership information) and conflicts (i.e., privacy norms).
Thus, this proposal requires the defintion of accurate user’s social contexts and con-
flict rules. Kafali et al. [129] provide an approach based on model checking for cer-
tain properties. This system uses as input privacy agreements of the users (i.e., clauses
about which relations are entitled to which privileges), user relationships, the content
updated by users, as well as inference rules. The system determines whether or not a
property of interest (i.e., whether OSN’s commitment to hide a user’s information item)
can be violated in a given social network. Then, the user use this output to decide his
actions. Mester et al. [178] presents a platform where agents interact among them to
reach a consensus regarding a message to be published. Agents are aware of user’s pri-
vacy concerns, expectations, and friends. When a user is about to publish new content,
the agent determines which other users would be affected by the message and contacts
the respective agents of those users. The negotiation protocol allow agents to discuss
constraints and determines a suitable way to publish the content when none of the
users’ privacy is violated. In this approach, the privacy rules (i.e., privacy concerns of a
user) should be predefined using a Semantic Web Rule Language. In addition, this ap-
proach is only based on direct contacts and does not consider other levels of friendship
that may have access to this information through a friend re-sharing action.
A more flexible approach is presented by Yang et al. [288]. They present a privacy
metric of user i sharing information with a neighbor j as a trade-off between user
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i’s concerns (i.e., potential privacy risks) and incentives of sharing information with j
(i.e., potential social benefits). The potential privacy risk of i is based on the re-sharing
probability of an information receiver j (i.e., the ratio of the number of times that j re-
shares over the number of times that j receives information from a user i) and its trust
level (i.e., user i’s opinion on j). The social gain considers the receivers that belong to
a selected sharing circle and the number of interactions between i and j. They present
the privacy risk as an individual metric, without considering the consequences that
other potential users might re-share the received information. Pensa et al. [206] pro-
pose a privacy metric that includes information sensitivity and the location of a user
in the network structure using a centrality metric. Although they metric proposed is
interesting, the authors use the page-rank metric without analyzing other centrality
metrics that might fit better to the context of information diffusion and might be ap-
plied in scenarios where there is no global information of the network.
There are other works focused on the analysis of the effects of information diffusion in
social networks using SIR models. Zhu et al. [294] define a privacy protection mech-
anism based on information sharing in ONS and classify users according to different
privacy setting policies. They use a SIR model to describe the dynamics and evolution
of information propagation. However, in this proposal the authors classify users based
on a static privacy policy. They do not consider that, depending on the information,
the privacy policy of a user might change. Similarly, Bioglio et al. [35] use a SIR model
to analyze the role of attitude on privacy of a user and her friends on information
propagation in OSN. They use an extension of a SIR model that considers the privacy
attitude of users using parametric values [36]. In the simulations, the authors consider
that all the neighbouring users of the initial user where the diffusion is going to start
are going to have the same attitude as the user that starts the diffusion. This is not very
realistic due to a user usually have different groups of friends with different attitudes
in social networks.
From our point of view, privacy risk does not only concern the problem that informa-
tion might reach people who were initially not expected to receive it. Previous works
focus on this problem providing mechanisms to avoid audience misalignment. In this
paper, we assume that users who received the information are in the expected target
audience and we focus on the next step. Our proposal is focused on the analysis of
the effects over the users’ privacy when users from the intended audience re-share the
original publication.
The proposal privacy metrics (Reachability and Audience) improves previous works in
the following ways: (i) it focuses on information sharing behaviors instead of static
user’s profile configuration; (ii) it does not require previous user intervention, norms
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(a)A social network structured into
communities.
(b) Sharing action initiated by the
red node.
(c) The potential audience in 2nd
layer.
Figure 4.1: Example of a potential privacy risk in online social networks.
definition, or manual classification of friends; (iii) the proposed metrics does not pro-
vide a unique value to represent the risk of sharing activities; it provides the metrics
considering layers of friendship (i.e., confidence) that provides a more accurate view
of the disclosure effect over user’s privacy.
4.3 Privacy Threats in OSN
Privacy risk not only concerns the problem that information might reach people who
were initially not expected to receive it, but it also involves the problem of losing con-
trol over the scope of the information. Figure 4.1 describes this privacy risk problem
in online social networks. The elements shown have the following meaning: nodes rep-
resent users; lines represent friendship relations; scribbled-nodes represent users with
content access; encircled-nodes (colored) represent users who share content.
In Figure 4.1a, we show the structure of a social network that is organized into four
communities. Figure 4.1b shows the action ”sharingmessage on his/her wall” performed
by the red node. The node determines the audience depending on his selected privacy
policy (e.g., friends). Therefore, only his friends can see themessage (i.e., nodes scribbled
in green). If a green node performs a sharing action (i.e., nodes encircled in green), the
message could reach other communities causing a privacy risk problem (see Figure 4.1c,
new nodes scribbled in green in community 1 and 4). The privacy risk of each node
variates, as can be seen in the scenario, depending on its position in the social network
and his behavior. Therefore, it is important to provide metrics about potential privacy
risks to users for improving their control and awareness of the privacy.
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Taking into consideration the problem described, there are a lot of moments using
social media where this problem may appear. For example, there are situations where
users need to use social media as therapy making negatives comments about work,
politics or religion [283]. This actions can become viral (or ”far-reaching”, depending
on user’s perception) causing privacy risks and users’ regret [293]. The use of social
media knowing the reachability of users’ publications would increase the awareness
of users’ actions reachability and would reduce users’ privacy risk. In addition, there
are many articles that analyse silent listeners or invisible audiences and the effect of
their actions on users privacy [31, 238]. When users share photos about their holidays
with relatives and friends, they may expect that these photos will be seen indirectly by
friends of friends; but previous research studies revealed that users are only aware of a
small part of the real audience that sees the publication [31].
To deal with the above privacy risk problems, we define two privacymetrics: Reachabil-
ity andAudience. Thesemetrics estimate the privacy risk of a user when shares amessage
in a social network. These metrics can be applied to users’ friendship layers. Reacha-
bility metric obtains the probability of a message to reach a specific ratio/percentage
of users given a specific sharing action. The user can specify this ratio. The Audience
metric obtains the percentage of users that will see a message given a specific sharing
action and a friendship layer revealing the invisible audience. These metrics aim to
increase the users’ awareness about the reachability of their publications in the social
network even though they have restricted the visibility of their publications.
4.4 Privacy Risk Metrics when Sharing Information
To define how Reachability and Audience work, first we are going to explain some
important concepts. We assume that there is a social network G that consists of N
nodes, where every node ai ∈ N = {a1, ..., an} represents a user. Users are connected
through bidirectional and undirected links that represent friendship relationships and
correspond to the edges E ⊆ N × N of G. We define the adjacency matrix A to
represent these links. Given two users ai and aj , if there is a link between these users,
we represent this as Aai,aj = 1 and Aai,aj = 0 if there is not a link.
The privacy metrics proposed to evaluate the risk of sharing information actions (e.g.,
publishing a message in his/her own wall, commenting an existing post, sharing a post,
etc.) act as an indicator of the potential risk of the messages diffused over the social
network (i.e., potential scope and visibility). The higher the Reachability and Audience
values, the higher the threat to user ai’s privacy by performing a sharing information
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action.
4.4.1 Metrics Calculation
In the social media context, users performmessage diffusion actions that have a poten-
tial risk associated with the potential subsequent action that may diffuse the message
over the social network. In addition, another point to take into consideration is that
not all users have the same view of risk when sharing information. Some users may
consider that sharing information with “friends of friends” might be risky while other
users may consider that the true risk is at the next layer of friendship. Moreover, some
users may consider risky that few users (one or two) of a certain layer of friendship
see some information while other users may consider risky only when the majority of
users of a certain layer see it. In order to consider different perceptions of risk in shar-
ing actions in social networks, we have defined the concepts of friendship layer and
information reachability.
Friendship layer is based on the social distance between users. We define the distance
between any pair of users ai and aj as the minimum number of links to be traversed
to reach one aj from ai and is represented as d(ai, aj).
We define a friendship layer Lai(l) as the subset of users whose distance to the source
user ai is l:
Lai(l) ⊆ N, ∀aj ∈ Lai(l) : d(ai, aj) = l ∧ ∄d′(ai, aj) < d(ai, aj)
Therefore, users in layer 1 are those that are direct neighbors of ai, users in layer 2 are
those that are linked with 2 links from ai and so on.
We define the information reachability of a user ai as the number of users that saw
a message m published by ai. We define a N × N reachability matrix γm for each
message m that is diffused on the social network. The rows and the columns of γm
represent users. We use γm(ai, aj) to refer to the entry in the aith row and ajth column
of γm, and it has two possible values [0, 1], where 1 represents that messagemwas sent
by ai and reached aj and 0 that did not reach aj . Γ = {γ1, ..., γm} represents the set
of all γm associated to each messaged propagated in the network.
Based on the friendship layer and the information reachability, we define two metrics,
Reachability and Audience, to provide feedback about the privacy risk of a user when
shares information in a social network.
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Figure 4.2: Example of social network activity and the calculation process of the Reachability and Au-
dience metrics. In this example, all information shared is visible by users’ direct friends. The directed
arrows indicate the direction of the message. The number between brackets indicates the stage in the
forwarding process of a message. Users perform the following actions on the social network: (case 1)
user a1 publishes/shares a message m1 on his/her wall and users a3 and a8 re-share m1; (case 2) user
a1 publishes/shares a message m2 on his/her wall and users a5 and a7 re-share m2; (case 3) user a1
publishes/shares a messagem3 on his/her wall and users a3 re-sharesm3.
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Reachability (Re(ai, l, r)) represents the probability of a message diffused by a user
ai of reaching a percentage r (i.e., reachability ratio) of users in layer l. Considering
Lai(l) as the set of users in layer l from a user ai and r as a reachability ratio of users,
Reachability metric can be calculated as
Re(ai, l, r) =
|Γ′′|
|Γ′| , (4.1)
where Γ′ represents the set of reachability matrixes associated to messages in which ai
participated in their diffusion, Γ′ ⊆ Γ, such that ∀γm ∈ Γ′ → ∃ak |γm(ai, ak) = 1;
and Γ′′ represents the set of reachability matrixes associated to messages in which ai
participated in the information flow and were viewed by a percentage of users of layer
l greater than r
Γ′′ ⊆ Γ′, such that ∀γm ∈ Γ′′ →
∑
aj∈Lai (l)
γm(ai, aj)
|Lai(l)|
≥ r
The Reachabilitymetric (Re(ai, l, r)) is appropriate to evaluate the risk that a message
shared by a user reaches certain friendship layer. Figure 4.2 shows an example ofReach-
ability metric calculation for user a1, at friendship layer 3, and considering a ratio r
of 0.15 (Re(a1, 3, 0.15)). In this scenario, a1 wants to obtain the probability that a
publication in its wall will reach a few users (i.e., r = 0.15) at friendship level 3. The
value of Re (Re = 2/3) means that there is a high probability (greater than 0.5) that
the information reaches level 3.
Audience (Au) represents the percentage of users in layer l that is expected to see a
message diffused by ai considering the total number of users of that layer Au(ai, l)
(Eq. 4.2), or considering the total number of users of the network AuG(ai, l) (Eq. 4.3).
The audience Au(ai, l) provides a local insight about the risk in a specific layer of the
social network. However, the information that Au(ai, l) provides about the audience
that has seen a message in a specific layer could be biased by the number of agents in
that layer. Therefore, it could be also interesting for the user to obtain a more global
picture of the risk of reaching certain layer considering the whole network. For this
reason, we have also proposed theAuG(ai, l)metric considering the total of agents of
the network.
89
4.4. PRIVACY RISK METRICS WHEN SHARING INFORMATION
Au(ai, l) =
∑
γm∈Γ′
 ∑aj∈Lai (l) γm(ai,aj)|Lai (l)|

|Γ′| (4.2)
AuG(ai, l) =
∑
γm∈Γ′
 ∑aj∈Lai (l) γm(ai,aj)|N |

|Γ′| (4.3)
The Audience metrics are appropriate to evaluate the privacy risk of a sharing action
based on the coverage that this actionwill achieve at certain friendship layer. Figure 4.2
shows the calculation of the Audience metrics for messages sent by user a1 considering
the third level of friendship. In this scenario, a1 wants to know exactly the percentage
of users (i.e., the audience) that will see a publication on his wall. Therefore, a1 will
consider the audience metrics.
Figure 4.2 shows a scenario that represents an example of a social network with in-
teractions between users. In the scenario, there are three friendship layers and the
reachability matrix associated with each message generated in the social network (i.e.,
γ1, γ2, and γ3). We assume that all of the users in G have the privacy policy that only
their direct friends can see their walls. The message diffusion actions performed in this
scenario are the following. In Case 1 (1), user a1 publishes a message m1 on his/her
wall. Therefore, users a2 and a3 can see the message m1. The information about the
users that seem1 as a result of this sharing action performed by a1 is stored in γ1. In
γ1, we are measuring the reachability of the m1 when a user interacts with the mes-
sage (2). Then, user a3 decides to share m1 on his/her wall. Users a4, a5, a6, a7, and
a8 can see the message m1. As in the previous case, the information about the users
that can see the message m1 as a result of the sharing action of a3 is updated in γ1.
Note that the corresponding row of a1 is also updated with the new users that seem1.
This update reflects the ’indirect’ reachability of user a1 through the actions of a3 (3).
Then, user a8 sharesm1 publishing it on his/her wall. Users a3 and a9 can see it and
the information in γ1 is updated. As in the previous situation, rows corresponding to
users a3 and a1 are also updated. In the cases 2 and 3 (i.e., messages m2 and m3 re-
spectively), the process performs in a similar way to the case 1. The difference is that
the users that re-share the message are different. In the case 2, the users that re-share
them2 are a3, a5 and a7. In the case 3, the user that re-shares them3 is a3. The corre-
sponding reachability matrixes (i.e., γ2 and γ3) are updated accordingly to the sharing
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actions performed by the users. Following the example, the metric values of Reacha-
bility and Audience proposed in this paper of the user a1 for a three-level depth and a
15% correspond to 0.66 (Re), 0.33 (Au), and 0.09 (AuG) respectively. A Reachability
value of 0.66 means in this case that 2 out of 3 times the message reached more than
15% of the users at third-level depth. An Audience value of 0.33means in this case that
as average 1 out of 3 users on the third-level will have access to the message, that at the
same time corresponds to a 10% of the users on the whole network (0.09).
4.5 Experiments
Several experiments were performed to evaluate the privacy risk metrics proposed:
Reachability and Audience. There are two sets of experiments. The first set evaluates
the privacy risk metrics in different network topologies considering different layers.
The second set of experiments analyzes if there is a correlation between the privacy
metrics proposed and structural properties of the networks. The use of structural met-
rics would facilitate the estimation of the privacy metrics proposed in scenarios where
there is no data available about users’ information flows.
For both set of experiments, we use a social network simulation tool. This simulation
tool was developed using the open source Elgg framework1 where is possible to build
real and virtual social environments. The simulation tool is capable of reproducing so-
cial network scenarios such as the creation of users and relationships, message sending,
and social interactions.
4.5.1 Experiment settings
The networks generated in the experiments follow three models: Watts-Strogatz [274]
(WS, small-world), Barabási-Albert [22] (BA, scale-free), and Erdös-Rényi [81] (ER,
random). Table 4.1 shows the set of parameters and properties that characterize each
of the networks used for the simulations.
Each simulation run consists of 1000 seed messages published by randomly selected
agents. These seed messages cause that other agents, in turn, perform actions to dif-
fuse the messages throughout the network. The diffusion of a messagem occurs when
an agent ai sees a publication. Then, the agent evaluates the risk of sharing m con-
sidering the reachability or the audience metrics (Re, Au or AuG depending on the
1https://elgg.org/
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Model Watts-Strogatz Barabási-Albert Erdös-Rényi
type small-world scale-free random
# agents 1000 1000 1000
mean degree 12 12 12
diameter 5 5 5
Table 4.1: Networks structural properties.
Parameter Values
network models {Watts-Strogatz, Barabási-Albert, Erdös-Rényi}
# agents 1000
privacy policy friends
layers 2-4
# simulations per network 50
# seed messages per simulation 1000
Table 4.2: Experiment settings.
scenario) values. If the value of the corresponding metric is greater than his individual
risk threshold (i.e., a random uniform distributed value in the range [0,1]), ai does not
perform the action, simulating that the agent decided not to propagate the publica-
tion. Otherwise, ai shares the messagem. In the latter case, the message could be seen
by other neighbor agents and the matrix γi will be updated. Figure 4.3 summarizes the
specific diffusionmodel adopted in the simulation which corresponds to a combination
of a SIR model with a threshold value.
We perform 50 simulations per each type of network and considering friendship layers
l = 2, l = 3 and l = 4 (see Table 4.2). For Reachability metric (Eq. 4.1), we considered
two reachability ratio values: r = all, where the label all represents the ratio percent-
age of 100% in the specified layer (i.e., if the message reaches all the agents of the layer);
and r = one, where the label one represents the ratio percentage to reach one agent
in the specified layer. This percentage value will change in each agent since the total
number of agents in a layer is not equal for all the agents. For Audiencemetrics (Eq. 4.2
and 4.3), we consider the population of a specific layer Au and the whole population
of the network AuG.
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Figure 4.3: Flowchart of the diffusion model followed for each agent in the simulation.
4.5.2 Privacy Metrics in Different Network Topologies
In this section, we analyze the performance of the Reachability and Audience metrics in
the three network topologies considered. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 summarize the results of
the simulations.
As it can be observed in Table 4.3, the value of Re for r = all is 0 or a value close
to 0 for layers 2-4 in all the networks structures. These results show that it is difficult
that a message reaches all the agents in the network. However, the value of Re for
r = one increases as the layer increases in the three network structures. Initially,
according to the privacy settings of the agents in the network, all direct friends of an
agent ai (i.e., agents in layer l = 1) see the publication of ai. Therefore, the Re in
that layer is 1. Then, a subset of these direct friends will re-share the publication. As a
result, among all the possible agents at layer 2, only those that are direct contacts of the
subset agents that re-shared will see the publication. For this reason, the probability to
reach an agent in layer 2 (i.e., Re(ai, 2, one)) decreases to 0.5. In the following layers
the Re value increases considerable. The main reason for this is that the publication
has been widely propagated in the network and there is a high probability that agents
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in layers 3 or 4 receive the same publication from different sources (i.e., agents). The
values of Re are higher in small-world and random networks due to there is a higher
degree of clustering in these topologies than in scale-free networks. Therefore, there is a
higher probability that an agent receives the same information from different sources.
The Re metric for r = one captures the idea of the reachability that a publication
can achieve in a specific layer. However, this information can be completed with the
consideration of the audience in a specific layer. In order to know the percentage of
agents that see a message in a specific layer, we calculate the values of Audience for the
agents (see Table 4.4). The results obtained withAu show a similar trend to the results
obtained withRe. The percentage of agents that see the message increases as the layer
increases in the three network structures. The highest values of Au are obtained by
agents in random networks.
The audience that has seen a message in a specific layer could be biased by the number
of agents in that layer. Therefore, we have also analyzed the AuG metric considering
the total of agents of the network. As in the case of Au, the highest values of AuG are
obtained in random networks. In the case of AuG metric, there is a difference with
respect the trend in the values obtained with Au and Re when a message arrives at
layer l = 4. In the scenario that we have considered for the experiments, the networks
have a diameter of 5. When a message arrives at a layer close to the diameter, the
number of agents in that layer is usually low. It is very likely that there is an alternative
shorter path to the agent that originated the message. Therefore, the number of agents
in that layer is low with respect to the total of agents in the network and the values of
AuG are also low.
Taking into account the results of Reachability and Audience obtained in the experi-
ments, we can conclude that the network topology has a direct effect on the outreach
of the information published and therefore, in the proposed metrics. Results also show
that there is a high probability that in a scenario where the agents’ privacy policy is
”friends”, a publication reaches a layer l = 3, and inside this layer, in the case of
random networks, the percentage of agents that could see the publication could arrive
close to 30% of the network. The results obtained with Reachability and Audiencemetrics
reinforce the theories of invisible audiences [31].
In spite of theReachability and theAudience estimations provide a suitablemeasurement
of the privacy risk associated with a user’s publication action, the calculation of these
values presents limitations under certain situations. In real-world scenarios, it is not
always computationally affordable the collection and analysis of a detailed record of
the sharing activity in an OSN.This becomes more complicated if the OSN frequently
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mean ± std small-world scale-free random
Re(ai, 2, one) .514± .121 .514± .121 .606± .025
Re(ai, 3, one) .901± .054 .765± .113 .950± .045
Re(ai, 4, one) .945± .038 .784± .151 .968± .048
Re(ai, {2, 3, 4}, all) 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table 4.3: Statistical analysis of Reachability (Re) values for different network topologies (mean±std).
mean ± std small-world scale-free random
Au(ai, 2) 22.56± 1.28 13.24± 4.37 18.56± 0.98
Au(ai, 3) 24.48± 2.99 28.77± 3.40 42.73± 5.37
Au(ai, 4) 39.13± 5.36 40.91± 9.31 70.51± 5.95
AuG(ai, 2) 2.51± 0.57 2.09± 1.94 3.66± 0.96
AuG(ai, 3) 14.73± 2.87 19.60± 3.13 31.24± 3.71
AuG(ai, 4) 10.61± 1.59 5.23± 3.78 3.63± 2.53
Table 4.4: Statistical analysis of Audience (Au) values for different network topologies (mean± std).
modifies its structure. Moreover, the access to users’ information and their activities in
some OSN applications to third-party applications is not always possible. It can also
happen that even if we have access to the activity of users, there are situations (e.g.,
when a new user joins the social network) where we do not have information about
the previous activity of users. For these reasons, in the following sections, we propose
an approximation that evaluates the use of structural network properties to estimate
Reachability andAudiencemetrics. Specifically, considering the previous results, we have
selected the Re(ai, l, r = one) and AuG metrics for the following analysis.
4.5.3 Correlation between privacy metrics and structural properties
In this section, we present an approximation based on structural network metrics. This
approximation does not use information about the traces of the paths follows by users’
messages in OSN. We analyzed the relationship between the Reachability and the Audi-
ence of a user and his centrality values.
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Global structural centrality properties
Initially, we considered global centrality metrics to evaluate if there is a relationship
between the privacy risk metrics and centrality. These centrality metrics use informa-
tion about the entire network structure to be computed. Among the global metrics,
we have considered [190]: (i) random-walk betweenness [191] that considers the number
of times a random walk between two pairs passes through the agent of interest; (ii)
closeness, that considers the average length of the shortest paths between an agent and
all other agents in the network; and (iii) eigenvector, that gives each agent a score pro-
portional to the sum of the scores of his neighbors. The values of the centrality metrics
were normalized in [0, 1] interval.
Using analytical regression, we study how each centralitymetric is related to the values
of Reachability and Audience. For this, we performed regression tests where a regressor
is launched for each centrality metric. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show the relationship be-
tween Reachability (or Audience) and centrality values. The point color represents the
number of agents with specific values of the metrics. We considered theR2 coefficient
to determine how close the values of the metrics are to the regression model. R2 values
close to 1 indicate that there is a high correlation betweenReachability (or Audience) and
the centrality metric. The regression models considered in the experiments are linear,
polynomial and logarithmic.
First, we analyze the accuracy of global centrality measures to estimate the Reacha-
bility metric by layers (see Table 4.5). In general, independently of the layer and the
network topology, the best results are obtained by the random-walk betweenness cen-
trality. Figure 4.4 shows the relationship between theRe at layer 3 and global central-
ity metrics in each network topology considered. We can observe that the polynomial
regressor model has slightly higher R2 values than the linear or the logarithmic. The
polynomial regressor model allows adjusting to a linear correlation, especially in the
case of the small-world network, whereas in the scale-free network and in some cases
the random network its behaviour tends to be curved and therefore it improves remark-
ably to other adjustments.
Second, we analyze the accuracy of global centrality measures to estimate the Audi-
ence metric by layers (see Table 4.5). The R2 coefficient values show that there is a
clear relation between closeness centrality and the AuG metric. Figure 4.5 shows the
relationship between the AuG metric at layer 3 and global centrality metrics in each
network topology. The polynomial regressor model provides the best R2 coefficient
values, especially in the case of the small-world network. In the scale-free networks,
the correlation values between the global centrality metrics and the AuG are low, ex-
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(a)WS small-world (b) BA scale-free (c) ER random
Figure 4.4: Approximation of Reachabilitymetric at layer l = 3 using global centrality metrics (different
network topologies considered).
cept for closeness centrality metric. It can also observed that for agents with high
centrality values, their AuG values are low. The main reason for these results is that
in scale-free topologies, when theAuG is calculated for layers close to the network di-
ameter (d=5), the number of agents that have not been received the message yet is low
compared to the total number of agents in the network.
Considering the global centrality measures analyzed, random-walk betweenness met-
ric provides a more fitted approximation to Reachabilitymetric, while closeness metric
provides a more fitted approximation to Audience metric.
Another phenomenon that can be observed is the distribution of agents in different
groups depending on network topology and the metrics. In Figure 4.4, we observe that
most of the agents in small-world networks have high Re values (values close to 0.9)
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(a)WS small-world (b) BA scale-free (c) ER random
Figure 4.5: Approximation of Audience metric at layer l = 3 using global centrality metrics (different
network topologies considered).
compared to other network topologies, and there are two extreme minorities: one with
lower Re values ([0.6, 0.85]) and another with slightly higher Re values ([0.9, 1]). In
the scale-free networks, there is a small group of agents with high values of Re metric
([0.8, 1]) while the rest of agents are distributed between 0.6 and 0.8 values of Re. In
the random networks, there is a core group with high values (between 0.9 and 1) and a
minority of agents with values of Re between 0.7 and 0.9. Therefore, in this scenario,
the topologies where there is a large group of agents with a high degree of Reachability
are random and small world networks.
Something similar occurs in Figure 4.5. In the small-world network for layer l = 3, we
observe thatmost of the agents have intermediateAuG values (i.e., values close to 0.15)
compared to other network topologies, and there are two extreme minorities: one with
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slightly lower AuG values ([0.1, 0.12]) and another with slightly higher AuG values
([0.17, 0.22]). In the scale-free networks, there is a small group of agents with high
values ofAuG metric ([0.15, 0.22]) while the rest of agents are distributed between 0.1
and 0.15 values ofAuG. In the random networks, there is a core group with relatively
high values (0.35) and a minority of agents with very low values of AuG. Therefore,
in this scenario, the topologies where there is a large group of agents that can reach a
wider audience are scale-free and random networks.
R2
small-world scale-free random
RW_BC CC EC RW_BC CC EC RW_BC CC EC
Re(ai, 2, one) 0.69 0.48 0.34 0.85 0.25 0.24 0.73 0.50 0.43
Re(ai, 3, one) 0.80 0.79 0.61 0.87 0.38 0.39 0.86 0.91 0.82
Re(ai, 4, one) 0.55 0.51 0.52 0.67 0.24 0.34 0.49 0.48 0.49
AuG(ai, 2) 0.81 0.92 0.75 0.97 0.92 0.90 0.90 0.96 0.95
AuG(ai, 3) 0.71 0.93 0.72 0.20 0.82 0.34 0.49 0.56 0.54
AuG(ai, 4) 0.53 0.81 0.61 0.21 0.96 0.83 0.80 0.96 0.94
Table 4.5: Dependence strength between global centrality properties and privacy risk (Reachability and
Audience) values measured using the R2 coefficient. The best adjustments have been highlighted. Header
columns correspond with random-walk betweenness centrality (RW_BC), closeness centrality (CC), and
eigenvector centrality (EC).
Local structural centrality properties
Global structural centrality properties are suitable for social networking services
providers that have access to the network structure. Otherwise, some OSN applica-
tions do not facilitate access to users’ information to third-party applications, there-
fore it is not possible to infer the social network structure beyond the first layer. For
these reasons, we have also considered strictly local metrics to evaluate their suitability
to estimate Reachability and Audience values in layers.
Considering the limitations to calculate global centrality metrics, in this section we ex-
amine local centrality metrics. We considered degree, the number of links of an agent;
ego-betweenness, an ego-centric method to approximate the betweenness centrality; and
effectiveness, an ego-centric method that measures the number of alters minus the aver-
age degree of alters within the ego network, not counting ties to ego network [3]. The
effectiveness reflects the links that lead to different people. A high value of effectiveness
implies that the agent can lead to a high number of different people.
Table 4.6 shows the results of the analysis of the relation between Reachability and local
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(a)WS small-world (b) BA scale-free (c) ER random
Figure 4.6: Approximation of Reachability metric at layer l = 3 using local centrality metrics (different
network topologies considered).
centrality metrics in different network topologies. It can be observed that the best
results are obtained with the effectiveness centrality. Figure 4.6 shows the relation
between Re values and local centrality values for layer 3. In small-world networks,
ego-betweenness and effectiveness centrality metrics yield good results, in some cases
even better than global centrality metrics. In scale-free networks, the relation between
Re and local centrality metrics is better than with global metrics. Moreover, we can
observe a logarithmic relation between Re and local centrality values, especially in
scale-free networks. In random networks, there are no significant differences between
global and local metrics and their relation to the Re metric.
Regarding theAudiencemetric, Table 4.6 shows the results of the analysis of the relation
between Audience and local centrality metrics in different network topologies. It can be
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(a)WS small-world (b) BA scale-free (c) ER random
Figure 4.7: Approximation of Audience metric at layer l = 3 using local centrality metrics (different
network topologies considered).
observed that the best R2 values for small-world and random network topologies are
obtained using the effectiveness centrality. In the case of scale-free network topologies,
there is only a high correlation values betweenAuG and local centrality values for layer
2. Figure 4.7 shows the relation between Audience values and local centrality values for
layer 3. Ego-betweenness and effectiveness centrality metrics yield good results using a
linear regressor. In scale-free networks, the relation between Audience and local metrics
is similar to global metrics. We also observe a polynomial behavior between Audience
and local centrality values. In random networks, there are no significant differences
between global and local metrics and their relation to the Audience metric.
Results show that local centrality metrics offer similar results to global metrics to
estimate Reachability and Audience values. Effectiveness centrality metric provides a
101
4.5. EXPERIMENTS
R2
small-world scale-free random
D EGO_BC EF D EGO_BC EF D EGO_BC EF
Re(ai, 2, one) 0.46 0.58 0.68 0.72 0.78 0.78 0.65 0.65 0.65
Re(ai, 3, one) 0.67 0.83 0.86 0.83 0.86 0.85 0.88 0.82 0.88
Re(ai, 4, one) 0.57 0.53 0.56 0.69 0.43 0.74 0.50 0.41 0.53
AuG(ai, 2) 0.76 0.89 0.90 0.98 0.95 0.98 0.96 0.95 0.96
AuG(ai, 3) 0.67 0.79 0.81 0.21 0.07 0.21 0.53 0.51 0.53
AuG(ai, 4) 0.55 0.60 0.61 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.85 0.79 0.88
Table 4.6: Dependence strength between local centrality properties and privacy risk (Reachability and
Audience) values measured using the R2 coefficient. The best adjustments have been highlighted. Header
columns correspond with degree centrality (DC), ego betweenness centrality (EGO_BC), and effectiveness
(EF).
slightly higher fitted approximation using the logarithmic regressor model. Results
obtained with Effectiveness along with the ease of its calculation allow us to make an
estimation of the proposed risk metrics (i.e., Reachability and Audience) that will assess
the user in the publication process of an information item in an OSN.
If we observe the relation between the different values of privacy risk metrics and the
centrality measures (global and local), we reach the following conclusions. Regard-
ing the global centrality metrics, closeness metric has a higher correlation with pri-
vacy risk metrics, especially with Audience, in different network topologies than other
global centrality metrics. In the case of Reachability, random-walk betweenness pro-
vides a higher degree of correlation. Regarding local centrality metrics, effectiveness
metric achieves the best results both in the different network topologies and for the
different types of privacy risk metrics (i.e., Reachability and Audience). Specifically, ef-
fectiveness metric yields promising results comparable to global centrality measures
and close to the proposed privacy risk metrics (i.e., Reachability and Audience). More-
over, effectiveness facilitates the estimation of privacy risk in scenarios where there is
no global knowledge or there is no previous information about users’ privacy policies
or information flows. Effectiveness offers a powerful advantage to provide real-time
personalized solutions to users when they post or share information through ONS.
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4.6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a newmodel of privacy risk based on friendship layers.
The concept of friendship layers allows us to provide information about user’s privacy
risk for different levels of risk perception. Based on this model, we propose two privacy
risk metrics Reachability and Audience. Reachability provides information to the user
about the probability that a message that he publishes reaches a specific friendship
layer or a specific number of users in that layer. Audience provides information to the
user about the percentage of users in a specific layer that is probable that see a message
he published.
We evaluated the proposed Reachability and Audience through simulations in different
social network topologies and considering different layers. The results show that net-
work topology has a direct effect on the outreach of the information published when
agents’ privacy policy is “friends”. In the scenario analyzed, if an agent publishes a
message, there is a high probability (close to 0.9) that reaches a layer l = 3 and the per-
centage of agents that could see the publication will be close to 30% of the network. The
results of the simulations provide a real vision of the privacy risk that is higher than
the users risk initially might think, which reinforces the theories of invisible audiences.
Finally, we consider a different approximation of Reachability and Audience for sce-
narios where there is no previous information about users activity or the information
about the traces of the messages cannot be obtained. The proposed approximations
are based on structural centrality metrics. We analyzed the relation between Reach-
ability and Audience and centrality metrics. We considered global centrality metrics
that have a complete overview of the structure of the network and the local centrality
metrics that only consider local information. Regarding the global centrality metrics,
the results show that, to estimate the Reachability metric the best results are obtained
by the random-walk betweenness centrality. To estimate the Audience metric the best
results are obtained by the closeness centrality. Regarding local centrality metrics, ef-
fectiveness is the most suitable property to approximate Reachability. In the case of the
relation between Reachability and centrality metrics, there are no relevant differences
between the degree of correlation values obtained with global or local metrics. To esti-
mate the Audience using local centrality metrics, in small-world and random networks,
the best results are obtained with effectiveness centrality. For scale-free networks, ef-
fectiveness provides good results for the estimation of Audience in layers that are not
close to the network diameter. Based on these results, we propose a common regression
model based on the effectiveness centrality values of agents to approximateReachability
and Audience values in different network models.
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As future work, we plan to validate Reachability and Audiencemetrics in a real scenario
that allows us to obtain users’ feedback to evaluate the suitability of the proposed met-
rics. We also plan the analysis of the effects of different informative methods to show
the users’ privacy risk in an online social network. Finally, we will extend the proposed
metrics with the inclusion of new factors about the users (such as personality and trust)
and about the publication (such as sensitivity and virality). These factors may have a
great influence on the diffusion of a message in the social network and provide a more
precise approximation about the publications’ scope.
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Abstract
The use of online social networks is a continuous trade of relinquishing to some pri-
vacy in exchange of getting some social benefits like maintaining (or creating new)
relationships, getting support, influence on others opinions, etc. OSN users are faced
with this decision each time they share some information. The amount of informa-
tion or its sensibility is directly related to the amount of users’ privacy loss. Currently,
there are several approaches for assessing the sensitivity of the information based on
the willingness of users to provide them, the monetary benefits derived from extracting
knowledge of them, the amount of information they provide, etc. In this work, we focus
on quantifying data sensitivity as the combination of all the approaches and adapting
them to the OSN domain. Furthermore, we propose a way to score a publication sen-
sitivity as the accumulative value of sensitivity of the information types included in it.
Finally, an experiment with 196 teenagers was carried out to assess the effectivity of
empowering users about the sensitivity of the publication. Results show a significant
effect on users’ privacy behavior with the nudge message and the sensitivity included
in it.
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5.1 Introduction
Online social networks have become a popular tool, being one of the main Internet
activities among users [245]. OSN users1 interact and socialize with each other by
sharing their opinions and comments, supporting their friends and favorite groups,
and posting their information, activities, etc. As a result, a huge amount of traffic of
personal data is produced daily. The way to control the access and use of the data
is via privacy policies. However, privacy is a very complex concept for users due to
its diffuse nature and the number of factors that must be taken into account [231]
(e.g., the sensitivity of the message, the properties/context of the receiver, the scope of
the action, etc.). Even so, users are constantly confronted with the privacy decision-
making process for each piece of data they share, which may produce privacy issues.
These occur not only due to the users’ lack of knowledge about privacy or the service
provider’s data usage but also because other usersmay have access to user data [213]. As
a consequence, some usersmay be exposed to situations such as losing their reputations,
experiences that make them feel uncomfortable, or publications that unintentionally
become available to a broader audience than the audience initially expected [11]. For
these reasons, users’ concerns regarding the vulnerability of their personal data have
been raised.
Although users state that they are concerned about their privacy [5, 125], there are
works that highlight the difference between users’ attitude and their actual behavior
towards privacy [148, 24]. This phenomenon is known as the Privacy Paradox. A way
to explain this phenomenon is the users’ perception at the moment of privacy decision
making [109]. When they are going to share personal data, users assess the benefits
and risks of sharing personal data. If users perceive the benefits to be higher than
the risks, they will share. However, privacy risks are perceived as being abstract and
psychologically distant, andmore related to the distant future, while the social rewards
are perceived to be psychologically near and more concrete, and related to the short
term. If users had informative and personalized metrics available about the risks, they
could better assess their privacy decisions. The nudge mechanisms are a great solution
since it may minimize regret and align the behavior with the stated preferences [7].
The information shared by users, especially personal data, has different levels of sensi-
tivity ranging from totally trivial to extremely intimate data. Legislation such as the
1Over the course of this paper, when we use user and network concepts, we refer to OSN users and
OSNs, respectively.
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GDPR2, NIST3, or UKAN4 (which emerged from the need to protect users’ data) dis-
tinguishes different levels of data sensitivity. Companies that buy, sell, and exchange
users’ data as an economic resource also consider different values of data based on the
kind of information provided and whether they can link it to other data [172]. Compa-
nies have included the data as part of their business model in a data-driven economy.
However, users are not completely aware of the value or sensitivity of their data. More-
over, we have different perceptions of sensitivity for our personal data depending on
socio-cultural factors [221]. Therefore, if we empower users by making them aware of
the value and/or sensitivity of their personal data through nudge mechanisms, they
will be able to choose more suitable privacy policies [7].
In this work, our main contributions are the following: (i) a literature review about the
different approaches to estimate the sensitivity of personal data (law, market, individ-
uals, linguistic, and social networks); (ii) a proposal for a ranking/metric of sensitivity
as the combination of all of the approaches that adapts them to the OSN domain; and
(iii) a validation experiment that tests the effect of sensitivity nudges (based on our
metric proposal) on real users’ behavior. The paper is organized as follows. Section
5.2 analyzes and reviews previous works on establishing a sensitivity value for data.
Section 5.3 presents our proposal for calculating the sensitivity value of social network
publications. Section 5.4 includes the results of the experiment carried out to assess the
effect of informing the user (via a nudge message) about the sensitivity of their pub-
lications before sharing them. We discuss our findings in Section 5.5 and provide our
final conclusions in Section 5.6.
5.2 Literature review
5.2.1 Definition of personal data
First, we define what we mean when we speak about data, information, or personal
data. Data is the raw material that is processed and refined to generate information
that provides meaning. Individually, a single piece of data is rarely useful. For example
a single date may be an appointment, a holiday, or an anniversary [217]. However,
data is often used to specifically mean digitally stored quantified information. In this
paper, we use the terms data and information to refer to the same concept. Personal
2European General Data Protection Regulation
3National Institute of Standards and Technology
4UK Anonymisation Network
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data is information that can be linked directly or indirectly to an individual and can
specifically identify him/her.
At the same time, the sensitivity of information is the potential loss that is associated
with the disclosure of that information. This definition allows for the fact that sensi-
tive information is perceived as being riskier and more uncomfortable to divulge [184].
Generally, by definition, personal data is more sensitive than data.
5.2.2 Quantifying the value of personal data
According to Acquisiti et al. [6], there is not just one method for properly establishing
the value of privacy and personal data. Different references could be considered to es-
tablish this value, such as the money users would be willing to accept for their data, the
money they would be willing to pay to protect their data, the cost of making their data
public, etc. For this purpose, we reviewed the relevant research studies that proposed
rankings and metrics. We have detected four different approaches for sensitivity that
are based on (i) laws and regulations; (ii) market valuation; (iii) individuals’ valuation;
and (iv) linguistics. Below, we present and discuss the solutions provided by each one.
Law & regulation. In this approach, countries have been forced to regulate company
activities that collect, store, and manage personal data. These regulations distinguish
between different levels of sensitivity of the data that requires more protection than
other data. The starting point for defining sensitive data under EU law is the list of
“special categories of data” in the GDPR, which is based on the concept of privacy as
a fundamental right. According to Article 9 of this regulation, sensitive data includes
personal data revealing racial origin, political opinions, or religious or other beliefs as
well as personal data on health, sex life, or criminal convictions [102]. Personal data
that does not match these categories is also protected but is considered to be less sen-
sitive, so companies do not have so many controls. In the UK, the UK Anonymization
Network (UKAN) classifies data following two criteria: whether or not data is per-
sonal, and whether data may or may not be identifiable. It is interesting to consider
the data that is not personal but that may be used to identify an individual such as
vehicle registration or a dynamic IP address, since it may be strongly associated with
an individual [79]. In US law, there is no comprehensive data protection regulation
and no clear starting point for defining sensitive data that is analogous to the “special
categories” of personal data found in the EUData Protection Directive [140]. Agencies
such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security have struggled to provide a precise definition of personally
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identifiable information, but they have not completed the next step of defining differ-
ent categories of sensitivity or developing a topology of personal data that quantifies
personal data. Current US laws and regulations cover only the use of certain types of
personal data, such as financial and medical information.
Based on laws that are related to the protection of individual privacy in personal infor-
mation record-keeping systems, Turn proposes a sensitivity scale and classification for
personal information [256]. This scale consists of six levels that are based on the poten-
tial adverse effects on the individual, whichmay range from amild annoyance to phys-
ical harm. The levels are: AS, public (by statute); A, public; B, limited; C, restricted; D,
confidential (by statute); E, sensitive (by statute); and F, secret (by statute). The work
also provides a simplified classification on three levels merging the ones above: basic
(AS, A, B); medium (C, D); and high (E, F). The main problem with the law and regu-
lations approach is that it groups information into broad, abstract categories without
providing a scale or a ranking that indicates sensitivity in a fine-grained way.
Market valuation. This approach focuses on the information value for companies.
Companies generate economic benefits from users’ data and have decided to include
users’ data in their business models. User data and knowledge derived from it are sold
and bought by companies for different purposes such as developing new features, of-
fering new services, customizing an advertising campaign, etc. A report elaborated by
the OECD5 [196] analyzes different methodologies for measuring and estimating the
value of personal data from a purely monetary perspective (i.e., without taking into
account the indirect impacts of the use of personal data on the economy or society).
This report analyzes approaches from two perspectives based on the market’s valua-
tion and individual’s valuation. From the market perspective, the report assesses the
value of data from indicators such as the market revenues obtained per data record,
the market prices for data, the cost of a data breach, and data prices in illegal markets.
From the individual perspective, the report assesses the value of data from indicators
such as an individual’s willingness to pay to protect data. The result is several rankings
based on different indicators. An example of ranking based on the indicator of the
market prices for data is made up of the following types of data that are ordered from
highest to lowest cost: bankruptcy information, felony, employment history, sex of-
fender, education background, unpublished phone number, business ownership, credit
history, marriage/divorce, past address, social security number, address, voter regis-
tration. Another example of ranking based on the prices that individuals are willing
to pay to protect their information is made up of the following criteria: the top tier
5Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
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includes social security numbers (national identity numbers) and credit card informa-
tion, whichmost people value highly (USD 150–240 per entry); themiddle tier contains
digital communication history, such as web browsing history as well as location and
health information (around USD 50); the last tier of information contains facts about
users, including online purchasing history and online advertising click history, towhich
individuals attach little value (USD 3–6).
The Financial Times newspaper developed a calculator app based on the analysis of
industry pricing data from a range of sources in the US [236]. Malgieri et al. [172]
distinguish the following categories according to their economic value (from lower to
higher): general (mainly demographic) information about a person; shopping, finan-
cial, or vacation intentions; personal data of people going through certain important
life events (such as getting married, having a baby, etc.); and personal data containing
specific health conditions or information on taking certain prescription (the highest
value). In their work, they found that all of the data of a single person is not much
valuable economically (approximately less than one dollar). The authors emphasize
that the price of personal data has followed a declining trend in recent years. Con-
versely, companies collect the personal data of more and more people and this data
can be resold several times, increasing the profits generated. Another important fac-
tor that is highlighted is that there is a positive relationship between the sensitivity of
data and its economic value (i.e., the more sensitive the personal data, the higher its
economic value).
Individuals’ valuation. Another interesting approach is the individuals’ perception of
the data. After the analysis of the responses of 310 adults in a national survey, Milne et
al. [180] detected six groups of personal information and established a ranking based
on the consumers’ perceived sensitivity. The groups detected (ordered from lowest to
highest sensitivity) were: basic demographics, personal preferences, contact informa-
tion, community interaction, financial information, secure identifiers. In addition,
the authors detected that the perception of risk is multidimensional. They considered
that there is not just one type of risk. They differentiated four types of risk where the
six information groups could be classified: physical risk (secure identifiers); monetary
risk (financial information and secure identifiers); social risk (community interaction);
and psychological risk (community interaction and secure identifiers). Schomakers et
al. [221] established a sensitivity ranking of 40 different data types. The authors com-
pared their results with Brazilian, EEUU [174], and German individuals. Based on
the ranking, they grouped data into three categories (high, medium, and low) using
a linear clustering based on the sensitive value of data. Rumbold et al. [217] pro-
110
CHAPTER 5. EMPOWERING OSN USERS ABOUT THE SENSITIVITY OF
THEIR DATA THROUGH NUDGE MECHANISMS
pose six categories of data (based on the UKAN): non-personal data; human-machine
interactions; human demographics, behavior, thoughts and opinions; human charac-
teristics (unprotected); human characteristics (protected); and medical or healthcare
data. The authors propose a spectrum of sensitivity for these six categories and subcat-
egories inside them, where the relative frequency with which data would occur is given
by individuals.
Although these previous works highlight that the perceived sensitivity of a specific type
of data varies depending on socio-cultural factors (i.e., religion is highly sensitive in
areas where there is a high degree of sectarian conflict), the ranking of data based on
sensitivity is similar among individuals [221, 217].
Linguistics. The last approach considered is centered on linguistics and the use of
words. According to Viejo et al. [263], the terms that provide/disclose a large amount
of information are also likely to be sensitive. In this respect, several privacy-protection
methods for textual data and empirical studies have shown the close relationship be-
tween the informativeness of textual terms and their sensitivity [4, 219]. Therefore,
Viejo et al. [263] measure the informativeness of a term according to its Information
Content (IC), which is computed as the inverse of the term’s probability of appearance
in a corpus. To that end, they use the largest and most up-to-date electronic repository
available: the Web. Other works such as Imran et al. [120] also consider the same idea
of linguistics properties to quantify the sensitivity of data, but they use the ontologi-
cal properties of DBPedia6 resources to create taxonomic generalizations of words. To
do this, they use SPARQL as a query language and the Semantic Web API. Thus, the
deeper a word is in the taxonomic tree of generalization, the higher the sensitivity of
the word.
5.2.3 Sensitivity in the OSN domain
Some of the categories and information types analyzed in the previous approachesmay
make no sense in the social network domain (e.g., DNA profiles or bankruptcy infor-
mation). Conversely, other categories that were not included in the above approaches
could appropriately be considered as sensitive due to the risks or consequences for the
post’s owner, such as personal attacks (which are very common in Twitter) [293].
An important aspect in the OSN domain is identification. Depending on the network
platform, users need to provide a minimum amount of information about themselves
6http://dbpedia.org/About
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Information types from Source
regrets in OSNs
Location data [50]
Personal and Family issues [270, 293, 268, 50]
Work and Company data [270, 293, 50]
Religious issues [270, 230, 293, 268]
Political issues [270, 230, 293, 268]
Health and Medical [293, 268, 50]
Alcohol consumption [270, 293, 268, 50]
Illegal drug use [270, 293, 268, 50]
Sexual content [270, 293, 268]
Negative emotions [270, 230, 293, 50]
Positive emotions [230, 50]
Attacks on individuals [270, 230, 293, 268]
Attacks on collectives [270, 230, 293, 268]
Lies and Secrets [270, 230]
Table 5.1: Summary of the most common information types that cause regrets in social networks
in order to have a profile. Even when this information is not required, users upload
information about themselves to be identifiable to others (e.g., their real name, birth-
day, a photo of themselves, etc.) [283]. This effect emerges from the nature of OSNs
for communicating and socializing with others. When users are identifiable, they are
easily included in the social network structure as friends or followers, and, in addition,
they increase their social rewards with the interactions [59]. Therefore, information
that users share could be personal by default.
As a consequence, there are a lot of works in the literature that collect and group differ-
ent kinds of content based on users’ regrets caused by sharing data on social networks
[270, 230, 293, 268] (see Table 5.1). Most of them consider the most common regret as
revealing too much information. Based on this regret, users usually highlight posting
about categories like personal and family issues, religion, politics, health, work and
company issues, and location data. These categories fully match the categories of per-
sonal data from the previous approaches analyzed. As an example, although it is not a
common practice, posting lists of defaulters involves a high risk for the publisher and
the defaulters due to other users’ reactions. On the other hand, network usage has gen-
erated regrets that are related to self-presentation and reputation. The information
types that could cause these regrets such as publications about alcohol or illegal drug
use, obscenity, personal attacks, complaints, and curses were not considered in the ap-
proaches analyzed. Since these information types can change the other’s perceptions
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towards the user that publishes, they are also sensitive for the users’ privacy. Extreme
emotions are also included in this same group. Most of them are negative emotions,
but there are some cases of extreme happiness that can cause regrets by the reactions
of others (in this case, moved by jealousy). Finally, this research also highlights regrets
caused by posting lies and secrets, but no one (to the best of our knowledge) has enough
information to detect them.
In fact, some works such as [50] have tried to identify some of these categories, but the
only thing they did was to reveal the habits of users. They did not extend their work to
enhance the users’ awareness of the sensitivity of this type of information or privacy-
seeking behavior. Our goal is to propose a quantification value for users’ posts and to
use it to improve users’ privacy.
5.3 Proposal
In the proposal of this work, we address three issues: (i) providing a sensitivity value
for each information type that might be present in the OSN domain; (ii) providing and
justifying the sensitivity value for the regret-based information types; and (iii) the rep-
resentation of the total value of sensitivity for a publication, taking into consideration
that multiple information types could appear in the same publication.
For the first issue, we propose a ranking that combines the sensitivity values and the
information types that appear in the works reviewed (see Figure 5.1). The value for each
information type was normalized on a scale of 0 to 1, where 0 means no sensitive data
and 1 means the maximum sensitive value of data. We added new information types
based on users’ regrets (see Table 5.1). For each of these information types, we proposed
a potential sensitivity value considering the nature of the regret and its proximity to
other information types. For the Illegal drug use information type, we propose position-
ing this information type between Medication and Law enforcement files (immediately
next to Medication) since it could be considered as medication, but, depending on the
kind of drug, it may lead to legal consequences. For theAlcohol consumption information
type, we propose positioning this information type as individuals’ behaviors, especially
since it represents health-damaging behaviors [85] (belowReligion and close to Lifestyle).
For strong sentiments, works about regrets concurred that negative emotions are more
regrettable than positive ones [270, 230]. Therefore, we propose positioning the posi-
tive emotions in the same place as demographic data, and the negative emotions over
the Opinions information type. Finally, the information type related to attacks, curses,
offensive comments, or profanity depends on the kind of target. On the one hand, if
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0.00
0.25
0.25
0.50
0.50
0.75
0.75
1.00
1.00
Relating to objects [A]
Personal anonymized data [A]
Travel [I]
Educational level [D]
Gender [C]
Positive emotion [I]
Age [C]
Buy a vehicle [I]
Birth date [D]
Height [C]
Country [D]
Zip code [D]
Hometown [D]
Sensors (sport, etc.) [B]
Opinions [I]
Place of birth [D]
Weight [C]
Work's company name [G]
Marital status [D]
Number of children [D]
Work phone number [E]
Negative emotion [I]
Ethnic group [C]
Work address [E]
Browsing history [B]
Mother s maiden name [G]
Alcohol consumption [I]
Family/Friend s relationship [G]
Income level [F]
Job title [F]
Shopping behavior [I]
Occupation [F]
Lifestyle [I]
Email address [E]
Social class [F]
Religion [G]
Political affiliation [G]
Facial pictures [C]
Religious belief [I]
Buy a phone [I]
Body pictures [C]
Move (home) [I]
Social network profile [H]
Engaged to be married [I]
Expecting a baby [I]
Credit score [F]
IP address [B]
Phone number [E]
Political opinions [I]
Attacks to individuals [J]
Vehicle registration number [H]
Home address [E]
Sexual preference [I]
Driver s license number [H]
GPS location [B]
Handwriting sample [H]
Voice print [H]
Nude body images [C]
Digital signature [B]
Attacks to collectives [J]
Transgender status [I]
Health insurance ID [K]
Finger print [H]
Lose weight (diet) [I]
Medication [K]
Illegal drug use [J]
Credit card number [H]
Passport number [H]
Criminal history [J]
Financial account numbers [H]
Social security number [H]
DNA profile [K]
Medical history [K]
Access codes/passwords [B]
Sensitivity
mean(x)
Rumbold et al. (2018)
Goodman et al. (2017)
Turn et al. (1976)
proposed values
Markos et al. (2017)
Steel et al. (2017)
Schomakers et al. (2019)
Figure 5.1: Sensitivity for information types. Categories are A=Non-personal, B=Human-machine,
C=Human characteristics, D=Demographics, E=Contact info., F=Status/Financial, G=Association,
H=Identifiable info., I=Behaviors/Intentions, J=Law-related, and K=Medical. The color of each point
corresponds to the research paper that considered the data.
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the target is an individual (i.e., Attacks on individuals), we propose positioning the infor-
mation type between Negative emotion and types related to laws due to its possible legal
consequences. On the other hand, if the target is a group or association (i.e., Attacks on
collectives), the sensitivity is greater than the sensitivity of Attacks on individuals, and, in
some countries, it could be considered as a hate crime against a collective.
Finally, using the sensitivity information types from previous works and the proposed
sensitivity values for regrets, we created a ranking (see Figure 5.1) of 74 informa-
tion types (y-axis). We grouped the information types into the following categories:
(A) Non-personal, related to anonymized data or object data; (B) Human-machine,
data generated from technology interactions; (C) Human characteristics, related to
physical aspects; (D) Demographics, related to common features that are not identi-
fiable; (E) Contact info., any information that allows others to contact you; (F) Sta-
tus/Financial, related to monetary status; (G) Association, data able to link users with
other individuals or collectives; (H) Identifiable info., data that can directly identify
an individual; (I) Behaviors/Intentions, related to past and future actions; (J) Law-
related, that can or have caused legal consequences; and (K) Medical, related to health
data. Once we quantified and normalized the value for each information type, we
placed them in order from the most sensitive types to the least sensitive types. The
sort criterion was the mean value of the information type and the number of research
works that assessed that information type. From the resultant ranking, we observed
that there is a consensus in most cases for the information types at the extremes of
sensitivity (the lowest and highest value). We also observe that information with low
values of sensitivity is mainly demographic, anonymized, or related to objects, while
information with the maximum values of sensitivity is mainly passwords/access codes
(because they can give access to other sensitive information), health information, and
identifiable and unique data of an individual. In contrast, the rest of the information
types have less consensus with a huge sensitivity variability among the works. We high-
light the information types of facial pictures, ethnic/race, and behavior/intentions as
being of greatest variance. Furthermore, we also observe that behaviors/intentions of
individuals (such as losing weight, expecting a baby, engaging to be married, etc.) are
especially valuable for companies, while other approaches give them values that are
significantly lower. For this reason, it is so important to consider all of the approaches
involved.
In order to provide an estimated value by category, we selected the mean as the repre-
sentative value for the category. Figure 5.2 depicts the distribution values per category,
which includes a Box-plot to enhance visual comprehension. The mean values are in-
cluded in the legend, which reflects the conclusions extracted in the ranking. Thus, if
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of sensitivity values for the identified categories of information types.
a relevant information type was not included in our proposal, other researchers could
derive an approximate sensitivity value by classifying the new information type in a
category and/or comparing it with the other information types.
We illustrate a common scenario for proposing a value of sensitivity for a publication.
A user posts on a social network. The post (e.g.,W ) may consist of a media item (e.g.,
a photo), a textual message, or both [270]. The question that may arise is: What value
of sensitivity s should the publication W have (i.e., s(W ))? In fact, the combination
of information types (ti ∈ W ) actually creates value. When the attribute name is
provided as “John” or the attribute gender is provided as “male”, these are meaningless.
Single attributes without any further context have no monetary value. Only when
they are combined (i.e., when John is male) do these attributes create value [172]. In
OSN, the profile provides a linkable space for new attributes. Therefore, assessing per-
sonal data sensitivity is not about assessing individual information types, but rather
assessing combinations of personal data. Using the approach of the market pricing
valuation of personal data [236], where data is bought and sold in a combined way,
we propose using the same system (i.e., summing their values) to assess combinations
of information types.
s(W ) =
∑
ti∈W
s(ti) (5.1)
Thus, the more information types the post has and the more sensitive they are, the
riskier it is to share the post.
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Age [years] mean(SD) 13.03 (0.70)
12 years 22.45%
13 years 51.53%
14 years 26.02%
Gender male 53.57%
female 46.43%
Table 5.2: Demographics of participants (N=196).
5.4 Experiment
We ran an experiment to test the effect of informing the user (via a message) about
the sensitivity of their publications before sharing them. The message acts as a nudge
for users. Nudges attempt to influence decision making in order to improve individual
well-being without actually limiting users’ ability to choose freely, thus, preserving
freedom of choice [7]. For this reason, we consider that nudges could reduce users’
regrets.
5.4.1 Methodology
The experiment consisted of a questionnaire that was distributed online within the con-
text of a one-month workshop about social networks for teenagers. The questionnaire
was embedded in the social network platform that they used in the workshop. A total
of 196 Spanish participants (from the Valencia area) ranging in age from 12-14 years
old completed the experiment. The sample shows heterogeneous distributions regard-
ing age (M = 13.05, SD = 0.71), and gender (53.57% male teenagers) (see Table 5.2). The
questionnaire consisted of asking participants to choose an audience (i.e., the privacy
policy) for real publications (selected previously from Twitter) as if they had written
them. The privacy options available were based on the social circles defined by [78].
We removed the social circles that made no sense for teenagers (such as coworkers), and
we combined the first and second level of family into a single social circle. The final
options were: No one, Family, Friends, Acquaintances, and All. We collected 53 tweets that
were classified by raters taking into account the information types that the tweets had
(Figure 5.1). We finally chose the 30 tweets with the highest level of agreement with
the information types identified to be included in the questionnaire. From the manual
classification, we calculated the sensitivity value of the tweet using our proposal (i.e.,
accumulating the sensitivity of the different information types, Eq. 5.1).
The questionnaire had two stages, which took place in different weeks, with 15 ques-
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Figure 5.3: Template of the survey questions.
tions per stage. The questions were designed following the structure depicted in Figure
5.3. The difference in the questions between stages was the nudging message that was
hidden during the first 15 questions. In the first stage, the nudges were not activated,
so the participants did not receive any kind of advice concerning the privacy decision.
In contrast, in the second stage, the nudges were activated, assisting the participants
with the privacy decision. Thus, we observed and assessed whether meaningful changes
in their behaviors were produced with nudges about the sensitivity of the publication.
5.4.2 Results
Once the experiment had ended, a total of 5880 privacy decisions (196 participants
x 30 questions) were collected. Each entry consisted of the participant identifier, the
tweet identifier, whether the sensitivity nudge was enabled, the sensitivity value, and
the privacy policy choice. We codified the data following the next criteria: the sen-
sitivity nudge variable as a binary value (representing whether it was enabled); the
sensitivity value was discretized into four grades (none, low, medium, and high sensitiv-
ity); and the privacy policy choice was normalized taking into account how restrictive
the choice was, considering No one as the minimum value (0), and All as the maximum
value (4). Since participants did not repeat their choices for the same tweet, we consid-
ered running an independent sample test to assess the effect of the nudge messages on
the participants’ decisions. Moreover, we also wanted to evaluate the effect taking into
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Source df Mean Squares F p Effect Size
(A) Nudge 1 10.55 4.84 .028∗ .001
(B) Sensitivity 3 165.26 75.87 .00∗∗ .038
A × B 3 13.68 6.28 .00∗∗ .003
Error 5873 2.17
Table 5.3: ANOVA analysis for the privacy policy chosen (α = .05). ∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01.
account the information sensitivity value of the tweet. Therefore, we used an ANOVA
test (α = .05) using the privacy policy value as the dependent variable and using the
sensitivity value and whether the nudgewas activated as the fixed factors (see Table 5.3).
The results of the statistical tests reveal a significant difference in users’ behavior re-
garding privacy policy choices. On the one hand, the presence of nudge messages was
significant to the privacy decision made (p-value = .028). On the other hand, the test
results also showed a significant difference in the privacy decision made by partici-
pants regarding the sensitivity value shown in the nudge message (p-value = .00). Fi-
nally, the combination of both variables (nudge and sensitivity) also revealed a sig-
nificant difference in their decisions (p-value = .00). Table 5.4 depicts the comparison
of the mean value of the privacy policy decisions organized by sensitivity and nudge
variables. The table shows the differences in the mean of privacy policy choices, that
the ANOVA statistical test confirms that are significant. From the privacy decisions
made by the participants, we can extract some remarkable facts. First, the partici-
pants were able to slightly identify the sensitivity of the information contained in the
tweet. They showed more restrictive behavior for the information with higher sensi-
tivity (see the Mean column for rows where the nudge variable is 0), except at the low
sensitivity level. We explored the information types identified in those tweets. Most
were from the Intentions category, which was one of the categories with the lowest
level of agreement. Therefore, we believe that that may have had some effect on their
initial decision-making. Second, the participants were less restrictive in their privacy
policy choices when the nudge message confirmed that the message was not sensitive
(see the Mean column for rows with non-sensitivity), while they were more restrictive
with sensitive content. Finally, the difference in the mean of the privacy policy choices
of the participants was higher when the sensitivity value of the message was higher.
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Sensitivity Nudge N Mean Std. Error
none 0 784 1.858 .061
1 784 2.042 .061
low 0 784 1.166 .048
1 784 1.130 .047
medium 0 686 1.507 .056
1 686 1.302 .058
high 0 686 1.408 .057
1 686 1.117 .057
Table 5.4: Comparison of privacy policy mean values by sensitivity grade and nudges (0: the most re-
strictive policy; 4: the less restrictive policy).
5.5 Discussion
Depending on the information type, data is more or less sensitive/valuable due to: the
cost of storing it [196]; the willingness of users to provide it [180]; the monetary ben-
efits derived from extracting knowledge from it [236]; the loss of users’ privacy [221];
the amount of information it provides [102]; etc. After the analysis and review of pre-
vious works that deal with the assignment of a sensitivity value to information types,
we identified that some information types have small variability of value among the
different works (especially in the case of information types that are located at the ex-
tremes of the sensitivity values). In this work, we have identified that categories such
as demographics and human characteristics have a high degree of agreement among
works that evaluate this data as being of low sensitivity. We have also identified that
medical, legal and personally identifiable data categories also have a high degree of
agreement, evaluating this data as being highly sensitive. For information types with
less agreement among approaches, we highlight user behaviors and intentions. These
may be valuable to companies, but the other approaches (laws & regulations and in-
dividuals’ valuation) give them low sensitive value or they do not even assess the value
of these types.
Regarding the proposal presented in this work, for estimating a sensitivity value for
each information type, we decided to accumulate the values of all the works and cal-
culate the mean value for each information type. Based on these values, we create a
ranking. This ranking could be extended considering new values for a certain informa-
tion type and including new information types. We included new information types
from OSNs regrets positioning them by proximity to others types. However, this or-
der could be also validated through questionnaires to users and companies about their
120
CHAPTER 5. EMPOWERING OSN USERS ABOUT THE SENSITIVITY OF
THEIR DATA THROUGH NUDGE MECHANISMS
perception of sensitivity/value of these new information types in comparison with the
existing ones. Moreover, the value of estimated sensitivity introduced to users could
be provided to users in different ways (e.g., as a monetary value, as a color scale, etc.)
for testing which representation has a greater effect. Another aspect to assess other
alternatives to estimate the aggregated value of data. Only few works calculate the
sensitivity value of the information and, to the best of our knowledge, there is a lack
of proposals that consider the combined value of information.
As someworks point out [7, 172], empowering users during complex decisions with valu-
able information has two direct effects on them: (i) it raises their awareness; and (ii) it
nudges their behaviors toward controlled decisions (i.e., with expected consequences).
Wang et al. [272] proved that identifying the imagined audience before making deci-
sions about posting changed the users’ privacy decisions. Schöning et al. [222] tested
significant differences by personalizing the styles of the nudges shown. Alemany et
al. [12] tested personalized nudges based on an estimation of the final audience before
posting. In that work, the authors reported that teenagers used more restrictive poli-
cies when they were aware of the potential audience. In this work, we empower users
with nudges that contain information about the sensitivity value of the information
they would share in OSNs. We assess how teenage users choose the privacy policy for
a given publication when we nudge about its sensitivity. Through the experiment, we
found out that the teenagers of the experiment had some previous knowledge about
the sensitivity of information, because they chose restrictive privacy policies for the
most sensitive posts when nudges were not activated. We also figured out that nudge
messages about sensitivity had a significant effect on their behavior as well as the sen-
sitivity level shown on the nudge message. The effect on teenagers’ privacy behavior
was more significant the greater the sensitivity value included in the nudge message
(i.e., the privacy policy mean value decreased more for high sensitive posts than for
low sensitive posts). From the results, we conclude that the teenagers were able to un-
derstand the nudge message that contained information about the sensitivity of their
publications and they used them to have less risky behaviors on social networks.
5.6 Conclusions
This paper proposes a combined ranking using sensitive information types collected
from an extensive literature review as well as a set of newly proposed information
types for the OSN domain based on the most common regrets. The ranking provides
the quantification of the sensitivity value of the different information types and could
also be used to approximate the value of new information types that are not included in
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this work. Our proposal for assessing the sensitivity of a publication uses the ranking to
estimate its value by accumulating the values of the different information types iden-
tified in the publication. The sensitivity value associated with a publication was used
in nudges that were tested in an experiment with 196 teenagers. In this experiment, the
teenagers had to choose a privacy policy for a set of publications with different degrees
of sensitivity. The information provided by the nudges made them more aware of the
privacy risk before choosing a privacy policy. The results of the experiment showed the
relevance of empowering users with information about the sensitivity of their publica-
tions in order to make informed decisions that protect their privacy.
As future work, we plan to include our proposal in a real social network; thus, we could
apply the nudges to the users’ generated content in their daily usage. We also think
that it would be interesting to match the topics of the publication with the sensitive
categories developed in our proposal in order to improve its performance.
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Abstract
Online social networks (OSNs) provide users with mechanisms such as social circles
and individual selection to define the audiences (i.e., privacy policy) of the shared in-
formation. This privacy decision-making process is a hard and tedious task for users
because they have to assess the cost-benefit in a complex environment. Moreover, little
is known about how users assess the cost-benefit of matching the elements of online
communication and their interests. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to develop
and test a research model to understand the impact that the types of receivers and the
sensitivity ofmessages have on privacy decisions. A studywas conducted to understand
how users evaluate the cost-benefit of the disclosure action in online social networks for
the different types of receivers identified and the sensitivity of the message. Data from
400 respondents was collected and analyzed using partial least squares modeling. The
findings of this study demonstrated a trade-off variance between the perceived cost-
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benefit and the disclosure of sensitive information with different receiver types. Dis-
closing personal information with trusted receivers, influencer receivers, and receivers
from the circle of coworkers had a positive significant effect on social capital building.
Conversely, disclosing personal information with receivers from the circle of family or
unknown receivers had a significant negative effect on social capital building and even
a significant positive effect on privacy concerns. Recent literature has documented the
increasing interest of the research community in understanding users’ concerns and in-
terests in making the most suitable privacy decisions. However, most researchers have
worked on understanding the disclosure action from a user-centered perspective and
have not considered all of the elements of online communication. This study puts the
focus on all of the elements of communication during disclosure actions, taking into ac-
count the properties of the message and receivers and the impact on users’ cost-benefit
value.
6.1 Introduction
As social network users, we are constantly faced with decisions that are the product
of interaction and socialization with others that have a direct impact on our privacy.
Research studies have shown that when we are faced with these decisions in online
communication, we always assess the cost-benefit of the decision [210]. This process
is well-known as the Privacy Calculus theory1. However, the privacy concept is very
complex, and the number of factors to assess in online communication is higher than
in traditional communication (e.g., the number of friends, the relationship types, the
persistence of the information, etc.). Moreover, these decisions have tremendous impor-
tance because they may negatively affect our privacy and reputation [270]. Because of
this, we often have difficulty in assessing the cost-benefit of disclosure decisions, which
leads us to regret our decisions. In order to avoid regrets, decisions need to be made
with information that is as perfect as possible, even though research experiments have
demonstrated that we seldom have perfect information for deciding [5].
Research on online communication and users’ behavior has studied a wide range
of factors and relationships to explain information disclosure decisions in OSNs
[211, 200, 161]. Most of these factors are related to the user transmitting the infor-
mation through the following: personal characteristics, such as personality traits, gen-
der, motivation for using the social network (self-presentation, enjoyment, building
1Privacy Calculus theory states that individuals always rationally weigh the potential benefits and
potential risks of data disclosure decisions.
124
CHAPTER 6. “WHO SHOULD I GRANT ACCESS TO MY POST?”:
IDENTIFYING THE MOST SUITABLE PRIVACY DECISIONS ON OSNS
relationships, etc.); network usage characteristics, such as time of use, the number of
friends, etc.; and users perceptions about information control, subjective norms, bene-
fits, risks, etc. However, factors that are external to the transmitter (e.g., the sensitivity
of the information, confidence in the channel, types of receivers, etc.) have been less
studied. The study of communication elements study has been in decreasing order,
the transmitter, the channel, the message, and, ultimately, the receiver. In traditional
communication, the combination of the factors of the elements of communication fa-
vors effective communication similarly, the factors of the elements (channel, message,
and receiver) in online communication must also be considered in order to favor com-
munication that is free of regrets. The main objective of these studies is to understand
the self-disclosure action of the users and which factors favor it and which do not. They
do not, however, analyze in detail which factors are considered by a user for granting
or denying access to a specific contact for a post (i.e., fine-grained privacy decisions).
Thus, there is a gap in explaining which factors of communication elements and their
combinations produce benefits and which produce privacy risks.
The main objective of this work is to understand the privacy decision-making process
in social networks by making sense of each decision choice of the communication el-
ements. We analyze the impact of communication element factors on privacy risks
and social benefits in order to make suitable privacy decisions. To do this, we have
developed a research model for individually granting/denying receivers access to in-
formation published in OSNs. We test our research model with real users to obtain
feedback about how these factors influence the privacy decision-making process. The
resulting model could be used to improve current privacy mechanisms, automatizing
the assessment of the cost-benefit trade-off for each potential receiver, leading to suit-
able privacy policy decisions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 includes a literature review about the
social benefits and privacy for the disclosure process in OSNs. Section 6.3 presents
our research model and the relevant factors regarding communication elements. Sec-
tion 6.4 describes the research methodology. Section 6.5 presents the results obtained.
Section 6.6 discusses the main findings. Finally, Section 6.7 presents some concluding
remarks and future work.
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6.2 Literature review
6.2.1 Privacy calculus theory and privacy decisions
The assessment of social benefits and privacy cost (well-known as Privacy Calculus
theory) is a complex task that users should complete for effective communication in
social networks [29]. This theoretical privacy calculus framework has been proven in
the OSN domain by a large number of research works [151, 220, 54, 138]. However,
these research works have mostly assessed the users’ perceptions and preferences to-
wards the privacy risks and socials benefits of information disclosure in a general way.
When users face an OSN privacy decision, this decision has several sub-decisions that
are directly linked to the elements of the communication. A clear example is when a
user is going to share his/her holiday experience, he/she has to choose a social network
on which to share it (the channel). The user then creates the publication (the message),
and finally selects the social circles or audience that will have access to it (the receivers).
This is when the receivers generate positive or negative responses (the feedback), which
is related to social benefit building and loss of privacy (and possibly bad reputation),
respectively. Therefore, there is a gap in the individual factors of those sub-decisions
that may contribute or stand in the way of disclosing a specific message with a specific
receiver.
Finally, privacy calculus is a short-term assessment that users make before making
decisions. Literature reviews in human behavior show that online social well-being is
usually tested as a long-term assessment of users’ satisfaction for all decisions made
[118]. The online social well-being of users can be seen as the individual’s consciousness
and feelings about their whole social lives, which consists of perceptions of pleasure,
positive emotions, and greater satisfaction. Previous studies have tested well-being
with respect to users’ benefits [118, 144]; however, very little research has been done to
test social well-being with respect to users’ privacy cost.
6.2.2 Information disclosure and benefit
Disclosure actions can be defined as communicating personal information to other
people [75]. The degree of disclosure is often based on trust and tries to reinforce the
closeness of people. In OSNs, information disclosure actions can be carried out ei-
ther using texts (status updates, commenting, location sharing, or private messages)
or through other non-verbal means (sharing photos, videos, or links). Users generally
tend to disclose different forms and types of information in order to achieve differ-
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ent gratifications. For instance, maintaining social relationships, seeking attention,
feedback, and communications are some of the major gratifications that users seek by
self-disclosing in OSNs [211, 200]. Furthermore, unlike traditional communication, in
online communication (social networks), disclosure actions require the selection and
configuration of more elements than just the message. It also involves the choice of
the channel and the receivers, which in traditional communication is inherent by the
context.
[251] found that people tend to disclose more information in OSNs compared to tra-
ditional communication. In addition, according to [192], the information disclosed is
more sensitive. Some researchers such as [264] defend the ease of sharing information
as a cause, while others relate this to the maintenance of users’ contacts with weak ties.
Another factor that they consider is the number of Facebook friends a user has. This
could influence the user’s self-disclosure since many of the social connections on Face-
book require a certain degree of self-disclosure. Moreover, it has been shown that trust
in contacts and in the social network platform influences the self-disclosure of informa-
tion by users, which increases it [247]. These studies test the factors that influence the
users’ self-disclosure, but not how these factors provide them benefit. Other studies on
the social benefit of self-disclosure, such as [144] and [161], have been done. However,
those studies did not analyze the benefit obtained by information disclosure with cer-
tain factors of communication elements, with the exception of the study by [118] where
several dimensions of self-disclosure (that included sensitive information) were tested.
By extending the factors with respect to the channel, the message, and the receiver, the
understanding of users’ perceived benefit and efficient online communication could be
advanced.
Focusing on the benefits of disclosing information, previous studies have used several
theories to measure benefits such as social capital theory [144, 161, 62], social support
[54, 118], motivation-based theory [151, 150], and other less popular theories such as
[284]. However, these theories have not been sufficiently supported by the community
of behavioral science studies, except for social capital theory. Therefore, we apply the
well-known social capital theory to online communication to investigate the motiva-
tions behind users’ behaviors of self-disclosure. Social capital is a theoretical frame-
work that considers the benefits that individuals accrue from interactions with mem-
bers of their social network [40]. Social capital is typically divided into two categories:
bonding social capital and bridging social capital. Bonding social capital consists of
the physical, emotional, and social support that an individual can provide to another
member within the network. It is often associated with homogeneous dense networks
and close intimate relationships since they aremore likely to provide emotional aid and
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companionship than acquaintances [275]. Bridging social capital consists of informa-
tion resources and influence among members of heterogeneous networks. According
to [103], this kind of social capital is more likely among users with “weak ties” because
they can provide more novel information and new perspectives than close relation-
ships. Usually, bridging social capital provides the benefit of feeling connected to a
larger group and having contact with a broad range of people. In OSNs environment,
users can assess the social capital for both categories by taking into account the close-
ness of the relationship that supports them (bonding social capital), and the number
of people reached (bridging social capital) [264].
6.2.3 Privacy cost and overexposure
The flip side of disclosing information on social networks is the loss of privacy and the
potential consequences of it. In the literature, a rich discussion of the nature, definition,
and conceptualization of privacy is offered. As [109] claim, privacy can be defined as
a right, a commodity, and a state. This representation of privacy as a commodity
matches the privacy calculus theory where users’ privacy (the cost) is exchanged for
social rewards (the benefits).
To measure the cost in privacy decisions, prior research used perceived privacy risks
and/or privacy concerns to reflect the cost dimension of the privacy calculus equation.
For instance, to measure the cost of self-disclosure decisions, [109] defined information
privacy in four taxonomic dimensions: collection, unauthorized secondary use, im-
proper access, and errors. Conversely, [138] consider that risk appraisal emerges from
the vulnerability and the severity perceived in OSN decisions. These privacy concerns
generally reflect a personal predisposition to worry about privacy and are therefore
antecedent to risk beliefs, which are defined as the expectation of losses related to self-
disclosure [151]. For the purpose of our study, we measure the privacy risk through
users’ privacy concerns about their information privacy on a website.
Similarly to the research on perceived benefits by disclosure actions, most research fo-
cuses on the influence of factors on self-disclosure (e.g., [264, 161]) and on understand-
ing how perceived cost influences self-disclosure (e.g., [151, 109]). For this reason, very
little is understood about how different kinds of factors related to communication im-
pact users’ cost during self-disclosure decisions. A few researchers have tested the users’
cost perception of sharing sensitive information [284] and of sharing different types of
personal information [138], but no one has tested factors related to the receiver.
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Figure 6.1: Conceptual model.
6.3 Research model and hypothesis development
The research model of this study is designed to explain the impact of the element prop-
erties of online communication (channel, message, and receiver) on users’ assessment
of social capital building and privacy concerns during information disclosure. In ad-
dition, it also includes the assessment of those perceptions (benefit and cost) regarding
the users’ final online social well-being, which can be interpreted as a long-term as-
sessment of the benefits-costs of disclosure actions. All of the factors considered in our
study are framed as dimensions of the disclosure action. Figure 6.1 provides the con-
ceptual model used for the current study. Figure 6.2 presents the developed research
model after the development of the hypotheses.
6.3.1 Channel factors
In online communications, the users’ decision regarding the channel may be done at
the OSN environment level (i.e., choosing the social network), or it may be done in
a social network level (i.e., choosing the disclosure mechanism such as stories, wall-
publications, etc.). The channel choice sheds light on the way users choose their pref-
erence for disclosing information on one social network platform and not on another;
the mechanism choice sheds light on the properties that the disclosing mechanism of-
fers to users. In this study, we focus on the properties of the privacy decision-making
process of the channel from the first approach (the social network choice). Therefore,
we assess how users’ perceptions either support or do not support the users’ privacy
calculus evaluation. To do this, we consider two well-known factors: trust in the OSN
provider, and the users’ perceived capacity to control their actions.
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Trust in the OSN provider
In previous literature, researchers describe trust as a multidimensional factor with dif-
ferentmeanings. Some researchers consider trust as a belief, whichmay produce benefits,
while other researchers interpret trust as an intention, which is linked to assuming risks
[151]. In our work, we assess trust in both senses in order to link it with both sides of
the privacy calculus (benefit vs. cost). Most of the time, trust in providers has positive
impacts (e.g., on the willingness to participate in transactions in E-commerce [137, 208]
and on self-disclosure in social networks [243]). Hence, trust in the OSN provider may
positively empower the users’ perceived benefits regarding disclosure actions, increas-
ing their bonding and bridging social capital. However, with the new social network
reports and scandals about the usage of user data [122], we want to confirm that trust
in the OSN provider is still a cost-mitigating factor and contributes to social capital
building. Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 6.1: Users’ trust in the OSN provider is negatively related to their perceived privacy
risk.
Hypothesis 6.2: Users’ trust in the OSN provider is positively related to the building of (a)
bonding social capital and (b) bridging social capital.
Perceived Control
Information control refers to the capacity that people have to control information
released online. Factors that determine the perception that people have of informa-
tion control are related to the way in which web sites collect, store, and utilize users’
personal information. Social networks offer users different privacy mechanisms and
privacy settings to control the scope of their information. Some mechanisms provide
more granularity, allowing users to choose the desired audience for each publication
individually or based on social groups, while others use always the same social group
(followers or friends). [285] empirically demonstrate the importance of providing self-
controllingmechanisms in order to impact the perception of privacy calculus onOSNs.
[151] considered perceived control as a cost-mitigating factor, and they validated this
hypothesis in their study. In addition, by allowing users to control their information,
[154] state that better choices can be made about the audience (specialized receivers),
which finally contributes to improving the users’ benefits. Hence, we hypothesize the
following:
Hypothesis 6.3: Users’ perceived control is negatively related to their perceived privacy risk.
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Hypothesis 6.4: Users’ perceived control is positively related to the building of (a) bonding social
capital and (b) bridging social capital.
6.3.2 Sensitivity of the message
The information contained in a publication has great relevance in privacy calculus.
Many works have reported regrets on social networks because of the information that
users shared, mainly due to disclosing too much personal information or inappropri-
ate information [270, 242]. In social networks, most users are identifiable so that their
actions bring them social benefits [264]. As a consequence, the users’ data becomes
personal, but how does the sensitivity value of data in disclosure actions contribute
to the users’ cost-benefit? [138] assessed different types of personal data and how it
impacts benefits and risks in video recommendation systems. They found a significant
impact on all of the personal types regarding risk appraisal. According to the defini-
tion by [118], self-disclosure has five dimensions: amount, depth, honesty, intent, and
valence. In our study, we assess self-disclosure on OSNs taking into account the sen-
sitivity dimension that corresponds to depth, which is defined as “the degree of intimacy
of the information topic revealed”. [197] observed an empowering effect on users’ bene-
fit regarding the benefits of information-sharing activity. Hence, we hypothesize the
following:
Hypothesis 6.5: Users’ depth-disclosure action is positively related to their perceived privacy
risk.
Hypothesis 6.6: Users’ depth-disclosure action is positively related to the building of (a) bond-
ing social capital and (b) bridging social capital.
6.3.3 Differences between types of receivers
The privacy policy choice in social networks is essentially about deciding the receiver
for a specific message (the publication). In this environment, the user interacts with
user types that have different properties that could affect the privacy risks and social
benefits of the user. Features such as the visibility/influence of users on the network
and trust in other users have been used by [233] to assess user risks and calculate a pri-
vacy score for specific users. Many other works such as [288] have recently used these
same features to calculate privacy policy recommendations for users. The influencer
user’s role, which is growing in popularity on social networks, is able to enhance the
visibility of the user’s information while the trusted user’s role can ensure more secure
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communication of information. In addition to these types, users interact with other
types based on social circles, even with unknown users [288]. The types represented
by social circles often contain their own rules and information routines that can af-
fect cost and benefit in different ways. [116] analyzed the influence of different social
circles on image sharing and showed that information sharing with different types of
relationships has a significant effect on the quality of the relationship. Furthermore,
[270] who studied the most common regrets of social network users have stressed the
relationship between regrets and disclosing information with some social circles such
as family, friends, and coworkers. Therefore, we analyzed the types based on the pri-
mary social circles defined by [78]. Some of these types of receivers may overlap in a
real user; however, for simplicity we consider them separately in this study. Therefore,
in our research model, we analyzed the dissemination action with different types of
receivers and how they compute for privacy.
In all of these decisions, since users always share personal information because it is
linked with the OSN profile that usually identifies them, both decisions (message and
receiver) are made together. Therefore, we have reformulated the previous hypotheses
(H6.5 and H6.6) to include a specific receiver in the depth-disclosure action for each
of the following types of receivers considered.
Trusted receivers
The strength of a relationship is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time,
the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services
that characterize the relationship [103]. Previous evidence has shown a significant re-
lationship between information disclosure with trusted members and social benefits
[54]. [187] suggested that when trust exists between the parties, they are more willing
to engage in cooperative interaction. [195] indicated that interpersonal trust is impor-
tant in teams and organizations for creating an atmosphere for knowledge sharing.
[151] have studied the relationship between trust in members (as a cost mitigating fac-
tor) and privacy risks but with no conclusive results. Therefore, we hypothesize the
following:
Hypothesis 6.5.1: Users’ depth-disclosure action with trusted users is negatively related to their
perceived privacy risk.
Hypothesis 6.6.1: Users’ depth-disclosure action with trusted users is positively related to the
building of (a) bonding social capital and (b) bridging social capital.
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Influencer receivers
The influencer role is a combination of desirable attributes (be they personal attributes
like credibility, expertise, enthusiasm, or be they network-related attributes such as
connectivity or centrality) that allows someone to influence (produce an effect on)
others [20]. There are many research papers that analyze the users’ characteristics
to influence other users [186, 56]. Interacting with those users may potentially pro-
mote the visibility of a regular-user. This technique is commonly used in the design
of optimal marketing strategies [100]. Social capital definition includes this aspect of
border openness for obtaining social benefit by users; however, it might turn out to be
a double-edged sword when unintended audiences access personal information [270].
This risk could be measurable for users [280]. Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 6.5.2: Users’ depth-disclosure action with influencer users is positively related to
their perceived privacy risk.
Hypothesis 6.6.2: Users’ depth-disclosure action with influencer users is positively related to
the building of (a) bonding social capital and (b) bridging social capital.
Social circle-based receivers
Generally, each social circle contains its own rules and information routines. When
we disclose information with one of them, depending on how sensitive the information
is, it can affect users’ cost and benefit in different ways. Reports of regret on social
networks such as those of [270] and [242] have provided evidence of regret by divulging
too much personal information with specific social circles. Differences between the
most common social circles and their properties may have a common impact on users’
cost-benefit. For our study, we have analyzed four different social circles, three of
which are based on a simplification of Dunbar’s relationship theory [78] (friends, fam-
ily, and coworkers) and a new one based on the OSN domain to represent unknown
users. These social circles also match the reasons for the disclosure decisions regretted
by users in [270].
The reports about regrets on social networks [270, 242] indicate that most of regrets
were related to disclosing too much personal information with close users like friends,
family, and coworkers. It seems users are more concerned about their information
when receivers are in a social circle that is closer to them (family, then friends, then
coworkers). In contrast, there is also concern about unknown (or distant acquaintance)
users accessing personal information [173]. Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
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Hypothesis 6.5.3: Users’ depth-disclosure action with friends is positively related to their per-
ceived privacy risk.
Hypothesis 6.5.4: Users’ depth-disclosure action with family members is positively related to
their perceived privacy risk.
Hypothesis 6.5.5: Users’ depth-disclosure action with coworkers is positively related to their
perceived privacy risk.
Hypothesis 6.5.6: Users’ depth-disclosure action with unknown users is positively related to
their perceived privacy risk
With regard to the social benefits of disclosing personal information with each of these
social circles, the context of these relationships may change the perceived benefits by
users. [246] showed that, generally, friends and family members provide emotional
support (which is related to bonding social capital) when disclosing information about
personal issues, and coworkers provide informational support (which is related to
bridging social capital). Also, professional networks encourage information exchange,
promote interpersonal relationships, and lead to improvements in productivity and
loyalty, which contributes to informational support [133]. Thus, friends and family
members have less propensity to contribute to bridging social capital, and, conversely,
coworkers have less propensity to contribute to bonding social capital. For users with
no relationship with the user (i.e., unknown receivers), even though the interaction
may provide informational support (like the coworker social circle), by sharing inti-
mate information with them negative reactionsmay be elicited for amore public social
circle [27]. Therefore, we expect a positive impact on social bonding by providing emo-
tional or substantive support for friends and family circles, and we expect a negative
impact on social bonding for coworkers and unknown users. In contrast, disclosing in-
formation with social circles that are not close may positively impact social bridging
building. Thus, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 6.6.3: Users’ depth-disclosure action with friends is (a) positively related to the
building of bonding social capital and (b) negatively related to the building of bridging social
capital.
Hypothesis 6.6.4: Users’ depth-disclosure action with family members is (a) positively related
to the building of bonding social capital and (b) negatively related to the building of bridging
social capital.
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Hypothesis 6.6.5: Users’ depth-disclosure action with coworkers is (a) negatively related to the
building of bonding social capital and (b) positively related to the building of bridging social
capital.
Hypothesis 6.6.6: Users’ depth-disclosure action with unknown users is (a) negatively related
to the building of bonding social capital and (b) positively related to the building of bridging
social capital.
6.3.4 Online Social Well-being
According to [193], self-disclosure can improve an individual’s physical and mental
health from a positive psychology perspective. Moreover, it has been shown that posi-
tive reactions collected from social capital building contributes to improving the users’
well-being [220]. In contrast, the users’ concern regarding OSN risks is related to neg-
ative experiences resulting in a heightened awareness of privacy-related issues and in-
creased privacy concerns. Those negative experiences could hinder the psychological
state of users, impacting on their social well-being [286]. Thus, we hypothesize the
following:
Hypothesis 6.7: Users’ perceived privacy risk is negatively related to their online social well-
being.
Hypothesis 6.8: Users’ building of (a) bonding social capital and (b) bridging social capital is
positively related to their online social well-being.
The overall research model is described in Figure 6.2.
6.4 Methodology
This study presents an initial attempt to investigate the role of receivers’ properties
and message sensitivity in the users’ assessment of potential benefits and risks of data
disclosure decisions in social networks. We also investigate howmessages and receivers
contribute indirectly to users’ online social well-being. The research setting, data col-
lection method, measurement, and demographics of the respondents are reported be-
low.
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Figure 6.2: Research model.
6.4.1 Research settings
For this study, we chose the users of Facebook as the main object of discussion since it is
one of themost popular andwidely used online social networks. Launched on February
2004, Facebook allows its users to define different kinds of connections/relationships
with each other (e.g., friends, acquaintances, followers, etc.) and to create social el-
ements (e.g., groups, posts, albums, preferences, etc.) for interacting with others in a
whole variety of ways (e.g., comments, tags, mentions, direct messages, etc.). More
importantly, unlike other online social networks, Facebook offers users many mecha-
nisms to decide all of the elements of online communication for users’ disclosing ac-
tions in a fine-grained way. Users have complete and free capability to choose the
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channel, message, and receivers (by selecting a specific privacy policy) in a disclosure
action. Therefore, we believe Facebook users are perfect for investigating the influ-
ence of these elements on users’ cost-benefit perceptions (Privacy Calculus) and on the
disclosure action.
6.4.2 Data collection
The data used in this study were collected through a survey created on Google Forms
and shared through Prolific Academy [204], which is an online participant recruitment
platform for surveys and market studies. The questionnaire that was developed for the
survey was pre-tested by six researchers, three of whom are experienced in surveys and
quantitative research. Their remarks and suggestions were used to make improvements
and to clarify some questions, which led to the final version of the questionnaire. We
also made a very small-sample experiment with colleagues to avoid potential errors
(such as technical blips, etc.) and to measure the average time required for completing
the questionnaire. Then, we linked the questionnaire to a study in Prolific. Before pub-
lishing the study, we made a custom pre-screening of the target audience of the study
using the menus of Prolific. As required features for participating in the study, we
selected the following: (r1) fluent English language comprehension so that the ques-
tionnaire was understood completely; (r2) being a regular Facebook user in order to
fit our target population; (r3) a minimum of 50 completed studies on Prolific; and
(r4) an approval rate greater than 90% for quality control. For quality control, we
also included some attention check questions in the questionnaire asking participants
to select a specific answer. The participants that answered at least one attention ques-
tion incorrectly were excluded from the study. Finally, we published the study, and,
after the participants completed it, we managed to collect completed questionnaires
from 400 participants. The resulting files (demographic data from Prolific, and the
questionnaire responses from Google Forms) were collected and joined for their later
analysis.
6.4.3 Measurement
All of the measures in this study have been used and validated in prior studies (see Ap-
pendix 6.A.1). Minor changes in the wording were made in order to fit the current re-
search context. Social bonding and social bridging were measured with items adapted
from [280]. Privacy concern was measured with items adapted from [284]. Perceived
control and trust in Facebook were measured by items adapted from [151]. Online so-
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cial well-being wasmeasured by items adapted from [62] and [80]. In addition, we took
the dimension of depth (related to sensitivity of information) in information disclosure
measured by items adapted from [279] as a reference in order to customize them for
different types of receivers. Instruments for all of the constructs were presented on a
five-point Likert scale, anchored from “1 = never” and “5 = always”. We used a unipolar
scale because, in comparison with a bipolar scale (such as “1 = strongly disagree” and “5
= strongly agree”), it allows users to focus on a single item’s absence or presence, which
may generatemore accurate answers2. For each statement, the participants were asked
to indicate how often participants agreed with the statement.
6.4.4 Sample characteristics
The demographic statistics of the respondents are reported in Table 6.1. Of the 400
respondents, 45.5% of them were male and 54.5% were female. The respondents’ ages
ranged from 18 to 76 years old with a positive skewness distribution (0.879), which
means their ages had a major concentration in younger ages (below 35.3 years, aver-
age). Approximately 75.5% of the respondents were not students, and the majority of
them were employed (around 70%). In addition, the respondents were mainly from Eu-
rope (87%), North-America (8%), and Australia (3%). Among European respondents,
there was a high concentration ofUK respondents (47%), followed by Portuguese (9.5%),
Poles (7.5%), Italians (4.2%), and Spaniards (3.2%). We split the nationalities into sub-
regions following the Eurovoc thesaurus to facilitate the reading of Table 6.1.
6.5 Analysis and results
Theproposed researchmodel was tested using partial least squares (PLS) analysis using
Smart PLS 3.2.9 because PLS employs a component-based approach for estimation that
minimizes residual distributions [58] and is best suited for testing complex relationships
by avoiding inadmissible solutions and factor indeterminacy [55]. Moreover, PLS has
less stringent sample size and indicator distribution requirements, as compared to the
covariance-based structural equation modeling (SEM) approaches. Following the two-
step data analytical procedures [108], the measurement model was first examined to
evaluate the reliability and validity of measures, and then the structural model was
tested to estimate the hypothesized relationships.
2https://www.questionpro.com/blog/unipolar-likert-scale/
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Measure Items Value
Age Range 18-76 years old
Average 35.3 years old
Gender Male: 45.5% 182 (400)
Female: 54.5% 218 (400)
Nationality Western EU: 54.0% 216 (400)
Southern EU: 19.3% 77 (400)
Central/Eastern EU: 11.7% 47 (400)
Northern EU: 2.0% 8 (400)
North-America: 8.0% 32 (400)
Australia: 3.0% 12 (400)
Others: 2.0% 8 (400)
Student status Yes: 24.5% 98 (400)
No: 75.5% 302 (400)
Employment Full-Time: 48.7% 194 (400)
status Part-Time: 19.8% 80 (400)
Unemployed: 12.0% 48 (400)
Other: 15.5% 78 (400)
Table 6.1: Demographic information.
6.5.1 Measurement model assessment
We evaluate the measurement model by examining the convergent validity and dis-
criminant validity of measurement items. Convergent validity can be assessed by ex-
amining the factor loadings, the composite reliability, and the average variance ex-
tracted (AVE). Specifically, composite reliability refers to the internal consistency of
the indicators measuring a given factor, and average variance extracted indicates the
amount of variance captured by a construct as compared to the variance caused by the
measurement error. Table 6.2 presents some descriptive statistics, composite reliability
values, Cronbach’s alpha values, and the average variance extracted of the principal
constructs. A composite reliability of 0.70 or above and an average variance extracted
of more than 0.50 are deemed acceptable. Cronbach’s alpha scores of 0.70 or greater
are also considered acceptable, while scores between 0.8 and 0.9 are considered satis-
factory [95]. All of the values of composite reliabilities and Cronbach’s alpha exceed
0.70, verifying the reliability of measurement items. From these facts, we conclude that
convergent validity is fulfilled (i.e., constructs that theoretically should be related are
in fact related). Appendix 6.A.2 extends Table 6.2 information including more statistic
data and the factor loadings for each of the measured items.
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Discriminant validity is established by initially ensuring that an indicator’s outer load-
ing on a construct is greater than cross-loadings with other constructs and the by ensur-
ing that the square root of AVE is higher than the outer correlations for each construct
[95]. Table 6.2 also presents the correlationmatrix of the constructs and the square root
of the average variance extracted for each construct. The results show that all outer
loadings are greater than cross-loadings for each construct and that squared root of
AVEs are higher than outer correlations. The results affirm discriminant validity (i.e.,
constructs that are not supposed to be related are actually unrelated). Overall, the
results show the high reliability and validity of the posited measurement model.
Furthermore, variance inflation factors (VIF) were used to assess the degree of mul-
ticollinearity in the measures of our study. This test assesses how much the variance
of an estimated regression coefficient increases if your predictors are correlated. The
VIFs ranged from 1.030 to 2.351, which are all below the suggested threshold of 3.3 [145].
Therefore, we did not find a significant multicollinearity problem in this study.
6.5.2 Structural model assessment
The results of the analysis are provided in Table 6.3 and Figure 6.3. Table 6.3 presents
the overall explanatory power with the hypotheses, the estimated path coefficients (β),
and the associated t-value of the paths (all significant paths are indicated with aster-
isks). Figure 6.3 visually summarizes the results of the conceptual model with r-squared
(R2), path coefficients, and p-values. A test of significance of all paths was performed
using the bootstrap resampling procedure. The research model of this study explains
25.1% of the variance in users’ perceived privacy concern, 31.5% in users’ perceived bond-
ing social capital, and 26.6% in users’ perceived bridging social capital for the inten-
tion of disclosing personal information with different types of receivers. Moreover, the
model explains 19.1% of the variance in online social well-being as the product of all
decisions made. In order to ensure that the findings of the analysis are not confounded
by other variables, we controlled the possible effect of users’ demographic informa-
tion (age, gender, nationality, and student status) on perceived risk, perceived benefit,
and online social well-being. All of the control variables were excluded from the final
model due their insignificance. Therefore, the research model demonstrates satisfac-
tory explanatory power to capture the effect of privacy trade-off between the different
communication elements and users’ self-disclosure decisions, and, in consequence, with
their online social well-being.
The findings demonstrate that users’ trust perception in the OSN provider (the chan-
nel), which in our case is Facebook, has great relevance in the privacy trade-off: de-
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Hypotheses Relations β t
H6.1 trust in facebook→ privacy risk -.416 7.44***
H6.2a trust in facebook→ social bonding .159 3.06**
H6.2b trust in facebook→ social bridging .193 3.83***
H6.3 perceived control→ privacy risk -.117 2.13*
H6.4a perceived control→ bonding sc .073 1.42
H6.4b perceived control→ bridging sc .158 2.99**
H6.5.1 DD: trusted receiver→ privacy risk -.038 0.58
H6.6.1a DD: trusted receiver→ bonding sc .463 7.12***
H6.6.1b DD: trusted receiver→ bridging sc .229 3.29**
H6.5.2 DD: influencer receiver→ privacy risk .053 0.85
H6.6.2a DD: influencer receiver→ bonding sc .067 1.12
H6.6.2b DD: influencer receiver→ bridging sc .124 2.01*
H6.5.3 DD: friend receiver→ privacy risk -.104 1.43
H6.6.3a DD: friend receiver→ bonding sc -.014 0.19
H6.6.3b DD: friend receiver→ bridging sc .051 0.70
H6.5.4 DD: family receiver→ privacy risk .163 2.48*
H6.6.4a DD: family receiver→ bonding sc -.145 2.21*
H6.6.4b DD: family receiver→ bridging sc .010 0.15
H6.5.5 DD: coworker receiver→ privacy risk -.100 1.37
H6.6.5a DD: coworker receiver→ bonding sc .209 3.25**
H6.6.5b DD: coworker receiver→ bridging sc -.018 0.24
H6.5.6 DD: unknown receiver→ privacy risk .052 0.82
H6.6.6a DD: unknown receiver→ bonding sc -.129 2.27*
H6.6.6b DD: unknown receiver→ bridging sc .050 0.75
H6.7 privacy risk→ online social well-being -.223 5.00***
H6.8a bonding sc→ online social well-being .177 3.58***
H6.8b bridging sc→ online social well-being .218 3.96***
Table 6.3: Partial least squares path estimators for the research model. Note: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01,
***p < 0.001.
creasing the users’ privacy concern (β = -0.416, p < 0.001), which supports H6.1; and
increasing the users’ perception of bonding social capital (β = 0.159, p < 0.01) and
bridging social capital (β = 0.193, p < 0.001), which supports H6.2a and H6.2b. The
relationships between perceived control and benefits-risks are also significant, which
supports H6.3 (β = -0.117, p < 0.05) andH6.4b (β = 0.158, p < 0.01), except for bonding
capital building (H6.4a) which was not supported.
The findings further indicated interesting results between the depth dimension of self-
disclosure and the different types of receivers. For the disclosure with trusted receivers,
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Figure 6.3: Results of the research model.
there was a significant increasing relationship with both dimensions of social capi-
tal, which supports H6.6.1a (β = 0.463, p < 0.001) and H6.6.1b (β = 0.229, p < 0.01),
while no significant relationship was found with privacy concern (H6.5.1). For the
disclosure with influencer receivers, there was only a significant increasing relation-
ship with bridging capital (H6.6.2b), while H6.5.2 and H6.6.2a were not supported.
For the disclosure with friend receivers, there was not a significant relationship with
privacy concern (H6.5.3) or with social capital (H6.6.3a and H6.6.3b). For the disclo-
sure with family members, we found a significant increasing relationship with users’
privacy concern (β = 0.163, p < 0.05) and a significant decreasing relationship with
social capital (β = -0.145, p < 0.05), which supports H6.5.4 and H6.6.4a and does not
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support H6.6.4b. Finally, for the disclosure with coworkers and unknown receivers,
there was only a strong relationship between coworkers and bonding social capital (β
= 0.209, p < 0.01) and a strong relationship between unknown receivers and bonding
social capital (β = -0.129, p < 0.05), which supports H6.6.5a and H6.6.6a, respectively.
Therefore, the rest of the hypotheses that link the depth dimension of self-disclosure
with receivers were not supported (H6.5.5, H6.6.5b, H6.5.6, and H6.6.6b).
Finally, as we expected, the users’ perceptions of benefits and risks of self-disclosure
with their online social well-being had strong significance, which supportsH6.7, H6.8a,
and H6.8b. The relationship between privacy concern and their online social well-
being had a significantly decreasing impact (β = -0.223, p < 0.001). The relationships
between the two social capital dimensions (bonding capital (β = 0.117, p < 0.001)
and bridging capital (β = 0.218, p < 0.001)) and their online social well-being had a
significantly increasing impact.
6.6 Discussions
The current study has evaluated users’ privacy trade-offs (cost-benefit) in the privacy
decision-making process in social networks taking into account the different element
properties of communication. The relationship between the theory of privacy calcu-
lus (PCT) and users’ trade-off perceptions of the properties of the receiver, message,
and channel was conceptualized and empirically tested, performing a study about the
participants’ online social network usage. While there was a mix of supported and un-
supported hypotheses in the results, the change in significance between constructs of
depth-disclosure actions by receiver types and the perceived benefit-risk was the most
interesting.
There was a striking significance between the trust factors (trust in the OSN provider,
and trust in other users) and the users’ perceptions of benefits. As previous research
works state [137, 208] and our study confirms, trust in the OSN provider helped to
reduce the users’ privacy concerns (H6.1) and increase the users’ perception of both
dimensions of social capital building (H6.2a and H6.2b) to the same extent. Trust in
other users significantly increased both dimensions of social capital building (H6.6.1a
and H6.6.1b), but there was a stronger impact on bonding capital. However, there
was no relation between trust in members and privacy concerns. For the control per-
ceived by users, there was a less significant effect than trust factors on users’ perceived
benefits-risks. This also helped to reduce the privacy concerns (H6.3) and partially
increase the social capital building of users (only for the bridging capital, H6.4b).
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There was a striking significance between the trust factors (trust in the OSN provider,
and trust in other users) and the users’ perceptions of benefits. As previous research
works state [137, 208] and our study confirms, trust in the OSN provider helped to
reduce the users’ privacy concerns (H6.1) and increase the users’ perception of both so-
cial capital building (H6.2a and H6.2b) to the same extent. In the case of trust in other
users, it increased significantly both social capital building (H6.6.1a and H6.6.1b), but
with a stronger impact on bonding capital. However, there was no relation between
trust in members and privacy concerns. Regarding the control perceived by users, it
had a less significant effect than trust factors on users’ perceived benefits-risks, helping
also to reduce the privacy concerns (H6.3) and increasing partially the capital building
of users (just the bridging capital, H6.4b).
When disclosing personal information to different kinds of users, there was a signifi-
cant difference in users’ privacy calculus perception. As we predicted, based on OSN
users’ regrets [270], the social circle of family members had a significantly positive im-
pact on users’ privacy concerns (H6.5.4) and a partially negative impact on social cap-
ital building (H6.6.4a). Although the social circle of coworkers also showed some lim-
ited evidence of regrets as in the family case, our study did not find a significant effect
on users’ privacy concerns but we found a significant positive effect on bonding social
capital (H6.6.5a). This behavior might be explained by a desire for strengthening ties
with coworkers with whom we spend an important amount of time daily and for the
seeking of job satisfaction [119]. Curiously, the social circle of friends had no signif-
icant effect on users’ perceptions of benefit or risk. It could be that the friend social
circle has become the most open to interpretation for the users. For instance, social
networks like Facebook collapse other context relationships within friends [68], so this
social circle blends in with a lot of other types of receivers. As we predicted, disclosing
personal information with influencer receivers had a significantly positive effect on
bridging capital building (H6.6.2b), while there was not a significant impact on users’
privacy concerns. Users do not perceive disclosing their information with influencer
users to be risky. However, if they do not know them (unknown receivers) and they
disclose their personal information, it has been shown that there is a significantly neg-
ative effect on their bonding capital (H6.6.6a). Taken together, these findings reveal
that relationships that are too close (family) or, the flip side, unknown relationships
are perceived by users as not being beneficial. Conversely, disclosing users’ personal in-
formation with highly trusted receivers and influencer receivers improves their social
capital building. Generally, most of the relations between depth-disclosure with differ-
ent receivers and user privacy concerns did not have a significant relationship. As [151]
state, this could be due to the fact that user privacy concerns mainly center on organi-
zational risks such as the collection and secondary use of their information. Users may
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believe companies have more incentive to abuse their information compared to other
network members (except for family members who are a conflicting audience). Also,
many of the relations between depth-disclosure with different receivers and bridging
social capital did not have a significant relationship. This could be due to the fact that
not all of the members of a specific social circle contribute in the same way to this fac-
tor and that the features (trust and influence) of an individual are those that produce
a significant effect on bridging social capital.
Finally, the findings confirm that the benefit and risk constructs that we tested con-
tributed to the online social well-being of users, inversely relating users’ privacy con-
cerns with online social well-being (H6.7) and directly relating social capital with on-
line social well-being (H6.8a and H6.8b).
6.6.1 Theoretical implications
This study contributes to the existing literature in the following three important ways.
First of all, we have examined in detail the OSN users’ decisions in the information
disclosing context with insights from the elements of online communication (channel,
message, and receiver) and how they contribute to the users’ benefit-risk perception.
Previous research was mainly focused on exploring self-disclosure as a single decision.
They just modeled users’ perceptions of the social network properties (the channel) and
users’ interests and how these constructs impacted their social benefits and privacy
risks. Those research works took an approach that is closer to OSN business features
in order to increase the number of users’ self-disclosing actions instead of an approach
that focuses on users’ privacy and their understanding of online communication. In
contrast, the research presented in our work takes into account the users’ perspective
focusing on privacy decision-making.
Second, we have tested the impact of the elements of online communication on the
users’ perceptions of privacy risk and social benefit. It is important to note that people
disclose their personal information as a continuous trade-off between relinquishing
some privacy in exchange for some social benefits. Academic attention to potential
receiver types and the sensitivity of the message to be disclosed will generate a more
comprehensive picture of information disclosure on social networks and will further
improve our current understanding of which features contribute to users’ benefit and
risk and to what extent they contribute.
Third, we have investigated the disclosure of personal information with types of re-
ceivers based on social circles, which is a mechanism that is commonly offered by so-
146
CHAPTER 6. “WHO SHOULD I GRANT ACCESS TO MY POST?”:
IDENTIFYING THE MOST SUITABLE PRIVACY DECISIONS ON OSNS
cial networks to users for privacy policy selection. Similarly to the research work by
[138] where different types of personal information were investigated, we found dif-
ferences in significance towards social circles. In contrast to the findings of [138] for
different types of personal information, our study found more relationships between
depth-disclosure actions (by types of receivers) and users’ perceived benefit than be-
tween deep disclosure actions and risk perceptions. These findings could also improve
the understanding of users’ regrets on social networks and online communication.
6.6.2 Practical implications
The current research also has several implications for practitioners in the context of so-
cial networking apps. It has been shown that privacy decisions are a burdensome task
because users have toomany connections (also known as friends), and they are required
to assess the disclosure decision for each one. These research results shed light on the
relevance of each factor in privacy decision-making and its relationship with others.
A better classification of users’ relationship types, trust estimation, and the visibility
properties of a user on the network could provide improvements in current privacy
mechanisms. Those mechanisms combined with our results could help to recommend
suitable privacy policies, automatizing the individual process of privacy calculus and
maximizing the users’ social benefits obtained by disclosing their information. There-
fore, recommending audiences that are highly trusted, influential, or belong to the
coworkers circle will be prioritized over other audiences such as family members or
unknown users that might reduce the benefit of the user or even increase his/her risk.
For example, a user belonging to a social circle of coworkers with a high level of trust
and influence on others will be recommended as an audience for a social network post,
while family members will not be recommended (unless there is an extremely high level
of trust with the user).
6.6.3 Limitations and future research
While the current research provides several implications for theory and practice, there
are limitations that must be acknowledged and opportunities to be considered for fu-
ture research. Even though the sample size of our study is sufficient, it could be unbal-
anced or biased for some external and uncontrollable factors. The reiterative confir-
mation of the presented findings should be performed to validate that our samples are
not biased. In our findings, we observed a few more significant relationships for per-
ceived benefit than for perceived risk. According to [109], users easily perceive benefits
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as being closer, while privacy risks are perceived as being abstract and psychologically
distant. Thus, a limitation of our work is that we do not know how our proposed re-
search model could fit a population that is only composed of participants that have
had negatives experiences when disclosing personal information on social networks.
Another limitation was the constructs used. We mainly checked the self-disclosure
decision and the influence of properties of other elements of online communication.
However, individually analyzing the decisions for those elements could shed light on
their suitability for users’ self-disclosure. Our future research will be directed towards
the application and validation of our research model in a social network (e.g., in our
prototype of a social network called Pesedia3). The research model will be used to au-
tomatically compute privacy policies during disclosure decisions in social networks.
We will test our privacy mechanisms based on the validated model versus other pri-
vacy mechanisms considered in the literature. For future research, it would also be
interesting to test our research model with OSN users that have already had negative
experiences when disclosing personal information on social networks. This would in-
clude analyzing a target population with more experience with privacy risks in order
to confirm whether or not our hypotheses are also supported. In addition, future stud-
ies can extend the current study by including additional constructs that have not been
evaluated in the current research, such as risk aversion, general risk, ease of use, and
an expansion of message and receiver properties.
6.7 Conclusion
The goal of the current research was to evaluate the relationship between the elements
of online communication (especially channel, message, and receiver), personal infor-
mation disclosure, and privacy trade-off in the social network context. Based on the
literature, a research model was derived and tested using the responses of a study
that assesses the constructs of that model. The results revealed a change in privacy
trade-off perceptions and their influence on disclosure behaviors with different prop-
erties/factors of the elements of communications such as the social circles of receivers,
the sensitivity of the message, and the trust in the OSN provider or in other users.
While most of the users’ perceptions mainly influenced social capital building, there
were some significant relationships between family members and unknown relation-
ships that had negative effects on social capital building. In the case of familymembers
there were also repercussions on their privacy concerns. As we predicted, there was no
relationship between the message or receivers; however, there was a decrease in users’
3https://pesedia.webs.upv.es/
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perceived risk in the case of channel trust and control perception. Last, we confirm
that users’ perceptions of benefit and risk were properly aligned with their online social
well-being. With the extension of privacy trade-off in users’ privacy decision-making
in social networks, the current research established varying effects of the relationships
to different elements of online communication, creating a strong foundation for future
studies in privacy decision-making research.
6.A Appendix
6.A.1 Measurement instrument
Construct Code Items
Privacy
Concern
[284]
PC1 I am concerned that Facebook is collecting too much personal information about me.
PC2 I am concerned that unauthorized people may access my personal information.
PC3 I am concerned that Facebook may keep my personal information in an inaccurate
manner.
PC4 I am concerned about submitting personal information to Facebook.
PC5 It bothers me when Facebook asks me for this much personal information.
Trust in
Facebook
[151, 173]
TF1 I believe that privacy of my personal information is well protected by Facebook.
TF2 I believe that Facebook will not use my personal information for any other purpose.
TF3 I believe that Facebook is a secure platform for sharing my personal information.
Perceived
Control
[151, 57]
CN1 I feel in control over the information I provide on Facebook.
CN2 I feel in control over who can view my information on Facebook.
CN3 Privacy settings allowme to have full control over the personal information I provide
on Facebook.
Bonding
Social
Capital
[280, 80, 62]
BO1 There are people on Facebook I trust to help solve my problems.
BO2 There are people on Facebook I can turn to for advice about making very important
decisions.
BO3 There are people on Facebook I can talk to when I feel lonely.
BO4 The people I interact with on Facebook would put their reputation on the line for me.
BO5 The people I interact with on Facebook would be good job references for me.
BO6 The people I interact with on Facebook would help me fight an injustice.
BO7 There is no one on Facebook that I feel comfortable talking to about intimate personal
problems. (reversed)
BO8 There is no one on Facebook I know well enough to get them to do anything impor-
tant. (reversed)
Bridging
Social
Capital
[280, 80, 62]
BR1 Interacting with people on Facebook makes me interested in things that happen out-
side of my close contacts.
BR2 Interacting with people on Facebook makes me want to try new things.
BR3 Interacting with people on Facebook makes me interested in what people unlike me
are thinking.
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(Table continued)
Construct Code Items
BR4 Interacting with people on Facebook makes me curious about other places in the
world.
BR5 Interacting with people on Facebook makes me feel like part of a larger community.
BR6 Interacting with people on Facebook makes me feel connected to the bigger picture.
BR7 Interacting with people on Facebook reminds me that everyone in the world is con-
nected.
BR8 On Facebook, I am willing to spend time to support general community activities.
BR9 Interacting with people on Facebook gives me new people to talk to.
BR10 On Facebook, I come in contact with new people all the time.
Depth-
Disclosure
(by receiver
type),
adapted
from [279,
127, 118]
DR1 With receiver on Facebook, I intimately disclose who I really am, openly and fully in
my conversations.
DR2 With receiver on Facebook, once I get started, my self-disclosures last a long time.
DR3 With receiver on Facebook, I typically reveal information about myself without in-
tending to.
DR4 With receiver on Facebook, once I get started, I intimately and fully reveal myself in
my self-disclosures.
Online
Social
Well-being
[118]
SW1 In my Facebook social life, in most respects, I am close to my ideal.
SW2 In my Facebook social life, the conditions are excellent.
SW3 In my Facebook social life, I am satisfied.
SW4 In my Facebook social life, so far, I have obtained the important things I want.
SW5 In my Facebook social life, if I could live it over, I would change almost nothing.
6.A.2 Descriptive statistics, reliability and validity results
Construct Item Mean SD Skew Kurt FL AVE CR CA
Privacy Concern PC1 3.87 1.14 -0.65 -0.61 .820 .689 .917 .887
PC2 3.62 1.12 -0.42 -0.59 .801
PC3 3.36 1.21 -0.25 -0.84 .782
PC4 3.75 1.09 -0.59 -0.45 .810
PC5 3.88 1.09 -0.74 -0.33 .812
Trust in Facebook TF1 2.27 1.03 0.37 -0.77 .775 .759 .904 .841
TF2 2.05 1.09 0.74 -0.42 .831
TF3 2.15 1.04 0.47 -0.80 .758
Perceived Control CN1 3.02 1.15 -0.11 -0.93 .834 .698 .874 .785
CN2 3.03 1.07 -0.16 -0.79 .801
CN3 3.07 1.05 -0.17 -0.71 .738
Bonding Social Capital BO1 2.56 1.17 0.30 -0.84 .809 .515 .889 .859
BO2 2.52 1.21 0.30 -0.97 .819
BO3 2.92 1.31 -0.06 -1.22 .746
BO4 2.20 1.06 0.58 -0.46 .681
BO5 2.42 1.16 0.42 -0.79 .589
BO6 2.72 1.08 0.18 -0.67 .681
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(Table continued)
Construct Item Mean SD Skew Kurt FL AVE CR CA
BO7* 3.56 1.27 -0.54 -0.78 .600
BO8* 3.73 1.14 -0.62 -0.44 .532
Bridging Social Capital BR1 3.16 1.06 -0.19 -0.61 .784 .542 .922 .906
BR2 2.93 1.09 0.08 -0.69 .723
BR3 2.88 1.09 0.07 -0.63 .714
BR4 3.37 1.08 -0.27 -0.60 .693
BR5 2.87 1.20 0.11 -0.97 .786
BR6 2.88 1.14 0.08 -0.81 .791
BR7 3.29 1.14 -0.25 -0.71 .652
BR8 2.32 0.99 0.36 -0.55 .655
BR9 2.60 1.18 0.22 -1.05 .728
BR10 2.30 1.07 0.74 -0.08 .636
Dept-Disclosure:
Trusted Receiver
DT1 2.43 1.15 0.41 -0.76 .870 .733 .916 .877
DT2 2.27 1.08 0.57 -0.44 .859
DT3 2.11 1.02 0.70 -0.19 .766
DT4 2.27 1.09 0.51 -0.66 .922
Dept-Disclosure:
Influencing Receiver
DI1 1.65 0.93 1.32 0.95 .859 .667 .889 .832
DI2 1.65 0.92 1.36 1.14 .772
DI3 1.56 0.79 1.41 1.80 .742
DI4 1.49 0.86 1.87 2.96 .885
Dept-Disclosure:
Friends Receiver
DF1 2.57 1.16 0.30 -0.82 .872 .727 .914 .874
DF2 2.37 1.06 0.36 -0.60 .865
DF3 2.21 1.03 0.58 -0.26 .762
DF4 2.38 1.10 0.37 -0.77 .906
Dept-Disclosure:
Family Receiver
DA1 2.72 1.32 0.12 -1.20 .906 .786 .936 .908
DA2 2.43 1.21 0.42 -0.89 .897
DA3 2.25 1.16 0.61 -0.59 .810
DA4 2.54 1.28 0.26 -1.14 .931
Dept-Disclosure:
Coworkers Receiver
DC1 1.60 0.87 1.51 2.02 .905 .777 .933 .904
DC2 1.64 0.94 1.46 1.45 .833
DC3 1.49 0.75 1.43 1.27 .850
DC4 1.53 0.80 1.49 1.77 .934
Dept-Disclosure:
Unknowns Receiver
DU1 1.20 0.58 3.58 14.1 .918 .705 .905 .857
DU2 1.33 0.82 3.04 9.45 .734
DU3 1.24 0.57 2.68 7.45 .791
DU4 1.21 0.60 3.38 12.1 .902
Online Social
Well-being
SW1 3.01 1.03 -0.39 -0.47 .813 .663 .907 .874
SW2 2.96 0.90 -0.27 -0.08 .779
SW3 3.34 0.99 -0.75 -0.01 .815
SW4 3.11 1.00 -0.52 -0.40 .802
SW5 2.96 1.07 -0.20 -0.91 .750
Note: SD=standard deviation; FL=factor loadings; AVE=average variance extracted; CR=composite
reliability; CA=Cronbach’s Alpha. *responses reversed prior to evaluation.
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Abstract
Privacy Risk in Online Social Networks (OSNs) is one of the main concerns that has
increased in the last few years. Even though social network applications provide mech-
anisms to control risk, teenagers are not often aware of the privacy risks of disclosing
information in online social networks. The privacy decision-making process is complex
and users often do not have full knowledge and enough time to evaluate all potential
scenarios. They do not consider the audience that will have access to disclosed infor-
mation or the risk if the information continues to spread and reaches an unexpected
audience. To deal with these issues, we propose two soft-paternalism mechanisms that
provide information to the user about the privacy risk of publishing information on a
social network. That privacy risk is based on a complex privacy metric. To evaluate
the mechanisms, we performed an experiment with 42 teenagers. The proposed mecha-
nisms were included in a social network called Pesedia. The results show that there are
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significant differences in teenagers’ behaviors towards better privacy practices when
the mechanisms are included in the network.
7.1 Introduction
Teenagers constitute one of the main user groups of Online Social Networks [258]. The
use of social networks is part of children’s daily living routine. According to Livingstone
et al. [166], 93% of 9-16-year-old users go online at least weekly (60% go online every day
or almost every day). Although teenagers obtain a benefit from sharing and consuming
information on OSN (i.e., instant messaging, watching videos, or playing games), they
are also exposed to privacy risks (i.e., cyberbullying or experiences that make them
feel uncomfortable) [155, 223]. Recent surveys have shown that users’ privacy concerns
regarding social networks have increased in the last few years [5, 125].
There are clear differences in behavior between teenagers and adults on social net-
works. The comparison carried out by Christofides et. al [61] reveals that teenagers
spend significantly longer on SNS per day, and they have more contact with strangers
[87] (17 percent of teens have become “friends” with people who they have never per-
sonally met, and 43 percent of teens have been contacted online by strangers). They
can be easily convinced to share their personal information with the promise of a small
prize or gift. Since children and teenagers tend to be trusting, naïve, curious, adven-
turesome, and eager for attention and affection, potential offenders and strangers have
found that children and teenagers are perfect targets for criminal acts in cyberspace
[52]. The combination of both factors (i.e., the number of friends and their vulnerabil-
ity), makes the risk (i.e., the probability of reaching a broader audience) of a teenager’s
publication higher than an adult’s publication. Therefore, the privacy risk of teenagers
actions increases. Theneed ofmechanisms oriented to increase privacy awareness when
teenagers share information in social networks or applications becomes more relevant.
Despite the importance and vulnerability of this demographic group, this subset of the
community has hardly been researched in the context of privacy in social networks.
In this research, we focus on teenage users’ behavior regarding online privacy. In this
context, three processes are considered to be important [235]: risk assessment (i.e., cal-
culating risk probability andmagnitude); risk evaluation (i.e., determining the accept-
ability of a given risk); and risk management (i.e., the process of reducing risk to an
acceptable level). When users are going to publish a message on an OSN, they should
evaluate the benefits and risks of performing that action. The privacy decision-making
process is complex and users often do not have full knowledge of the audience that will
154
CHAPTER 7. ENHANCING THE PRIVACY RISK AWARENESS OF
TEENAGERS IN ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS THROUGH
SOFT-PATERNALISM MECHANISMS
see the publication or how other users are going to use the disclosed information. In ad-
dition, the evaluation of all the possible scenarios of a disclosure could be overwhelming
for a user, especially for teenagers [10].
Several approaches have been proposed to facilitate the decision-making process of
users in OSN that may affect their privacy. For instance, some social network appli-
cations offer privacy-settings controls. However, in some cases, these controls are com-
plex for non-expert users that are unable to fully understand the implications of their
own settings. In other cases, the configuration of privacy settings is considered by users
to be a tedious task, so they prefer to maintain the default settings [164]. In addition,
privacy controls in OSN are more focused on protecting the information related to the
user profile than on protecting the privacy of the user’s publications [164, 189, 225].
There are other approaches that address the problem of users’ privacy with the au-
tomation of privacy settings configuration [86, 262, 34, 244]. However, these propos-
als usually require an initial user intervention. Other approaches try to improve user
awareness about the misalignment of users’ expected audience with the actual audi-
ence to reduce the negative effects of performing an action in an OSN [49, 129, 178].
Several works also propose privacy risk metrics to asses users in the management of
their privacy just before performing a sharing action [11]. However, to facilitate the
decision-making process of users, it is not only important to measure the privacy risk
(i.e., risk assessment), but also the way the metric will be shown to users. The way the
information is shown can influence the users’ decision-making process (i.e., risk evalu-
ation and management).
According to Staksrud and Livingstone [235], it is relevant to assist teenagers to cope
with risk without restricting their freedom of online exploration that society promotes
for children in other contexts. In recent years, there has been growing interest in the
use of mechanisms from behavioral economics to improve decision-making processes
where lack of information or cognitive overload may unfavorably affect user privacy
[21]. These mechanisms are known as soft paternalistic interventions (i.e., nudges).
They attempt to influence decision making to improve individual well-being, without
actually limiting users’ ability to choose freely, thus, preserving freedom of choice [7].
In this paper, we present two soft-paternalism mechanisms to assist users (especially
teenagers) to make better decisions about actions in social networks that may increase
their privacy risks. The aim is to increase their privacy awareness. In this paper, pri-
vacy awareness refers to the users’ knowledge about the potential audience that might
see a user’s publication disclosure. The proposed mechanisms “nudge” users to recon-
sider the disclosure actions before performing them. The proposed mechanisms use
information from a Privacy Risk Score (PRS) metric that considers different levels of
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friendship and the potential audience that may have access to the disclosed message
[11]. The first mechanism shows the profile images of users that are part of the poten-
tial audience that may have access to the message and a risk-level alert. The second
mechanism shows the number of users that are part of the audience that may have
access to the message and a risk-level alert. We tested the mechanisms in a four-week
experiment with 42 teenagers in an online social network called PESEDIA. The results
obtained through the analysis of the social network logs suggest that the use of soft-
paternalism mechanisms could be a suitable option to assess in the decision-making
process and prevent teenagers from privacy risk publications that could have negative
consequences.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 7.2 presents previous works that
are related to privacy protection and awareness. Section 7.3 describes in detail the
nudging mechanisms proposed. Section 7.4 describes the methodology followed for the
experiment (i.e., their study subjects, protocols, and types of evaluations). Section 7.5
presents the evaluations and results derived from the teenagers’ activities and inter-
actions during the study. Section 7.6 presents our discussions about how the results
obtained should be interpreted and what was learned from the research. Finally, Sec-
tion 7.7 presents conclusions and future work.
7.2 Related work
As the number of activities in online social networks increases, teenagers have to deal
with an increasing number of privacy decisions. These decisions are made with in-
complete and asymmetric information (i.e., limited knowledge about the reachability
of a publication) and with bounded rationality (i.e., limited resources to evaluate all
possible options and their consequences). Previous studies [229] state that the limited
attentional capability of humans results in their bounded capacity to be rational.
Several educational strategies have been carried out by education centers and public
administrations to leverage teenage users’ awareness of privacy risks and to reduce
their exposure to associated negative experiences [258, 1, 260]. There are also some
studies that evaluate the impact of educational initiatives which suggest that they are
successful in increasing awareness about online risks [67, 232]. However, the research
community considers that awareness and confidence do not necessarily promote less
risky behavior among young people [166]. This result is in the line of the number of
young people that report negative online experiences despite the initiatives carried out
by education institutions [166].
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As an alternative to educational materials, mechanisms from the field of behavioral
research have been considered to be appropriate for designing systems that nudge users
towards better decisions concerning privacy [7]. Specifically, soft-paternalism inter-
ventions have been considered as a suitable method to influence teenagers’ privacy
behaviors without losing freedom of choice or liberty.
In the context of privacy in mobile applications, Almuhimedi et al. [16] propose the
creation of an application that includes soft-paternalism mechanisms with the aim
of raising the awareness of data collected by other applications. The authors carried
out an 8-day experiment where the participants installed the proposed application.
The application alerts consist of messages describing the number of apps accessing
one information type and the total number of accesses in a given period. The alerts
triggered changes of 58% in the data access permissions of other applications. The
results suggest the positive effect of the soft-paternalism on the awareness of users’
data that is being used by third-parties. This work monitorizes and informs once a
third-party application has already accessed to user’s data. However, our proposal is
oriented to the creation of preventive action messages that would avoid future regrets
about the sharing action.
Other works have used soft-paternalism mechanisms to deal with privacy in instant
messaging applications. Patil et al. [202] carried out an experiment with 50 partic-
ipants to evaluate whether privacy preferences of the social circles influence privacy
setting configuration. When the participants were configuring their preferences for six
privacy-relevant settings, they also had information about the privacy choices made
by the majority of their contacts. The results of the experiment show that the primary
driver in establishing a certain setting value is the privacy aspect. The privacy choice
of user’s social circle is a secondary source of guidance to establish privacy settings. The
results also show that one’s personal perception of privacy is an influential characteris-
tic. Therefore, it could be considered appropriate provide information about the user’s
situation regarding privacy when he is going to perform an action in order to influence
in his behaviour.
Soft-paternalism mechanisms have also been applied to online social networks. Kon-
ings et al. [149] present an approach that controls the access to information published
on social networks and for how long it would be available. This proposal combines a
policy-based cryptographic enforcement system with social signaling. Social signal-
ing is used to label sensitive information. The authors propose a set of privacy icons
to label the information shared on a social network. When users publish a message,
they can select the users that will have access to the message, how long they will have
access to it, and the social icons that recommend how the message should be treated
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(i.e., private, keep information internal, not print, etc.). However, users do not have
information about the potential audience that might see the message. Users only have
the option to express their personal preferences about the audience.
Wang et al. [273] present the results of a 6-week experiment with 28 Facebook users. In
the experiment, the authors introduced three types of nudges: audience nudge (contains
textual and visual information of the audience), timer nudge (introduces a visual delay
of 20 seconds after a user clicked the “post” button before publishing the submitted
post), and the combination of the two. The results conclude that participants that use
Facebook to post personal opinions perceive the nudges as being more beneficial than
those who use it to broadcast news articles or for commercial purposes. Moreover, the
users that have experience in the configuration of privacy settings considered that the
nudges could bemore useful for peoplewithout experience in social networks. However,
in the case of the audience mechanism the privacy risk that a user could have if the
expected audience re-share the user’s publication is not considered. This information
could provide him a broader view of the potential reachability of his publication. The
results of the experiment suggest that these mechanisms can be useful for people who
are starting to use social networks (e.g. children and adolescents).
A similar 12-day experiment with 21 participants was carried out in [271]. The au-
thors propose different nudging mechanisms to be integrated into Facebook. The first
mechanism “audience nudge” provides images of the audience that could see the post.
Similarly to the audience mechanism proposed in [273], this mechanism also does not
take into account the potential audience in the case of user with permissions re-shares
the publication. The second mechanism “timer nudge” includes a time delay before a
user posts a message on the social network. The third mechanism “sentiment nudge”
consists of an estimation of the sentiment associated to the post that the user is going to
publish. The authors analyzed the data collected from the experiment (i.e., number of
changes in online privacy settings, number of canceled or edited posts, post frequency,
and topic sensitivity) and the data of a questionnaire after the experiment. They found
clear evidence of changes in posting behavior for some of the participants. The partic-
ipants mentioned that the “audience nudge” was useful for thinking about customized
groups. For the “timer nudge”, the users mentioned that the mechanism provided them
the opportunity to stop and think about the publication. In general, the “sentiment
nudge” was perceived as being a less useful nudge than the others. The authors men-
tion that the reasons could be associated with the sentiment algorithm that was used.
It is important to provide mechanisms that facilitate the increase of privacy aware-
ness. The concept of privacy awareness varies depending on the research work. Some
authors consider privacy awareness to be the knowledge of privacy notices and un-
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derstanding of privacy controls and settings [30]. Others define privacy awareness as
the perception of the elements in an environment, threats, and implications from per-
sonal information disclosure [228]. In this work, we consider a more specific concept of
privacy awareness to be the knowledge of the users about the potential audience that
might see a user’s publication disclosure. Specifically, we propose a nudge approach
similar to the one proposed by Wang et al. [271, 273] to increase users’ privacy aware-
ness. However, the work presented here differs from the previous ones in several ways
(see Table 7.1). First, we integrate a privacy risk metric in the nudges, which considers
the potential audience of a publication (i.e., if a user of the intended audience re-shares
the information). The current approaches consider the audience based only on the pri-
vacy policy defined by the user, without considering the potential re-sharing actions.
Second, we introduce a new quantitative nudge that shows the number of potential
users that may see the publication instead of showing the users’ profile images. We also
evaluate whether there are differences in the influence on users’ behaviors between the
visual nudge or the numeric nudge. Third, we evaluate the nudges in a population of
teenagers between 12 and 14 years old.
7.3 Nudging Mechanisms
Recent research works state that social media users underestimate their audience size,
guessing that their audience is just 27% of its true size [31, 43]. Users usually do not
remember which users are part of their direct audience in social networks, and, there-
fore, it is highly complicated to determine those users that can be reached from their
direct audience. Therefore, users do not usually apply privacy tools (e.g., audience se-
lectors or access lists) to define who has access to their information. As a consequence,
users post information that may reach undesired audiences without being conscious of
it. This information can even reach other communities that were not in their intended
audience.
The idea of nudging was popularized by Thaler and Sunstein [250] as a form of soft-
paternalism to guide individuals toward certain behaviors. A nudge can be viewed
as an intervention that can modify people’s behavior without forcing them. Hansen
[112] stated that users are not usually aware of biases that may result in choices that
have potentially adverse outcomes. Therefore, nudges can be viewed as mechanisms
oriented to mitigate human biases to provide more beneficial outcomes for users. In
decision-making scenarios that are involved in social networks, nudge mechanisms can
be focused to provide support for users to enhance their privacy and security.
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Nudges Nudges for privacy Media
Almuhimedi et
al. [16]
• application message alerts
(number of apps accessing one
information type and the total
number of accesses in a given
period)
✓ Considers AppOps logs shown
for each app-permission
Mobile
app
Patil et al.
[202]
• user’s social circle ✓Considers the actions performed
by the user’s social circle
Instant
mes-
saging
app
Konings et al.
[149]
• privacy icons for social signal-
ing
✓ Considers the user’s preferences
Wang et al.
[271] (2013)
• audience (profile images of the
publication audience)
✓ Considers the privacy policy of
the publication
Social
network
• time (visual delay)
• audience + time ✓ Considers the privacy policy of
the publication
Wang et al.
[273] (2014)
• audience (profile images of the
publication audience)
✓ Considers the privacy policy of
the publication
Social
network
• time (visual delay)
• sentiment
Our work • visual audience + text message
with a degree of privacy risk
✓ Considers a privacy risk metric
that estimates the potential audi-
ence of a publication
Social
network
• numerical audience + text mes-
sage with a degree of privacy risk
✓ Considers a privacy risk metric
that estimates the potential audi-
ence of a publication
Table 7.1: Overview of approaches related to soft-paternalism mechanisms. We considered three main
features: (i) the type of nudges used; (ii) if the nudges are applied to prevent privacy risk scenarios and
what information was considered to establish the privacy risk; and (iii) the environment where the nudges
are applied.
According to this, we propose informing the users about the potential audience of their
publications using soft-paternalism mechanisms based on a privacy risk metric. The
metric used in this work to support the nudges is the Privacy Risk Score [11].
7.3.1 Privacy Risk Score (PRS)
We assume that there is a social network G that consists ofN nodes, where every node
ai ∈ {a1, ..., an} represents a user of the social network. Users are connected through
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bidirectional links that represent friendship relationships and correspond to the edges
E ⊆ N × N of G. We define the Privacy Risk Score (PRS) [11] for a user ai that
publishes a message as an indicator of the potential risk of this message to be diffused
over the social network (i.e., potential visibility). The higher the PRS value, the higher
the threat to user ai’s privacy.
To estimate the PRS, two important factors are considered: (i) the user’s position in
the network. Those users located in paths where messages follow frequently, have a
higher privacy risk than others; and (ii) the newness of a message. As stated in [69],
the diffusion of a message in a social network is dependent on the lifetime since this
message was created. In our case, the message diffusion process of a messagem is based
on othermodels [139, 106], in which users are initially represented as deactivated nodes,
since they did not received the message. Users become activated as they receive this
message and the diffusion process finishes when no activations occur from time step s
to s+ 1. The estimation of the PRS is described in more depth in [11].
According to this process, the privacy risk of a user by performing amessage’s diffusion
is related to the amount of users that this user can activate. Figure 7.1a shows a social
network in which user a1 is publishing a new message. Blue nodes represent users that
have not seen this message and can potentially see it (are deactivated nodes), while red
nodes represent users that have already seen the message (are activated). The privacy
risk associated with user a1 for the diffusion of this message is high, since the proba-
bility to reach deactivated nodes (i.e., the rest of the users apart from a1) is high too.
Figure 7.1b shows a social network in which user a1 is publishing a message that was
forwarded by user a2. However, this message has already been seen by a large number
of users of the social network. In this case, the privacy risk associated with user a1 for
the diffusion of this message is low, since there are only 3 remaining deactivated users
that can potentially be activated. Therefore, we say that the privacy risk associated
with a user for a message diffusion process is high when a user publishes a new mes-
sage since no other users have viewed it yet (i.e., they are deactivated). In contrast, the
privacy risk is low when a user publishes a message that has already been viewed by
others (i.e., they have become activated).
To represent this, we define S = {1, 2, . . . , n} to indicate the number of steps that a
message has taken from its creation. Considering these two factors, we define a S×N
reachability matrix γi associated to each user ai to represent the number of messages
that ai has published at a certain step s and have been seen by other users. As an
example, the value γis,aj represents the messages published by ai in step s that wereseen by aj .
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(a)High privacy risk of user a1 for sharing a message
non-seen yet.
(b) Low privacy risk of user a1 for sharing a message
seen by the majority.
Figure 7.1: Representation of user’s privacy risk for different diffusion times of a message.
In a general view, the PRS value for a user ai can be calculated as the percentage of
agents of the social network that potentially see amessage published by ai at any stage
(Equation 7.1).
PRS(ai) =
1
S
S∑
s=1

∑
aj∈N
γis,aj
γis,ai · |N |
 (7.1)
The PRS takes a value in the interval [0..1]. If this value is close to 0 when a user is
about to publish a message, it indicates that this message is expected to be seen by
a small number of users. In contrast, if this value is close to 1, it indicates that the
potential audience of the message is the majority of the social network. It is possible
to define PRS value intervals. Each interval is associated with informative labels (i.e.,
none, low, medium, high) that will appear in the nudging mechanisms. The definition
of the intervals depends on the domain.
This metric provides an estimation of the potential audience that could have access to
a publication in terms of the users of the social network that potentially see a message
published by another user. The goal of the PRS is oriented to helping users to manage
their sensitive and non-sensitive information, thereby improving their experiences in
the social network.
Figure 7.2 shows a scenario where the privacy risk score is calculated for users a1 and
a2 in a social network. We assume for simplicity that all of the users in G have the
privacy policy that only their direct friends can see their walls. The maximum value
for parameter S cannot exceed the network diameter (i.e., the longest of all of the
shortest paths between two nodes). Therefore, for this example of PRS calculation, we
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Figure 7.2: Example of social network activity and the PRS calculation process.
use the value 2 for parameter S.
Following, we define a diffusion process of four messages (m1, m2, m3, m4):
m1) User a1 publishes amessagem1 on its wall. Since a1 sends this message at s = 1,
γ1 is updated at s = 1, adding a value of 1 to a3, a4, a6, and a9, which are the
agents that can see the message. Then, a6 decides to sharem1 on its wall. Users
a1, a7, and a8 can see m1. The information about the users that can see m1 is
updated in γ6. The interaction of user a6 withm1 occurs after user a1 shares it
(i.e., the interaction is produced in the step s = 2). Note that the values of γ1
are updated at s = 1 because γ1 measures the reachability of the messages when
user a1 has interacted with them. Therefore, in row s = 1, columns a7 and a8
have a grey 1.
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m2) Then, user a4 publishesm2. This message is seen by a1 and a5. This information
is updated in γ4 at s = 1. After that, user a1 decides to sharem2, and agents a3,
a4, a6, and a9 can seem2. Therefore, γ1 is updated with this new information.
However, in this case, the row s = 2 is updated since the sharing action of a1
implies the second step ofm2.
m3) User a2 decides to publish m3 and only user a3 can see it. The γ2 matrix is
updated accordingly.
m4) The message m4 is generated by user a3. This message is viewed by its direct
neighborsa2 anda1, and the γ3matrix is updatedwith this information. Finally,
user a2 decides to sharem4, and only a3 can see it. Its γ2 its updated at s = 2
with this new information.
Considering these four messages, the PRS for a1 and a2 can be calculated as:
PRS(a1) =
1
2
(
6
9
+
4
9
)
= 0.6
PRS(a2) =
1
2
(
2
9
+
2
9
)
= 0.2
As can be observed, the PRS for a1 is 0.6, indicating that messages published by a1
are expected to be seen by a high number of users. In contrast, the PRS for a2 is 0.2,
indicating that messages published by this user are not expected to reach a lot of users.
If we consider intervals for PRS values of size 0.25 (i.e., None [0, 0.25]; Low [0.25, 0.5];
Medium [0.5,0.75]; High [0.75,1]), the PRS(a1) indicates that the risk is medium and
the PRS(a2) indicates that the risk is none.
7.3.2 Nudges
Considering the PRS, nudges are shown to users by means of two soft-paternalism
mechanisms in order to propose more beneficial choices regarding the privacy of this
publication. These mechanisms are Picture Nudge, which is based on profile images
of the potential audience, and Number Nudge, which provides numerical information
about the potential audience of a publication. These nudge mechanisms try to increase
the users’ awareness about the reachability of their publications. Then, users can re-
consider the privacy policy of a publication more carefully or can even decide not to
publish that information.
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Figure 7.3: Picture Nudge. A notice indicates the privacy risk estimation associated with the action that
the user is going to perform. The risk is categorized as high. The nudge shows the profile pictures of part
of the audience that potentially could see the publication.
Picture Nudge The Picture Nudge is a mechanism that is triggered when a user is
about to submit a publication (Figure 7.3). This mechanism consists of showing profile
images of some users that are part of the audience that will have access to this publica-
tion. Users to be displayed are selected based on the PRS values of the post’s audience
and the probability of reaching new users. The probability increases if a user can be
reached in more than one way. The selection of profile images to be displayed in the
nudge prioritizes users outside of the intended audience. Although only six users are
explicitly shown, the size of the audience can be very large. In addition, a warning is
also shown according to the privacy risk estimation of this publication (high, medium,
low, or none).
Unlike other proposals that provide mechanisms to detect and remove risky friends
[28], the aim of the picture nudge proposed is to increase awareness about the potential
audience that might see a user’s publication. This does not imply that the users that
appear in the images provided by the nudge are “risky” users. These users are part of
the potential audience that may see the publication.
Number Nudge The Number Nudge is also triggered when a user is about to submit
a publication (Figure 7.4). This mechanism consists of displaying the number of users
that may have access to this publication. Similarly to the previous nudge, a warning
related to the privacy risk estimation of this publication is also shown.
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Figure 7.4: Number Nudge. A notice indicates the privacy risk estimation associated with the action that
the user is going to perform. The risk is categorized as low. The nudge shows the number of users that
eventually could see the publication.
7.4 Experiment
We propose two research questions and two hypotheses to test the effects of the pro-
posed nudging mechanisms in users’ behaviors regarding privacy. We focus on the pri-
vacy aspect related to the content publishing, specifically, the selected audiences. First,
we should consider that a new social network (or app) has a “learning curve” (i.e., a pe-
riod of learning and discovery, until users start to use it regularly). This may influence
the participants’ behavior regarding privacy during the experiment. Therefore, we in-
vestigate the following research question:
Research Question 7.1: How does the private privacy policy rate differ between the learn-
ing/discovery period and later when users publish content regularly?
In other words, the private privacy policy for published content includes all of the
private audiences (“only me”, collections1, and “friends”).
Second, regarding the designed nudge mechanisms, we want to know if the nudge be-
fore publishing content and the information provided in it (about the potential audi-
ence) produce an effect towards better privacy practices. Therefore, two hypotheses
are proposed:
Hypothesis 7.1: The private privacy policy rate changes when teenage users publish content
using the Picture Nudge mechanism.
Hypothesis 7.2: The private privacy policy rate changes when teenage users publish content
using the Number Nudge mechanism.
1Collections are subsets of “friends” that are specialized and customized by users (e.g., best friends,
family, acquaintances, etc.)
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Finally, we investigate the differences between the effects of the designed nudge mech-
anisms in order to analyze which mechanism has a more powerful effect on users’ be-
havior. Therefore, we investigate the following research question:
Research Question 7.2: How does the private privacy policy rate differ between the Picture
Nudge and the Number Nudge when teenage users publish content?
To evaluate these effects, we performed an experiment in the context of the 2017 Sum-
mer School organized by the Universitat Politècnica de València. We focused the ex-
periment on teenagers aged between 12 and 14 years old because they are starting
with the use of social networking sites, and, at the same time, they are among the
heaviest users of social networking [214]. Moreover, this particular group is develop-
mentally vulnerable to privacy risks such as depression, sexting, and cyberbullying
[171, 198, 166, 47]. Therefore, the effect of nudge mechanisms can be highly benefi-
cial to them since these users may still not be aware of all of the consequences of their
actions in social applications regarding their privacy. In the following sections, we de-
scribe the social network platform PESEDIA where the experiment was performed and
the methodology used for measuring the effect of the proposed nudges on real users.
7.4.1 Platform
PESEDIA is an online social network for educational and research purposes that in-
cludes: (i) the design and development of new metrics to analyze and quantify privacy
risks [11]; (ii) the application of methods to change users’ behavior regarding their pri-
vacy concerns; (iii) the implementation of new features to improve the management of
users’ content; (iv) and the evaluation and testing of new proposals with real users.
The underlying implementation of PESEDIA uses Elgg [64], which is an open source en-
gine that is used to build social environments. The environment provided by this engine
is similar to other social networks (e.g. Facebook). Figure 7.5 shows the architecture of
PESEDIA. The PESEDIA architecture has two main components: the Platform Layer and
theUser Layer. The Platform Layer is the core of the architecture. This layer contains the
Social Network Services, which provides the main functionality of the social network,
and the Storage System, which provides persistent storage of all of the information
generated in the social network. Among other modules, the Social Network Services
include the Privacy Risk Module, which is responsible for estimating the risk a user
has when performing an action in the social network, and the Nudging Mechanism
Module, which is responsible for providing a suitable visualization of the privacy risk
associated to a user’s action in order to influence his/her behavior. The User Layer is in
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Figure 7.5: Block diagram that represents the architecture of Pesedia SN. Also represented are the relevant
plugins for this work: the Privacy Risk Module, and the Nudging Mechanisms.
charge of managing information associated to each user. This information is divided in
three categories: contacts (grouped or non-grouped); information (e.g., profile items,
publications, etc.); and settings, which are mainly focused on privacy settings, such as
privacy policies and privacy thresholds.
7.4.2 Setup
The experiment was carried out on the PESEDIA social network. Nudging Mechanisms
and Privacy Risk Module plugins were included in PESEDIA. We activated a log sys-
tem to record all of the users’ actions in order to analyze them after the experiment.
Moreover, we also included a registry controller (by a secret token) to avoid undesired
registrations that could affect the security of the participants and the experiment.
The experiment period was 21 days. A total of 84 teenagers participated in it. During
the period of the experiment, the participants had access to the PESEDIA social network
to share their experiences and feelings about the Summer School. We organized three
on-site sessions of 90 minutes in equipped labs at the university to use as control points
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of the experiment. These three on-site sessions were distributed at three points in time:
session 1, at the beginning of the 21-day period; session 2, in the middle, and session 3,
at the end. The aim of these sessions was to clarify any doubts that might arise among
the participants about the social network functionality and new features introduced.
In the first session, we introduced PESEDIA to the participants and they signed up on
the social network. In the second session, the nudges were activated and introduced to
the participants. During this session, we described how the Picture Nudge and Num-
ber Nudge mechanisms worked to all the participants. We provided details about the
information that each nudge provided and how they worked. We also explained both
nudges through a set of examples to clarify any doubt about their performance. In
the case of the Picture Nudge, we clarified that the users that appeared in the images
provided are not “risky” users, they are part of the potential audience that may see the
publication. The participants should evaluate, based on the potential audience shown
by the nudges, whether their publicationmay reachmore users than the initial expected
audience. In the third (and last) session, the participants answered the questionnaire
about the experience.
In order to test the research questions and hypotheses proposed in this work, we split
the participants into three groups and considered two stages in the experiment (see
Figure 7.6). The splitting of all the participants into the three groups was done before
the second session (i.e., after completing stage 1), and based on the private privacy
policy rate of users’ posted content on Pesedia to have the groups balanced. The groups
are explained below:
• GroupG1 did not have any nudges activated during the entire experiment. This
group was created to evaluate whether the “learning curve” influences the users’
privacy behaviors (RQ7.1).
• Group G2 did not have any nudges activated during stage 1, but the Picture
Nudge mechanism was activated during stage 2. GroupG2 was created to eval-
uate whether the Picture Nudge influences users’ privacy behavior (H7.1).
• Group G3 did not have any nudges activated during stage 1, but the Number
Nudge mechanism was activated during stage 2. GroupG3 was created to eval-
uate whether the Number Nudge influences users’ privacy behavior (H7.2).
Moreover, in order to reinforce the data obtained from social network activity, the
teenagers completed a survey questionnaire about the experiment. This questionnaire
was finally completed by 31 participants.
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Figure 7.6: Structure of the experiment. Two stages and three groups of participants (G1, G2, and G3)
were considered. In G1, the participants did not have any nudges activated during any stage. In G2,
the participants did not have any nudges activated during stage 1, but the Picture Nudge was activated
during stage 2. InG3, the participants did not have any nudges activated during stage 1, but the Number
Nudge was activated during stage 2.
7.5 Results
In this section, we show the results obtained from the experiment. First, we intro-
duce the participants’ demographics and their initial attitude toward privacy as well
as data related to posting behaviors. All of the information about participants was col-
lected from the PESEDIA platform through their profiles, activity, and settings. Second,
we analyze the participants’ activity during stage 1 (where none of the groups had the
nudging mechanisms activated) and during stage 2 (whereG1 andG2 had the nudging
mechanisms activated) in order to quantify the impact of the nudges on the partici-
pants. We applied statistical significance tests to answer the research questions and to
validate the hypotheses about the nudge effects on participants’ behaviors. Finally, we
present the participants’ perception of the benefits and drawbacks of the nudges based
on the survey results.
7.5.1 Demographics and activity
In this subsection, we provide an accurate description of the participants of the experi-
ment. We show the participants’ descriptive data and their performance in PESEDIA. In
addition, we focus on the privacy decisions made by the users during the experiment.
From the initial 84 participants that attended the experiment, we removed the partici-
pants who did not participate in both stages as well as participants who did not publish
anything since either they did not attend or did not log into PESEDIA (11 participants
170
CHAPTER 7. ENHANCING THE PRIVACY RISK AWARENESS OF
TEENAGERS IN ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS THROUGH
SOFT-PATERNALISM MECHANISMS
Stage 2
Stage 1
0 25 50 75
Number of publications
St
ag
es
Figure 7.7: Distribution of the number of publications by the participants in Pesedia during the experi-
ment by stages.
were removed). Also, there were participants that assisted to both sessions but they
did not publish in both sessions any content with its corresponding privacy policy in
the social network (e.g., they only performed “like” actions or comments). These users
were also excluded from the experiment (23 participants were removed). In addition,
we also performed a cleaning process of the data. This process consisted on removing
those users who were extreme outliers from the data (8 participants were removed).
“Outliers” are those points which stand out for not following a pattern which is gener-
ally visible in the data. To detect data outliers, we plotted the data points about users’
activity. Figure 7.7 shows a boxplot representation of the distributions of the number
of publications of participants in each stage. The activity of those users who lay far
outside the general distribution (i.e., participants who fall more than 1.5 times the in-
terquartile range above the third quartile) were analyzed in detail to detect if there
was an anomalous behavior. In the context of the experiment, we considered users
with an anomalous behavior those users whose activity was to repeat/create a message
with nonsense content (i.e., random sequence of characters or empty messages) a dis-
proportionate number of times. Once we had cleaned the data, the total number of
participants included in the analysis was 42.
The following analysis is based on the behavior of the 42 participants. Table 7.2 includes
information about the participants’ age and gender and their behavior (previous to the
experiment) on social networks, which is centered on the nature of the relationships
and how active the participants are. That information was collected with an initial
questionnaire during the first session to check the specific characteristics of teenagers
that differentiates them from adults. The average age of the participants was 13.35
years old and the genderwas balanced. Themajority of participants had used the social
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Figure 7.8: Information of participants’ activity by gender in Pesedia.
network sites, and the proportion of unknown friends was high (see the acceptance
threshold of friendship requests and the values of real friends).
Figure 7.8 shows quantitative information related to their activity by gender, includ-
ing log-in actions, friendship relations, and interactions considering different types
(posts, likes, comments, shares, and private messages). These data are the result of
the 21 days of the experiment. During that period, the participants did 317 log-in ac-
tions, established 220 relationships, and created 1976 pieces of content. In general, the
most frequent activities were posts (641), likes (630), and direct messages (313). Taking
into account the experiment duration, they carried out an average of 15 log-in actions
per day, and 2.25 interactions per day and participant. Moreover, they performed a
mean of 10.49 friendship relations. With regard to gender differences in activity, we
highlight that the female participants were slightly more active creating content, es-
pecially with textual posts, share actions, and direct messages. In contrast, the male
participants were more passive and performed more log-in actions.
With regard to the participants’ attitudes towards privacy, we analyzed: (i) the partic-
ipants’ privacy policies assigned to social network dimensions such as profile, settings,
and posts; and (ii) the participants’ privacy concern through privacy setting changes,
post updates, and collection creations. Collections are customized lists made by users
(e.g., best friends, family, etc.). Figure 7.9 displays the distribution of the participants’
privacy policy decisions grouped by dimensions. The dimensions considered are: Pro-
file, Settings, and Activity. In Profile, there are seven elements that contain the par-
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Demographic info. Friendship info.
Variables Number (%) Variables Number (%)
Age G1 G2 G3 Total Friends G1 G2 G3 Total
12 2 2 1 5 (11.90%) 0− 20 2 3 2 7 (16.67%)
13 6 6 5 17 (40.48%) 20− 80 4 3 3 10 (23.81%)
14 6 8 6 22 (47.62%) 80− 150 3 4 1 8 (19.05%)
> 150 5 6 6 17 (40.47%)
Gender G1 G2 G3 Total Real Friends G1 G2 G3 Total
Male 6 8 5 19 (47.62%) 90− 100% 3 5 1 9 (21.43%)
Female 7 8 7 22 (52.38%) 60− 70% 9 7 7 23 (54.76%)
30− 40% 2 3 3 8 (19.05%)
10− 20% 0 1 1 2 (4.76%)
Users of SNS G1 G2 G3 Total Acceptance threshold G1 G2 G3 Total
Yes 13 15 11 39 (92.86%) All 1 3 0 4 (9.52%)
No 1 1 1 3 (7.14%) Some unknown people 4 4 4 12 (28.58%)
Friends & Acquaintances 8 6 7 21 (50.00%)
Close Friends 1 3 1 5 (11.90%)
Activity info.
Variable 4-point likert scale∗ - Number (%)
4 3 2 1
Activity rate G1 G2 G3 Total G1 G2 G3 Total G1 G2 G3 Total G1 G2 G3 Total
Using SNS 4 5 5 14 (33.33%) 6 5 3 14 (33.33%) 3 5 3 11 (26.19%) 1 1 1 3 (7.15%)
Text posting 1 1 1 3 (7.15%) 0 2 1 3 (7.15%) 11 10 8 29 (69.05%) 2 3 2 7 (16.67%)
Photo posting 0 1 0 1 (2.38%) 0 1 0 1 (2.38%) 12 11 9 32 (76.19%) 2 3 3 8 (19.05%)
Video posting 0 1 0 1 (2.38%) 0 0 0 0 (0.00%) 3 2 6 11 (26.19%) 11 13 6 30 (71.43%)
Share 1 1 1 3 (7.15%) 3 3 2 8 (19.05%) 7 8 6 22 (52.38%) 3 3 3 9 (21.43%)
Comment 2 3 2 7 (16.67%) 4 1 5 10 (23.81%) 4 8 3 15 (35.71%) 4 4 2 10 (23.81%)
Like 7 5 7 21 (50.00%) 4 7 3 12 (28.57%) 2 3 1 6 (14.29%) 1 1 1 3 (7.15%)
Table 7.2: Participants’ information organized by demographic, friendship, and activity categories.
∗Likert scale: 4 = extremely frequent, 1 = not frequent at all
ticipants’ profile information: age, gender, description, phone, location, school, and
interests. In Settings, there are five general privacy setting options: default privacy
option, tag visibility, friend list visibility, who can post on your wall, and the privacy
policy for posts written on your wall. In Activity, we collected the privacy policy of all
the posts published. The different privacy policies were: Only me, Collections, Friends,
and Public; scored from 0 to 3, respectively. In Figure 7.9, the top red dashed line rep-
resents the mean privacy policy set as default in PESEDIA.
The privacy policy defined by default in PESEDIA for all of the participants was public
to be completely permissive. In the case of the Profile dimension, the expected behavior
was that the participants would limit their privacy policies, and this occurred. How-
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Figure 7.9: Distribution of privacy policies (represented as numbers: Only me, 0; Collections, 1; Friends, 2;
and Public, 3) that were used by the participants in the different dimensions and disaggregated by gender.
ever, as shown in Figure 7.9, this behavior was weaker than the expected, especially for
profile items that contain sensitive information. In the case of the Settings dimension,
the participants showed very little concern about it. Only 11.72% of the participants
changed their privacy settings. However, in the case of the Activity dimension, the
privacy policies that participants used for their posts were more restrictive than in
the other dimensions. Since we are considering all of the posts published during the
study, these results may be a consequence of the nudging mechanisms. Another point
to highlight is the differences between gender participants; the female participants, on
average, chose more restrictive policies than the male participants (for Activity and
Profile dimensions). In general, we have observed that, although the participants mod-
ified their privacy options, they maintained permissive policies except for postings. In
the following sections, we analyze these behaviors in more detail and how the nudging
mechanisms influenced them.
7.5.2 Participants’ posting behavior
In this section, we analyze the behaviors of the participants when they publish content
in PESEDIA by stages and groups. We also assess the accepted risk in privacy (i.e., the
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Privacy Stage G1 G2 G3 AllPolicies Control Group Picture Nudge Number Nudge
Only me S1 3.17% (4) 8.43% (7) 6.58% (5) 5.61% (16)
S2 9.09% (14) 11.87% (33) 9.92% (13) 10.66% (60)
Collections S1 0.00% (0) 0.00% (0) 0.00% (0) 0.00% (0)
S2 0.00% (0) 3.24% (9) 4.58% (6) 2.66% (15)
Friends S1 46.03% (58) 27.71% (23) 30.26% (23) 36.49% (104)
S2 17.53% (27) 35.61% (99) 44.28% (58) 32.68% (184)
Public S1 50.80% (64) 63.86% (53) 63.16% (48) 57.90% (165)
S2 73.38% (113) 49.28% (137) 41.22% (54) 54.00% (304)
Total posts S1 126 83 76 285
S2 154 278 131 563
Table 7.3: Participants’ posting behavior for the privacy aspect split into groups and stages. S1 and S2
denote stage 1 and stage 2, respectively.
levels of privacy risk accepted for content published) by the participants who had the
nudges enabled.
To understand the privacy behavior of the participants during posting activities, we ex-
tracted the participants’ privacy policy for each post from the social network PESEDIA.
In Table 7.3, we show the privacy policies used for all of the participants. The partici-
pants are split into groups and stages to be able to compare behaviors with andwithout
nudge mechanisms. We analyzed the total number of posts published and which per-
centage of these follow a specific privacy policy (i.e., Only me, Collections, Friends, or
Public). Thus, we were be able to detect behavioral privacy changes between stage 1
and 2 and measure the effect of nudges.
In stage 1, the participants published and shared a total number of 285 posts on the
PESEDIA social network. Considering all the participants (42) and the duration of this
stage (10 days), one out of every two participants published or shared a post per day.
This participation was low, but it can be considered normal because the participants
were new to PESEDIA and they had to explore all of the functionality and services that
our social network offers. From the privacy point of view, in general, the participants
were not concerned about the privacy of postings. Themajority ofmessages where pub-
lished with public privacy policy (57.90%), followed by friends privacy policy (36.49%),
then only me privacy policy (5.61%), and finally, no usage of collections by participants
was done (0.0%). It is important to remember that the default privacy policy was pub-
lic in the social network. Analyzing this information by groups, it can be observed that
posts done by participants within G2 and G3 were less restrictive about privacy than
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Risk level G2 G3 AllPicture Nudge Number Nudge
NONE 1.90% (2) 0.00% (0) 2
LOW 27.62% (29) 42.59% (23) 59
MEDIUM 5.71% (6) 5.56% (3) 9
HIGH 64.76% (68) 51.85% (28) 96
Total 105 54 159
Table 7.4: The risk level of the posting action that participants took when nudges were activated.
other groups. For G1, they used the friend policy more times than the other groups,
with usage being close to that of public policy. In conclusion, during this stage of the
study and with public policy as default, the participants were able to change the pri-
vacy of their posts to adapt it to their needs. However, the majority of the participants
maintained the public policy.
In stage 2, the participants published and shared a total number of 563 posts. The
participants’ activity increased considerably as a consequence of popularity, with a
daily activity of about 51.18 posts per day (563 posts divided by 11 days), and more
than 2 posts per user and day (51.18 posts divided by 42 participants). From the pri-
vacy point of view, if we analyze the average behavior of all of the participants and
we compare it with the behavior in stage 1, it can be observed that privacy behaviors
change. The use of more restrictive privacy policies such as Only me and Collections
increased, while Friends and Public policy usage was reduced. When focusing on the
behavior of each group, we found important differences between participants with and
without nudge mechanisms. The participants in the G2 and G3 groups evolved their
behaviors into more protective privacy policies, whileG1 did the opposite and evolved
to more relaxed privacy policies. G2 had a conservative privacy behavior since they
shared half of the posts as public and the other half with private circles such as Friends,
Collections, or Only me. When observing their previous activity in stage 1, there is a
progression towards more secure privacy habits for social network activity. G3 had
the most conservative privacy behavior with values close to 60% of posts shared with
private circles, while the rest of posts were shared as public. For both nudges, the use
of the Collections policy for sharing posts increased, but it was still too low. The pri-
vacy behaviors of G1 were less restrictive since they shared the majority (73.38%) of
their posts as public. When considering the participants’ behavior in stages 1 and 2 as
the reference behavior, the nudging mechanisms seem to have a positive effect on the
participants’ privacy.
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With regard to the posts published by nudged participants, Table 7.4 shows the propor-
tion and quantity of posts labeled with different risk levels (calculated with the PRS
metric and showed by the nudgemechanisms) that were accepted by participants when
publishing posts on PESEDIA. Quantities were shown as complementary information
to the participants’ acceptance of risk since, as we mentioned in previous sections, the
nudges were shown to them with a probability, thus avoiding upsetting the partici-
pants. The privacy risk accepted by participants was slightly higher in G2 than G3.
That information is coherent with the data shown previously (Table 7.3), where the
participants chose more protective privacy policies. Furthermore, the HIGH values of
privacy risk (64.76% for Picture Nudge; 51.85% for Number Nudge) are greater than
the public policies chosen. This reflects the risks of using friends policies for some users
since these are not still enough to protect sensitive information.
7.5.3 Research questions and hypothesis testing
In this section, we test the research questions and the hypotheses proposed in this work
in relation to the effects of nudges on users’ privacy behavior. We use data collected
from participants’ posting activity to test whether there is a significant difference be-
tween the privacy behavior of participants between stages for the different conditions
(G1, G2, and G3 groups). In this way, we are able to measure the effect of nudges on
participants’ behavior.
Given the filtering of participants done by the conditions required to test the research
questions and hypotheses (see subsection 7.5.1), we ran a samples equivalence test over
the private privacy policy rate of users of the different groups at stage 1 to ensure that
there were no existing differences between the samples. Kruskal-Wallis test of statis-
tical significance to compare the mean of the three groups (over the 42 participants)
revealed no significant differences were founded in the private privacy policies rate
between groups in stage 1 (p-value> .05). The samples equivalence test provides more
confidence that these samples were equivalent on related the participants’ privacy be-
havior in stage 1.
In order to ensure whether or not there is a significant difference in privacy behaviors
between groups during stages, some research questions and hypotheses for testing. We
collected data from the privacy policies of the participants’ publications during stage
1 and 2 (see Table 7.3), and we normalized this data by the number of publications for
each participant. Due to the continuous nature of the variable and the number of sam-
ples (less than 30 per group), we used the paired-sample t-test (α = .05). For this test,
we calculated the mid p-value since its Type I error rate is closer to the nominal level.
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t-Test ANOVA
Mean Std. D t df p F p partial η2 1− β
RQ7.1 S1 .409 .395 −.348 13 .734 .111 .742 .004 .062
S2 .457 .366
H7.1 S1 .249 .350 −3.813 15 .002∗ 6.260 .002 .173∗∗ .678
S2 .557 .344
H7.2 S1 .295 .385 −2.412 11 .035∗ 4.301 .044 .164∗∗ .509
S2 .613 .367
RQ7.2 G2 .557 .344 −.416 24 .681 .175 .679 .007 .069
G3 .613 .367
Table 7.5: Tests for the differences in privacy behavior between nudged and non-nudged participants.
∗p < .05 ∗∗partial η2 > .01 = small,> .06 = medium,> .14 = large effect [63]
In statistical hypothesis testing, a Type I error is the rejection of a true null hypothesis.
Thus, we are able to reject the null hypothesis (H0) to accept the alternative (H1). We
also measured the power test, which indicates the probability that the test correctly
rejects the null hypothesis. And, thus, we obtain the Type II error, also referred to as
the false negative rate (β) since the power is equal to 1− β. Therefore, we are able to
accept the null hypothesis (H0). Moreover, we measure the effect size to determine the
magnitude of the phenomenon. To do this, we carried out a one-way MANOVA test.
The sizes of effect can be classified as falling between small (> .01), medium (> .06)
and large (> .14) [63]. Table 7.5 contains the results of the hypothesis testing methods
carried out.
To answer the research questionRQ7.1 about how the private privacy policy rate differs
between the learning/discovery period and later when users publish content regularly
(in theG1 group), we tested mean differences between the two samples. In particular,
we ran a paired-sample t-test (α = .05) and the results (t = −.348, p-value= .734,
partial η2 = .004) revealed no significant differences between the samples. We also
measured the power (1 − β = .062) and the effect size (> .01) using the one-way
MANOVA test, which results also suggest no significant differences. Therefore, the
results revealed that no significant differences were found in the privacy policies used
by the participants in theG1 group during stage 1 and 2.
H7.1 predicted that the Picture Nudge mechanism produces an effect on the partici-
pants’ privacy behaviors (of the G2 group), specifically in the private privacy policy
rate of posting action. To address H7.1, we ran a paired-sample t-test (α = .05) and
the results (t = −3.813, p-value = .002, partial η2 = .173) rejected the null hy-
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pothesis. Therefore, significant differences were found in the privacy policies used by
participants in the G2 group during stage 1 and 2, and also the effect size was large
(> .16). H7.1 was supported.
H7.2 predicted that the Number Nudge mechanism produces an effect on the partic-
ipants’ privacy behaviors (of the G3 group), specifically in the private privacy policy
rate of posting action. To address H7.2, we ran a paired-sample t-test (α = .05) and
the results of the test (t = −2.412, p-value = .035, partial η2 = .167) rejected the
null hypothesis. Therefore, significant differences were found in the privacy policies
used by participants in theG3 group during stage 1 and 2, and also the effect size was
large (> .16). Thus, H7.2 was supported.
To answer the research question RQ7.2 about how the private privacy policy rate dif-
fers between the Picture Nudge (G2) and the Number Nudge (G3) when teenage users
publish content (in stage 2), we tested mean differences between the two samples. In
particular, we ran an independent-sample t-test (α = .05) and the results (t = −.416,
p-value = .681, partial η2 = .007) revealed no significant differences between the
samples. We also measured the power (1 − β = .069) and the effect size (> .01) us-
ing the one-way MANOVA test, which results also suggest no significant differences.
Therefore, the results revealed that no significant differences were found in the privacy
policies used by the participants with the Picture Nudge mechanism enabled (G2) and
the Number Nudge mechanism enabled (G3) in stage 2.
7.5.4 Participants’ perception about nudges
We asked the participants directly about the privacy nudges using a survey embedded
in PESEDIA. The results extracted from the survey represent the perceptions of the 31
participants who finally completed the survey. Of these participants, 11 participants
were nudged with the Picture Nudge mechanism; 9 participants were nudged with the
Number Nudge mechanism; and 11 participants were not nudged. The nudged partic-
ipants were asked about the perceived benefits and drawbacks of the privacy nudges
that they experienced. The non-nudged participants were asked about their desire to
have tools (ours or similar ones) in social networks to inform them about privacy risks
in order to improve their privacy awareness. Specifically, the following five questions
were asked:
• Q1: Did you consider the nudges useful for preserving your privacy on the post-
ing action?
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Picture
Nudge
Number
Nudge
Non-
Nudge
Total
# participants 11 9 11 31
Q1: Did you consider the nudges useful for preserving your
privacy on the posting action?
Y 8 7 15
N 3 2 5
Q2: Did you consider the nudges irritating? Y 4 3 7N 7 6 13
Q3: Did you use the nudges for setting/fitting the
audiences?
Y 8 6 14
N 3 3 6
Q4: Would you have liked to have a tool that informs you
about privacy risks in order to improve your privacy (e.g.,
showing the picture of potential users that will have access
to your publication)?
Y 5 8 13
N 4 3 7
Q5: Would you have liked to have a tool that informs you
about privacy risks in order to improve your privacy (e.g.,
showing the number of potential users that will have access
to your publication)?
Y 6 7 13
N 5 4 9
Table 7.6: Opinion from a subset of participants about the privacy nudges.
• Q2: Did you consider the nudges irritating?
• Q3: Did you use the nudges for setting/fitting the audiences?
• Q4: Would you have liked to have a tool that informs you about privacy risks in
order to improve your privacy (e.g., showing the picture of potential users that
will have access to your publication)?
• Q5: Would you have liked to have a tool that informs you about privacy risks in
order to improve your privacy (e.g., showing the number of potential users that
will have access to your publication)?
Table 7.6 shows the results of the participants’ opinions about privacy nudges. The
results are organized by the nudging mechanisms that the participants had during
the study. The rows in the table represent the number of participants that responded
(Yes or No) to a specific question. The empty values of the table are due to the fact
that those participants were not asked the question (i.e., it made no sense to ask non-
nudged participants about the inconveniences of the nudge). Questions Q1, Q2, and
Q3, which targeted the nudged participants, evaluate whether the participants con-
sider the nudges to be useful. Whereas questions Q4 and Q5, which targeted the non-
nudged participants, evaluate whether the participants would like to have tools inform
them about privacy risks in order to improve their privacy.
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According to the participants’ responses, both nudges had a good level of acceptance.
For question Q1, three out of four participants considered the nudges to be useful for
preserving privacy. For question Q2, about 65% of the participants did not consider
the nudges to be irritating. These responses make sense if we consider question Q2 as
being the opposite of question Q1. Nevertheless, the percentage is slightly lower than
for question Q1, this may be because some users considered the nudge, though use-
ful, should have been more appealing or less intrusive. For question Q3, almost three
out of four participants considered the nudges to be helpful for setting the audiences.
For the remaining questions (Q4 and Q5), we observed that non-nudged participants
positively accepted the need of tools to improve their privacy on social networks. Over-
all, the participants were satisfied with the nudging mechanisms that contain the PRS
metric to improve their privacy awareness on social networks.
7.6 Discussion
This paper reports the results of a 21-day field experiment about the use of two types
of nudging mechanisms to influence teenagers’ posting privacy behavior in the social
network platform PESEDIA. Nudge mechanisms proposed in this paper did not limit
participants’ ability to share information in the social network. Instead, they encour-
aged the participants to reflect on their potential audience that may have access to the
information. In general, previous soft-paternalism approaches not only in the context
of social networks state that these mechanisms make users reflect and become more
aware of their decisions, avoiding risky behaviors [16, 202, 273].
Initially, we thought that the “learning curve” of a new social network platform such as
PESEDIAwould influence the users’ privacy behaviors. However, after the analysis of the
behavior of users without mechanisms during the period of the experiment, we found
that there was not a significant difference in their posting privacy behavior between
the initial days of the experiment and the last days.
There is significant evidence that users’ privacy behavior for posting actions changed
when the nudging mechanisms were activated. Independently of the mechanism used
(i.e., picture or number nudge), when the nudging mechanisms were activated, the
number of messages published with a private policy (i.e., only me, collections, or friends)
was higher than the number of messages with a public policy. Therefore, this change
could be driven by the nudges. Although users seem to publish with a more restrictive
privacy policy, we noticed that most of them used friends or private policies without
considering collections (i.e., a personalized subset of friends). This could be because the
181
7.6. DISCUSSION
use of this policy in PESEDIA requires the manual creation of the collection or because
it is a concept that is not present in the social network platforms that they are used to,
and, therefore, they do not initially consider it as a possible option. Previous studies
already showed the importance of nudges for increasing users’ awareness about pri-
vacy and, thus, modify their behaviors. In this paper, we focused our experiments on
teenagers, who are usually less concerned about privacy risk [171]. Although the effect
of nudging mechanisms was appreciated, it is expected that more visible behavioral
changes can appear if the experiment was extended in time [258].
Previous works that proposed the use of different types of nudge mechanisms do not
pay attention to the differences between them on users behavior [271]. In this experi-
mental study, we analyzed whether there is a significant difference between the effects
on the privacy posting behavior of teenagers that had the PictureNudge or theNumber
Nudge activated. The results revealed that there are no significant differences between
mechanisms. This could be because the teenagers were focused mainly on the high-
lighted text about the risk level than on other details such as the profile pictures of
users that may see the publication or the number of users that may see the publication.
In the literature, we cannot find studies that sharply measure the effect of some type of
nudge to be more beneficial in terms of changing the posting behavior. However, some
authors such as [143] and [281] state that the design of nudges that are more tailored to
users would cause these nudges to be more effective. This would require aspects such as
not receiving alerts about information that is already known or designing personalized
nudges according to what is more effective for each specific user. This can be viewed
as a limitation of our proposal that can be explored in future works.
With regard to the perception of users about the nudges, the majority of teenagers
considered nudges to be useful mechanisms to preserve their privacy in posting. This
follows the results obtained by Wang et. al. [273] where the users that were involved
in a similar experiment with nudges in social networks mentioned that nudges could
be more useful for people without experience in social networks (i.e., teenagers). Al-
though the majority of the participants perceived nudges as beneficial, some of them
considered them as irritating, and this is considered as a disadvantage towards the
effective implementation of privacy nudges [124]. Wang et. al. [273] suggested that
this behaviour can be associated to the profile of the publications (personal or not),
but there is not any clear study that demonstrate this fact. In line with what is stated
above, future research line should consider the design of more personalized nudges that
really show information that is really valued by the specific user.
Regarding the ethical concerns of the mechanisms proposed, we would like to mention
that the nudge mechanisms were designed to remind users of the potential audience
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that might see their publications. Previous research works detected that users often
forget who are their friends in a social network or overwhelming the evaluation of all
the possible scenarios when they share a message in the network [31]. The intended
audience might be different to the final potential audience that could have access to
the publication. The Picture nudge mechanism uses a list of public profile pictures
of the users that may have access to a shared publication. The aim of this list is not
to labeled or presented the members of the list as “risky” users. The final goal is to
encourage users to be more aware of and more cautious about the privacy policy that
they use when sharing information. Moreover, based on the conclusions provided by
the research question RQ7.2, if the Profile Nudgemechanismwere to be integrated into
a social network platform where there was some concern about using a list of profile
images of users, Numeric Nudge mechanism could be used, as the results suggest that
there are no significant differences in the effects they produce on user behavior.
The main reason for eliminating those users considered outliers within the experiment
was to keep the population of users who attended the different sessions of the experi-
ments proposed and followed the guidelines in each session. This caused the analysis
of the effect of privacy nudges during posting actions on users is limited to users with
a behavior within the average population. Previous research works as [216, 42, 281]
highlight different kind of users taking into account their posting behavior in social
networks (e.g., influencers). It would be interesting to apply different privacy nudges
on different kind of users for comparing the changes in their behaviors (this, of course,
for large enough population). Thus, identifying which factors and nudges improve the
effect of privacy nudges for each kind of users, we would be able to maximize the effect
produced on them.
The results of the experiments suggest that the use of nudgemechanisms seemed promis-
ing for assisting users in social networks activity. We encourage the inclusion of this
type of mechanisms to commercial social network platforms as part of their function-
ality. Nudge mechanisms might be included as an optional functionality that can be
activated by the users. These mechanisms could help their users to avoid any regret-
table experiences disclosing information. We consider that nudges could especially
help to those teenagers that start using these social platforms.
Despite the valuable conclusions extracted, the study carried out has several limita-
tions. First, the current research was conducted for 21 consecutive days, and the nudg-
ing mechanisms were enabled only in the last 11 days. That is why only a short-term
impact on users’ privacy behaviors could be measured. As we stated above, we do not
know the consequences of long-term usage of nudging mechanisms and their impact
on behaviors. It could happen that after a certain period of time some users ignore or
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deactivate the nudge mechanisms. While the observed immediate effect of nudges was
desirable, future research extending the period of usage could be interesting to analyze
if the effect of the nudges is stronger or if it is mitigated, and in that case, think of new
nudge alternatives to maintain the effects. Second, the modeling of the experiment to
test our hypotheses and the different mechanisms designed forced us to split the par-
ticipants into groups. The limited number of participants in the experiments has con-
sequences for the interpretation of the results since these cannot be generalized for the
entire population of teenagers. Third, it is possible that other approaches of nudging
mechanisms that are focused on the sensitivity of the post could produce more effec-
tive changes in behaviors regarding privacy. However, according to the research work
described in [271], providing sentiment information about the message that is going to
be published was not perceived as useful. In addition, it is often difficult to measure
the effect of a nudge; users may not react to them in a noticeable way or the reaction
might be gradual. Finally, the participants considered for the experiments have a cer-
tain age distribution (approx. 12-14). Therefore, these results cannot be extrapolated
to users that are in other age range.
7.7 Conclusions
Teenagers are considered to be one of the vulnerable groups to suffer privacy risks be-
cause of their limited capacity for self-regulation and susceptibility to peer pressure.
Most privacy approaches proposed in the literature try to deal with privacy in social
networks to facilitate the configuration of privacy. However, there is still an open
problem of making teenagers aware of the extent of disclosing information on social
networks, even if users have defined a specific audience. In this paper, we focus on pro-
viding soft-paternalism mechanisms that integrate a privacy risk estimation (PRS) of
the action that users are going to perform. The proposedmechanisms (nudges) attempt
to influence users’ decision making to improve their privacy, without actually limiting
users’ ability to choose freely. One of the mechanisms consists of displaying profile
images of those users that might have access to the user’s publication. The other mech-
anism consists of displaying the number of users that might have access to the user’s
publication. The proposed mechanisms are displayed when the user starts to write a
message to disclose.
To evaluate the effect of mechanisms in a real context, we did a 21-day experiment
with 42 teenagers ranging in age between 12 and 14 years. We included the proposed
nudgemechanisms in the social network PESEDIA. The experiment was divided into two
stages. During stage 1, the nudges were not activated. During stage 2 the nudges were
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activated. We collected data about the teenagers’ activity during the experiment and
analyzed the privacy policy assigned to the publications. The results of the analysis
show that there is a significant difference in teenagers’ privacy behavior during stage 1
and stage 2. Therefore, the results suggest that the proposed nudges can be considered
a useful tool for enhancing privacy awareness in social networks. The results of the
analysis also show that there are no significant differences between the two nudges
proposed. Finally, we analyzed the level of acceptance of the proposed nudges using
a questionnaire. According to the participants’ responses, nudges were not seen as
irritating. The participants considered the proposed nudges to be useful for preserving
their privacy.
As future work, we plan to propose new nudge mechanisms to increase privacy aware-
ness. One of the extensions is the inclusion of an evaluation of the content of the mes-
sage that users are going to disclose in order to provide a more accurate informative
message about the privacy risk. Currently, we provide information about the reacha-
bility of the audience without considering the content. Another extension would be to
design personalized nudges depending on what is more effective for each user. In addi-
tion, we expect to analyze the use of nudgemechanisms in two additional situations: (i)
to assist users in the definition of the privacy policies associated to their profile items
(i.e., profile photo, age, gender, city, etc.) and (ii) when users receive a friendship re-
quest. We also plan to domore experiments with a larger andmore heterogeneous pop-
ulation to evaluate whether the mechanisms are appropriate for different user profiles.
Moreover, we plan to introduce PESEDIA in the educational context for its continued
use, so that, we can analyze the nudging effect on users’ behavior regarding privacy in
the long-term.
185

— (In press status) by Jose Alemany, Elena del Val, and Ana García-Fornes
in the IEEE Transactions on Learning Technologies
CHAPTER 8
ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A
GAMIFIED SOCIAL NETWORK FOR
APPLYING PRIVACY CONCEPTS: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY WITH TEENS
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
8.2 Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
8.3 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
8.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
8.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
8.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
Abstract
The concept of privacy in online social networks (OSNs) is a challenge, especially for
teenagers. Previous works deal with teaching about privacy using educational on-
line content and media literacy. However, these tools do not necessarily promote less
risky behaviors and do not allow the assessment of users’ behavior after the learning
period. Moreover, few research studies about the effects of social gamification have
been performed for this population segment (i.e., teenagers). To address this prob-
lem, we propose the use of gamification in an OSN called PESEDIA to facilitate the
teaching/learning process and assess its effectiveness in promoting suitable privacy be-
haviors. We tested our proposal comparing teenagers’ performance in two editions of
a course about social networks and privacy (with and without gamification) for one
month. We measured the impact of gamification in the participants’ behaviors to-
wards privacy concepts as a consequence of the privacy teaching/learning process and
the participants’ engagement in the educational process. The results show that there
are significant differences in participants’ behavior regarding privacy and engagement
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in the gamified social network. Moreover, there is also a significant difference in par-
ticipants’ engagement for the gamifiedmale participants. The gamified social network
proposed in this work may be relevant and useful for educators who wish to develop
and enhance teenagers’ privacy skills, or for a broader base of aspects related to the
development of digital competences and technology in education.
8.1 Introduction
Social networks are an important element in the daily lives of teenagers (ages from 13
to 17). According to the latest Pew Research Center report [18], most teenagers have
a profile on an Online Social Network (OSN). This report also points out that there
is no clear consensus among teenagers about the effect that OSNs have on their lives.
OSNsmake it easier for them to keep in touch and interact with others (i.e., friends and
family or others with similar interests), but they also entertain them and provide a new
way of learning things. However, as teenagers benefit from the use of social networks,
they are also exposed to the risks [259, 223, 26, 168] when interacting, publishing, or
sharing information in OSNs. This lack of knowledge about the opportunities and
risks derived from the use of OSNs (as new consumers and users) may have negative
consequences on their lives. Therefore, they need a proper education to enhance their
current and future performance in social networks.
To promote a critical and safe use of OSNs, researchers and governments have empha-
sized the role of school education to teach teenagers how to safely interact with others
in OSNs [260]. Specifically, the European Union has developed initiatives to support
safer online access and use of OSNs for children [82, 44]. An example is The European
Strategy for a Better Internet for Children [44] that has as goals, among others, promotion
of the production of creative and educational online content for children as well as to
increase children’s awareness of the Internet and to empower them to use it safely and
responsibly. In addition, online safety has been formally included in school curricula
in many European countries through media literacy to improve skills to avoid risks in
OSNs [260, 167]. However, it is unclear if these mechanisms can effectively increase
privacy awareness (i.e., the attention and understanding of an individual regarding
privacy aspects) [296] and prevent unsafe behaviors in OSNs.
Recently, an approach that is rising in popularity is the use of game mechanics and
game components in a non-game context (i.e., gamification) [123]. Gamification
as an educational learning tool is a powerful approach for dealing with the teach-
ing/learning of tedious or complex tasks [73], such as the learning of safe privacy be-
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haviors in social networks. This approach is powerful due to its ability to teach and
reinforce not only knowledge but also important practical skills that might be useful
for their daily lives. On the other hand, existing studies have highlighted the influence
of OSNs for improving usage levels and perceived levels of learning in students [72].
The properties offered by social networks such as centrality, communication, and con-
nectivity significantly influence learners’ performance. Therefore, taking into account
the context of the learning goal (social networks, opportunities, and risks), it could be
interesting to use both approaches to improve users’ learning performance. Moreover,
the use of a real social network allows us to assess the users’ behavior in real scenarios
after the learning period.
The aim of this work is to analyze the effect of introducing gamification in a social
network so that students could autonomously learn the functionality of the network
and the options and consequences of the different privacy options. We assessed the
application of what was learned by the students in the network and analyzed the in-
fluence that gamification had on this process. Therefore, this study contributes to the
research field in the following ways: 1) by illustrating the value of social gamifica-
tion for introducing the social network features to new users (reducing the “learning
curve”) and for learning and promoting the application of privacy behaviors that pre-
vent users from performing actions that could have negative consequences; and 2) by
exploring the effects of social network gamification on teenagers by gender and age.
Moreover, the gamified social platform proposed in this work may be relevant and use-
ful for educators who wish to develop and enhance teenagers’ privacy skills, or for a
broader base of aspects related to the development of digital competences and tech-
nology in education. The technical and design contributions that the paper makes to
the development of learning technologies are: 1) the development of a social network
for educating teenagers about safe privacy behaviors and social network features as
a unique tool in the “learning by doing” approach; and 2) the design of the learning
strategy integrated into the social network with the gamification system.
In the remainder of this article, we first highlight relevant research for education about
privacy in social networks and the advantages of gamification (Section 8.2), which will
lead to the postulation of four research questions. Then, we discuss the method of our
study (Section 8.3) and report the results (Section 8.4). We end this article by discussing
the implications of the findings, what we learned compared with current significant
research, and the limitations of the study (Section 8.5). Finally, we conclude this article
by answering our research questions and by presenting future work (Section 8.6).
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8.2 Literature review
8.2.1 Educating teenagers about OSN privacy
Teenagers grow up surrounded by a wide range of social media platforms and most of
them are both consumers and creators of content in them. However, they are not al-
ways aware or have a limited perception of the implications of their online actions and
the risks that they can encounter. Several educational strategies have been carried out
by education centers and public administrations to leverage teenage users’ awareness
of privacy risks and to reduce their exposure to cyberbullying or experiences that make
them feel uncomfortable in OSNs [53, 258, 45, 260]. Previous studies that have evalu-
ated the impact of educational initiatives suggest that these strategies are successful in
increasing awareness about online risks [67, 232]. However, the research community
considers that awareness and confidence do not necessarily promote less risky behav-
ior among young people [166]. This result is aligned with the number of young people
who report negative online experiences despite the initiatives carried out by education
institutions [166].
As an alternative to educational materials, the use of technological tools [121, 267] has
been proposed as a means of offering practical experience to learn appropriate atti-
tudes and behaviors when using social network sites. Inoue et al. [121] presented an
online and offline version of a tool that helps students to understand privacy risks in
online social networks. They performed an experiment in a practical lesson in a school
where the teacher interacted with the students using the tool, creating scenarios where
the privacy of the studentsmight be compromised. After each scenario, the teacher and
students analyzed the effects and potential consequences of their performed actions. A
survey conducted after the experiment concluded that the students retained the knowl-
edge about how to handle personal information in OSNs. Wang et al. [267] proposed
the development of education tools with high levels of usability and effectiveness to in-
crease knowledge about privacy risk in online sites. The authors presented a prototype
based on an educational game that incorporates ideas collected from online crowds to
increase the awareness of online privacy. An extension of this proposal was presented
in [269]. Along the same lines, Li et al. [157] proposed the development of labware
for teaching location privacy in online services. This labware was the mechanism to
provide a deeper knowledge about the topic of privacy and to increase the students’
privacy awareness. Although the tools proposed in these previous works made it easier
to learn safer behaviors on social networks, most were what-if web tools based on hy-
pothetical scenarios that did not put the user into a real social network environment
or in his/her own real scenarios.
190
CHAPTER 8. ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A GAMIFIED SOCIAL
NETWORK FOR APPLYING PRIVACY CONCEPTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
WITH TEENS
8.2.2 Social networks and Gamification in education
Although the use of technological tools has a positive effect on the users’ learning pro-
cess of online privacy, these tools are isolated from the context of the educational goal.
Therefore, they cannot determine whether the knowledge learned (reflected as aware-
ness and concern about privacy) will promote privacy-seeking behavior in real sce-
narios (i.e., the actions that users get involved in to safeguard their information on
the social network). Studies that focus on using technological tools for improving the
teaching/learning process have highlighted the influence of social networks on improv-
ing usage levels and perceived levels of learning in students [72]. Research works such
as [215] have tested the power of social networks to improve engagement and satisfac-
tion with the course. Properties of social networks such as communication, interaction,
and information are translated into support, motivation, and experience. These can
reduce the anxiety levels of students [107] and turn the educational expectations into
reality by applying a real social context in the teaching/learning process that requires
real decisions.
The inclusion of gamification is of interest to the design of activities that are oriented to
getting positive feedback (possibly in a competitive environment). Recent research in
this field [123, 254, 110] has emphasized the gamification features in order to facilitate
a user-centered, autonomous, and flexible learning environment that allows students
to follow their own learning path and encourage users to pursue their own goals. The
reviewed papers about the application of gamification are mainly focused on MOOCs
and e-learning sites [73]. Moreover, according to Dicheva et al. [76], many works focus
on the use of gamification in education, but the majority only describe some game
mechanisms and dynamics without empirical research that validates the effectiveness
of including game elements in learning contexts. Hanus et al. [113] also mention that
although the benefits of gamification arementioned inmanyworks, there is still a need
for deep empirical research on the effectiveness of gamification.
Social gamification aims to bring together gamification and social networking to com-
bine the potential of the two approaches in order to create compelling socially-driven
user experiences. From an educational perspective, social networks facilitate commu-
nication and interactions between students (and with teachers) and highlight relevant
content elements. Their potential can also be harnessed to cooperate and create mean-
ingful conversations in learning interactions. On the other hand, gamification stimu-
latesmotivational aspects such as participation and engagement with learning content
and with other participants. In addition, different skills such as competition, collab-
oration, and adaptation can be enhanced depending on the gamification instruments
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used [123]. There is little previous research in social gamification [72, 252], and, to the
best of our knowledge, none focus on the teenage population or the context of improv-
ing users’ online privacy through the learning of privacy-seeking behaviors. Therefore,
we set out to address the following research question:
Research Question 8.1: Is there a significant impact on teenage users’ learning and behavior
about online privacy between social network configuration with gamification and configuration
without gamification?
Furthermore, we want to know if the gamification of the social network improves
teenage users’ engagement to the social network (i.e., breaking the barrier of joining a
new social network site and consolidating them as regular users). Therefore, we set out
to address the following research question:
Research Question 8.2: Is there a significant impact on teenage users’ engagement between
social network configuration with gamification and configuration without gamification?
8.2.3 Individual differences
Different authors have shown that personal characteristics play a role in the individ-
ual’s behavior. Acquisti et. al. [7] analyze how different biases on information in-
troduction and personal characteristics influence users’ behaviors and decisions. Al-
Rahmi et. al. [9] test how education impacts learning differently depending on stu-
dents’ gender. Koivisto andHamari [146] study how individual learners interpret game
elements differently in highly unique ways. Pedro et al. [203] perform a gender study
in a virtual learning environment with gamification. The results indicate that gamifi-
cation contributed to improving student performance in the case of male students and
did not have any effect on motivation and performance in the female students. How-
ever, this work was a preliminary study with 16 students; hence, the results cannot be
generalized. In this work, we aim to statistically validate conclusions regarding the
influence of gender in gamified learning environments. We investigate the impact of
gender and age on teenage users regarding their learning about privacy and social net-
work features, safe privacy behaviors, and engagement in the gamified social network.
Therefore, we set out to address the following research questions:
Research Question 8.3a: Do female teenage users learn and have more privacy-seeking behav-
ior in the gamified social network than their male counterparts?
Research Question 8.3b: Do female teenage users engage more in the gamified social network
than their male counterparts?
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Research Question 8.4a: Does the age of teenage users influence learning and privacy-seeking
behavior in the gamified social network?
Research Question 8.4b: Does the age of teenage users influence engagement in the gamified
social network?
8.3 Experimental design
8.3.1 Study site
Introduction to Social Networks (ISNs) is a course that briefly covers the basics of so-
cial networking and provides students with basic competency for deciding which pri-
vacy policy is most appropriate when they share information in social networks. The
course is aimed at teenagers who are starting with the use of social networks. They are
among the heaviest users of social networking [214]. Moreover, this particular group is
developmentally vulnerable to online risks such as depression, sexting, and cyberbul-
lying [171, 198, 166, 47].
The course lasts onemonth and has a total workload of 4.5 hours that matches with on-
site teaching lessons. We only have three on-site lessons and the course should be a fun
learning experience. An ethics consent letter was obtained from each participant prior
to the course. The participants knew that anonymized data would be collected about
their activity on the social network. During the course, we provided teenagers with
access to our social network, PESEDIA1 (similar to Facebook), where only they could use
it and practice the learned knowledge acquired during the course. PESEDIA was active
and accessible 24/7. At the end of the course, we analyzed the behaviors of the teenagers
in the social network to evaluate the success of the course, and we presented them
with some conclusions. Previous course edition experiences had shown low motivation
and participation rates in the proposed activities. Providing teenagers with tools to
motivate participation may therefore be a sound approach to improve learning, safe
privacy behaviors and engagement. For this reason, we added a gamification module
in PESEDIA.
1https://pesedia.webs.upv.es
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Instrument Features Approach & targeted benefit
Social
networking
Posting, sharing, comments,
liking, friends, activity river,
user profiles, private
messaging, surveys, external
guidance (tutorials &
activities)
- Cooperation and communication among
participants
- Boost participation, collaborative work,
and community building
- Promote student-driven discussion
Social net-
working
with
gamification
Posting, sharing, comments,
liking, friends, activity river,
user profiles, private
messaging, surveys, points,
badges, achievements, score,
status, leaderboard
- Cooperation, communication, and
competition among participants with
gamification
- Boost participation, collaborative work,
and community building
- Promote student-driven discussion
- Motivate participation through public
leaderboard comparison
Table 8.1: Summary of instruments remarking the main features of the different means and targeted
benefits.
8.3.2 Instruments
In order to compare the performance as well as the attitude towards social gamifi-
cation, we carried out an experiment using two configurations of our social network.
One configuration consisted of using only the instruments provided by a social net-
work similar to Facebook. The other configuration consisted of including a module
in the social network to provide gamification instruments. The social network, called
PESEDIA, was the same for both configurations of the experiment. A summary of the
instruments used for each configuration is presented in Table 8.1.
PESEDIA is an online social network for educational and research purposes. PESEDIA
was designed as a tool for the teaching/learning of OSN features and to increase con-
cern, awareness, and seeking behavior on privacy, especially in the case of children
and teenagers who are just beginning to use OSNs. The main goals of PESEDIA include:
(i) the design and development of new metrics to analyze and quantify privacy risks
[11, 13]; (ii) the application of methods to influence users’ behavior towards safer ac-
tions regarding their privacy [12]; and (iii) the evaluation and testing of new proposals
with real users [14]. The underlying implementation of PESEDIA uses Elgg [64], which
is an open-source engine that is used to build social environments. The environment
provided by this engine is similar to other social networks (e.g., Facebook). We devel-
oped each functionality in PESEDIA through modules following the design principles of
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System
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…
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Plugins
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User Layer
Deliberation process
Contacts
Collections
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…
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Types
profile info.
posts
comments
…
Settings
Privacy policies
private
friends
public
…
Privacy threshold
Leaderboard
Points logger
Gamification Module
Rules
system
Requirements
Rewards
Badges
system
Requirements
Badge type
Figure 8.1: Block diagram that represents the architecture of Pesedia. Also represented is the relevant
plugin for this work: the Gamification Module.
the Elgg engine (see Figure 8.1). The modules allow us to enable and disable online fea-
tures of the social network at any time, adapting them to the needs of the experiment.
Moreover, the use of our social network allowed users to interact with each other and
to perform the course activities.
The first configuration was based on the last non-gamified course edition done. It was
a non-gamified configuration of PESEDIA, which provided the environment to perform
the activities planned in each lesson. Figure 8.2 depicts the different elements that the
social network offered to users: a profile view with their profile elements presented
(in the center of the figure); a wall, where users post their publications and comments
(at the bottom of the figure, accessible via the “Activity” tab or the profile icon in
the top bar); friendship management (group icon in the top bar); private messaging
service (message icon in the top bar); and other instruments that are easily identifiable
in the figure. The difference between the PESEDIA course editions is the gamification
module, so the “Score” and “Badges-and-points” tab were not available in the non-
gamified course. The other instruments used in this configurationweremainly tutorials
and activities. The difference between these instruments was related to the grade of
teaching assistance needed to complete them.
The second configuration was a gamified PESEDIA that allowed students to complete
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Figure 8.2: User wall of the social network Pesedia. This screenshot belongs to the gamified social network.
The non-gamified configuration does not include the “Score” representation in the top bar or the “Badges-
and-points” menu.
the activities planned in each lesson autonomously at their own pace without the in-
tervention of teaching assistants. The gamification design included in PESEDIA offers
users the possibility to choose what activities to complete and there are no penalties
for poor activity performance. We have considered game design elements at two levels
of abstraction: (i) educational gamification design principles, and (ii) game mechanics
[76, 295]. The gamification design principles selected are based on the idea of progress.
The intention was to present practical lessons in stages that scale by difficulty (i.e.,
scaffolded instruction), but that each user can accommodate to his/her own pace and
needs [113]. We considered a set of stages of mastery following the stages established by
Dreyfus when looking at how people engage with systems [77]. The stages of mastery
are the following:
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• Newcomer: The user who just arrived to the social network. He/she has created
an account in the social network and has logged in.
• Rookie: Similar to a newcomer but with information already in hand about
some privacy aspects. He/she is on his/her way toward figuring out how the
social network works and what functionalities it offers.
• Trainee: Users have increased their practice in a wide variety of typical social
network actions such as sharing and/or commenting on other publications, up-
loading photos, likes or labeling friends. Users also achieve a deeper knowledge
about the options that the social network offers in order to restrict the visibil-
ity of their actions. The situations that they deal with in the social network are
stored in order to provide a basis for future recognition of similar situations that
could appear in the future.
• Expert: The user starts to think about the different configurations of privacy
policies and which ones are the most suitable by considering different scenarios
and types of information (i.e., profile items or posts). He/she learns how to cre-
ate different personalized audience groups and how to use them to restrict the
audience of a publication.
• Master: The expert performer in the social network has reached the final stage
in the step-wise improvement of privacy awareness and good practices that we
have been following. The user repertoire of experienced situations is now quite
broad, and he/she can intuitively dictate an appropriate action for each specific
situation.
The game mechanics proposed are based on the following three key elements:
• Points: These allow us to see how users are interacting within the social network,
design for outcomes, and make appropriate adjustments. We have considered
two types of points: experience points, which are used to track the user activity
in the social network; and skills points, which are assigned to specific activities
within the social network that reflect whether the user has acquired certain skills
(see Figure 8.3).
• Badges: These offer a visual representation of progress and are given for special
achievements. We have considered different kind of badges: Status and Expe-
rience badges. The stages of mastery (Newcomer, Rookie, Trainee, Expert, and
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Figure 8.3: View of “My Points” with a registry of the latest points obtained for a specific user.
Figure 8.4: View of the “Badge Gallery” with all of the badges the user has not achieved yet.
Master) are represented as Status badges, while activities are represented as Ex-
perience badges. Each Status badge is composed of a set of Experience badges
(see Figure 8.4).
• Leaderboard: The goal of the leaderboard is to make simple comparisons. Based
on the points and badges, users are ranked on a leaderboard that encourages
engagement through competition (see Figure 8.5).
All of these instruments included in the gamification module were used to complete
learning activities. Each activity had a specific number of points associated to it (i.e.,
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Figure 8.5: View of the “Leaderboard” with a top-ten ranking of the users with the most points.
experience points or skills points). Moreover, an activity was associated with the re-
quirements to obtain a badge. To obtain a badge, the students had to complete several
activities depending on the level of the badge (i.e., Newcomer, Rookie, Trainee, Ex-
pert, or Master), thus giving them a sense of progression towards mastery and also
providing points on the achievement of each badge. The different activities/badges
were gradually enabled during each lesson so that the participants could complete
the activities/badges and have time to practice the learned knowledge acquired before
continuing with the other activities/badges. In other words, a lesson had a set of activi-
ties/badges that were enabled at the beginning of the lesson, and once the participants
completed them, they had time to practice them before the next lesson started. Based
on the number of activities performed (represented as badges and points obtained),
the leaderboard offered the possibility to see other students’ positions in the ranking
for competing and sharing their achievements. Once they achieved all of the badges
(from a lesson, or from the whole course), the participants could still get some extra
points for performing actions related to the activities. Therefore, they could continue
practicing the knowledge acquired on the social network but without activity support.
8.3.3 Participants
A total of 405 teenagers participated in the experiment. Of these, we excluded the par-
ticipants who did not complete all of the control lessons (13 participants) as well as the
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participants who decided not to participate (5 participants did not log into PESEDIA).
Finally, 387 participants completed the experiment (196 females, 191 males, 86 12-
year-olds, 199 13-year-olds, and 102 14-years-olds, Mage = 13.04, range: 12-14 years
old). We included the participants in the experiment taking into account their age
in order to have a sample of the teenage population (participants older than 12 years
old). All of the selected participants were attending high school in different school
centers of the Valencia area at the time of the experiment. When the participants en-
roll, they were assigned to one of the two groups of the experiment based on when they
sign up. The social network without gamification was administered to a group of 178
teenagers (97 females, 81males, 38 12-year-olds, 93 13-year-olds, and 47 14-year-olds,
Mage = 13.05). The social network with gamification was administered to a group
of 209 teenagers (99 females, 110 males, 48 12-year-olds, 106 13-year-olds, and 55
14-year-olds, Mage = 13.03).
8.3.4 Procedure
Experimentation took place during the summer period. Both course editions had a
duration of one month and had the same content and activities. The experiment was
carried out on the PESEDIA social network where both configurations were applied:
one configuration without the gamification module, and another with the gamifica-
tion module enabled. To prevent interferences, we included a registry controller (using
a secret token) to avoid undesired registrations that could affect the security of the par-
ticipants and the experiment. The participants of the experimental group who used the
social network without gamification took the course first. Then the course was taken
by the participants of the experimental groupwho used the social network with gamifi-
cation. During the period of the experiment, the participants had access to the PESEDIA
social network to share their experiences and feelings.
We organized three on-site lessons of 90 minutes in equipped labs at the university to
use as control points of the experiment. In these lessons, activities were delivered se-
quentially to be completed in the same session or from home. These three on-site lessons
were distributed at three points in time: lesson 1, at the beginning of the one-month
period; lesson 2, in the middle; and lesson 3, at the end. The aim of these lessons was
to clarify any doubts that might arise among the participants about the functional-
ity and features of the social network. Each lesson started with a brief explanation of
the activities that they should try to complete during the lesson, and then participants
had time to interact using the social network and complete the different activities. The
activities had textual descriptions. Students were assisted during the lessons to clarify
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doubts that could arise during the performance of the activities. In the first lesson,
we introduced PESEDIA to the participants and they signed up on the social network.
Then, they had to complete some activities that focused on customizing their user pro-
files, setting up their general setting options, and building their friendship relations
(low-medium difficulty). In the second lesson, they had to complete activities that fo-
cused on interacting and posting, choosing their audience (medium-high difficulty).
In the third (and last) lesson, the participants had to complete an extra activity (chal-
lenge). Finally, to conclude the course, we also presented them with a course summary
regarding their behaviors and answers to the survey.
8.3.5 Measures and data analysis
During the experimentation, a log system was activated to record all of the partic-
ipants’ actions in order to analyze them after the experiment. Information such as
the privacy policies chosen for profile items, general setting options, and posts were
used to assess the users’ privacy-seeking behavior. The rate of private policies used over
the total number of privacy decisions chosen was computed for each participant. In-
formation such as the amount of content created, and the rate of activity and survey
completions were used to calculate the users’ engagement with the educational process.
All of these values were normalized on a 0-1 scale, except for the content-created vari-
able. The Shapiro-Wilk test was used to check the normality of the data distribution
for the variables. That indicated to us that we had to use non-parametric tests since
the data gathered did not follow a normal distribution. Therefore, Mann-Whitney and
Kruskal-Wallis tests was used to analyze differences between groups.
8.4 Results
In this section, we present the participants’ results regarding the behavior and activities
performed on PESEDIA for both configurations (Non-Gamified and Gamified). We also
test the research questions considered above about the participants’ behaviors towards
privacy concepts as a consequence of the privacy teaching/learning process, the partic-
ipants’ engagement with the social network, differences in gender and/or age behavior
of the participants and their attitude towards the instruments used. Note that the
Shapiro-Wilk normality test was run to analyze the distribution values of the private
privacy policies rate and the participation rate of the participants (Tables 8.2, 8.3, and
8.4) collected from the social network PESEDIA for running the appropriate statistical
tests. The results showed the non-normality of the data (since p-values are less than
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α = 0.05). Therefore, non-parametric statistical tests were applied to investigate our
research questions.
8.4.1 Privacy-seeking behavior
Theparticipants’ behavior regarding privacywasmeasured through the usage that par-
ticipants made of PESEDIA. We specially analyzed the data collected from the privacy
policies of the participants’ profile items, general setting options, and publications. The
data collection was done for the duration of the experiment, which was one month.
Figure 8.6 shows the participants’ behavior regarding different privacy decisions on
the social network, which are split into three dimensions: the privacy policy of pro-
file items (e.g., name, phone number, etc.), the general privacy setting options (e.g.,
friend list visibility, “who is allowed to tag me”, etc.), and the privacy policy of publi-
cations. The values represent the rate distribution of private privacy policies used by
the participants (ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 means that no private privacy policies
were used while 1 means that only private privacy policies were used). Private privacy
policies include: Friends, personalized access lists (also known as collections), and Only
me. An analysis of the results reveals three notable points for discussion. First, the
profile items that contain the most sensitive information of participants such as name,
email, or phone number had more permissive privacy policies in the Non-Gamified
configuration than in the Gamified configuration. Although we explained to the par-
ticipants how to change these privacy policies in both course editions, they figured out
how to customize them better in the Gamified configuration. In contrast, in the Non-
Gamified configuration, the vast majority of participants shared their personal profile
data with public policies (all of the quartiles of the boxplot are in the 0 value) except
for a few participants (representing the outliers). Second, the general setting options
about privacy are an instrument that participants seldom take care of, regardless of
whether there is gamification. Both scenarios have a median of value 0 for private pri-
vacy policies (represented as a line in themiddle of the boxplot figure). The participants
changed their privacy setting options towards more restrictive privacy policies only in
a few cases, more in the Gamified configuration than in the Non-Gamified configura-
tion (where all of the quartiles of the boxplot are in the 0 value). The most changed
privacy setting options were “who is allowed to tag me”, “who is allowed to publish on
my wall”, and the visibility of the friend list, in that order. Third, the posting action,
which is the main action for interacting with others in a social network, also has a
median value of 0 for the Non-Gamified configuration. However, there are no outlier
points (in contrast to the other dimensions for the Non-Gamified configuration). This
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Figure 8.6: Participants’ behaviors regarding privacy decisions on profile items, general setting options,
and publications on Pesedia for Non-Gamified and Gamified configurations. Values (ranging from 0 to
1) represent the rate distribution of private privacy policies (e.g.,Only me, Collections, or Friends) used by
the participants, where 0means that no private privacy policies were used and 1means that only private
privacy policies were used.
means that a significant portion of participants also used private privacy policies. For
the Gamified configuration, the participants followed more restrictive privacy poli-
cies for posting actions. Even so, we observed that, in this configuration, the privacy
policies were slightly less restrictive than for the profile items. This is normal since the
information sensitivity of the profile item dimension is probably higher than for the
publication dimension. Finally, for all of the dimensions about privacy decisions in the
Non-Gamified configuration, the participants used the social network without taking
too much care about who could access their information. Research works such as [271]
highlight OSN users’ learning through regrets of their actions due to bad decisions as
the most common practice. In contrast, the use of gamification to introduce and edu-
cate users about privacy aspects in social networks as shown in our experiments may
help to improve these hurdles.
Research question RQ8.1 was tested in order to determine whether or not there is a sig-
nificant difference in privacy behaviors betweenGamified andNon-Gamified PESEDIA.
We collected the data from the privacy policies of the participants’ profile items, set-
tings, and publications for the duration of the experiment, which was one month. The
rate data of the private policies was normalized for each participant. Due to the non-
normality of the variables and the number of samples, we used the Mann-Whitney test
(α = .05). For this test, we calculated the mid p-value since its Type I error rate is
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Descriptive statistics Shapiro-Wilk test Mann-Whitney test
Variable Category N M SD SE Min Max W p-value U p-value
Profile privacy Non-Gamif. 178 .013 .096 .007 0 1 .120 < .001 3108 < .001
Gamif. 209 .373 .246 .017 .939 < .001
Settings privacy Non-Gamif. 178 .001 .015 .001 0 1 .048 < .001 11314 < .001
Gamif. 209 .090 .124 .008 .670 < .001
Posting privacy Non-Gamif. 126 .259 .368 .033 0 1 .706 < .001 9642 < .001
Gamif. 201 .265 .235 .016 .902 < .001
Table 8.2: Summary of descriptive statistics, the Shapiro-Wilk normality test, and the Mann-Whitney
test for investigating research question RQ8.1.
closer to the nominal level. We investigated the research questions taking into account
the theory of the null hypothesis as well as the Mann-Whitney test. In statistical hy-
pothesis testing, a Type I error is the rejection of a true null hypothesis. Thus, we are
able to reject the null hypothesis (H0) to accept the alternative (H1).
To answer research question RQ8.1 about how the gamification of the social network
impacts the participants’ behaviors towards privacy concepts and safe practices in so-
cial networks, we tested themean differences between theGamified andNon-Gamified
social network, especially taking into account the behaviors regarding private privacy
policies for the dimensions of the profile, settings, and posting (see Table 8.2). Specif-
ically, we ran the Mann-Whitney test (α = .05) and the results rejected the null hy-
pothesis of similarity for profile, settings, and posting dimensions (p-value=< .001).
Therefore, significant differences were found in the impact on the participants’ behav-
iors towards privacy concepts and safe practices in the social network between the
Gamified configuration and the Non-Gamified configuration of the social network.
Thus, RQ8.1 was supported.
8.4.2 Social network engagement
The participants’ engagement with the social network was measured through the ac-
tions they did publishing content and completing activities on PESEDIA. We specially
analyzed the amount of content created (such as posts, comments, likes, private mes-
sages, etc.), the rate of completed activities, and the rate of completed surveys. The
data collection was done for the duration of the experiment, which was one month.
Figure 8.7 shows the distributions of the engagement of the participants in the social
network in the experiment taking into account the following three features: the amount
of created content (i.e., number of posts, comments, likes, etc.), the rate of completed
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activities (i.e., the number of completed activities normalized by their total), and the
rate of completed surveys. For the content creation column, the values represent the
amount of content created by the participants. Both distributions have the same shape,
both have a few participants that are very active and produce great amounts of con-
tent and a majority of participants who only publish a few publications. Even so, the
rate of participation in the Gamified configuration (with a median of about 80 con-
tents created by each participant) is clearly higher than the rate of participation in the
Non-Gamified configuration (roughly 15 contents created by each participant). More-
over, the most active participants using the Non-Gamified configuration created the
same amount of content as a regular participant using the Gamified configuration.
For the activity and survey participation columns, the values represent the rate dis-
tribution of completed activities and surveys by each participant. The activities (for
both the Non-Gamified and the Gamified configurations) were focused on improving
the learning of the social network features, the privacy-seeking behavior, and the en-
gagement to participate actively. However, in the Non-Gamified configuration, only
a few users participated in the activities. The opposite occured in the Gamified config-
uration, where the median rate of completed activities was 95% (represented as a line
in the middle of the boxplot figure). In the case of the surveys, the rate of completion
was high in both configurations. Nevertheless, the number of completed surveys was
slightly better in theGamified configuration. We considered that the huge difference in
activity participation for both configurations could be because gamification provides
participants with the autonomy to complete the activities at their own pace, while the
Non-Gamified configuration does not provide this advantage.
Research question RQ8.2 was tested in order to determine whether or not there was a
significant difference in social network engagement between configurations. We an-
alyzed the amount of content created by the participants, the activity participation,
and the survey participation. The participation rate was normalized for each partici-
pant. Due to the non-normality of the variables and the number of samples, we used
the Mann-Whitney test (α = .05). For this test, we calculated the mid p-value since its
Type I error rate is closer to the nominal level. We investigated the research questions
taking into account the theory of the null hypothesis as well as theMann-Whitney test.
In statistical hypothesis testing, a Type I error is the rejection of a true null hypothesis.
Thus, we are able to reject the null hypothesis (H0) to accept the alternative (H1).
To answer research question RQ8.2 about how the gamification of the social network
impacts the participation rates of teenage users, we tested the mean differences be-
tween the Gamified and Non-Gamified social network, especially taking into account
the variables regarding the amount of content created, and the activities and surveys
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Figure 8.7: Participants’ engagement based on the amount of content created, the rate of activities com-
pleted, and the rate of surveys completed on Pesedia with and without gamification.
Descriptive statistics Shapiro-Wilk test Mann-Whitney test
Variable Category N M SD SE Min Max W p-value U p-value
Content creation Non-Gamif. 178 20.2 21.8 1.6 0 - .686 < .001 4180 < .001
Gamif. 209 98.0 85.4 5.9 .788 < .001
Activity participation Non-Gamif. 178 .106 .202 .016 0 1 .598 < .001 1732 < .001
Gamif. 209 .777 .311 .022 .726 < .001
Survey participation Non-Gamif. 178 .657 .273 .020 0 1 .846 < .001 12934 < .001
Gamif. 209 .777 .276 .019 .730 < .001
Table 8.3: Summary of descriptive statistics, the Shapiro-Wilk normality test, and the Mann-Whitney
test for investigating research question RQ8.2.
completed (see Table 8.3). Specifically, we ran the Mann-Whitney test (α = .05) and
the results rejected the null hypothesis of similarity for content creation, and the activ-
ity and survey completion dimensions (p-value=< .001). Therefore, significant differ-
ences were found in the impact on the participation rates of teenage users in the social
network between the Gamified and the Non-Gamified configuration of the social net-
work. Thus, RQ8.2 was supported.
8.4.3 Gender & Age behavior differences
Next, we analyze the privacy and engagement behavior of the participants in the social
network regarding their gender and age, but only for the Gamified configuration. We
want to determine whether gamification instruments affect the participants in a dif-
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Figure 8.8: Participants’ engagement split by gender and age for the Gamified Pesedia.
ferent way according to their gender and age. We analyze the same features as above
but split by gender and age. The collectionwas done for the duration of the experiment,
which was one month.
Figure 8.8 shows the distribution of the engagement of the participants in the social
network by gender and age for the Gamified configuration. We analyzed the features
tomeasure the engagement as we did in Section 8.4.2. The results obtained from the en-
gagement distributions show slightly similar distributions for these features by gender
and age. There were only some differences in the engagement distributions by gender.
The clearest difference can be seen in the amount of content created on the social net-
work by the male participants, where they obtain the maximum values per participant
and also have a higher median than the female participants. No differences were found
for gender or age regarding privacy behavior.
Research questions RQ8.3a, RQ8.3b, RQ8.4a, and RQ8.4b were tested in order to de-
termine whether or not there was a significant difference regarding privacy behavior
or engagement in the social network taking into account the gender and age of the
participants of the Gamified configuration. We used the features analyzed and nor-
malized for each participant in the Gamified configuration. Due to the non-normality
of the variables and the number of samples, we used non-parametric tests. For the
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Descriptive statistics Shapiro-Wilk test Man-Whitney test
Variable Category N M SD SE Min Max W p-value U p-value
PSB: Profile privacy Male 110 .389 .278 .026 0 1 .924 < .001 5380 .882
Female 99 .354 .206 .021 .955 .002
PSB: Settings privacy Male 110 .085 .128 .012 0 1 .634 < .001 5149 .429
Female 99 .095 .119 .012 .702 < .001
PSB: Posting privacy Male 110 .231 .208 .020 0 1 .899 < .001 4990 .297
Female 99 .282 .263 .026 .896 < .001
SNE: Content creation Male 110 120.2 102.6 9.7 0 - .820 < .001 3767 < .001
Female 99 73.4 51.1 5.1 .879 < .001
SNE: Activity participation Male 110 .799 .308 .029 0 1 .682 < .001 4375 .014
Female 99 .752 .314 .032 .769 < .001
SNE: Survey participation Male 110 .780 .270 .026 0 1 .725 < .001 5436 .983
Female 99 .773 .284 .028 .734 < .001
(Kruskal-Wallis test χ2)
PSB: Profile privacy 12-year-old 48 .361 .194 .028 0 1 .947 .003 3.307 .347
13-year-old 106 .397 .265 .025 .943 .002
14-year-old 55 .336 .249 .034 .905 .004
PSB: Settings privacy 12-year-old 48 .089 .116 .017 0 1 .691 < .001 1.296 .730
13-year-old 106 .094 .136 .013 .665 < .001
14-year-old 55 .085 .107 .015 .671 < .001
PSB: Posting privacy 12-year-old 48 .251 .234 .034 0 1 .898 .006 2.487 .477
13-year-old 106 .285 .264 .025 .895 < .001
14-year-old 55 .205 .166 .022 .928 .003
SNE: Content creation 12-year-old 48 84.2 70.3 10.2 0 - .819 < .001 .9516 .621
13-year-old 106 102.8 94.6 9.1 .747 < .001
14-year-old 55 100.6 79.8 10.8 .858 < .001
SNE: Activity participation 12-year-old 48 .763 .331 .048 0 1 .716 < .001 .4791 .787
13-year-old 106 .779 .307 .030 .732 < .001
14-year-old 55 .783 .313 .042 .704 < .001
SNE: Survey participation 12-year-old 48 .748 .290 .042 0 1 .776 < .001 .3587 .835
13-year-old 106 .781 .271 .026 .740 < .001
14-year-old 55 .784 .279 .038 .661 < .001
Table 8.4: Summary of descriptive statistics, the Shapiro-Wilk normality test, and the non-parametric
tests of significance (Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests) for investigating research questions
RQ8.3a, RQ8.3b, RQ8.4a, and RQ8.4b. PSB and SNE denote privacy-seeking behavior and social net-
work engagement variables, respectively.
tests, we calculated the mid p-value since its Type I error rate is closer to the nominal
level. We investigated the research questions taking into account the theory of the null
hypothesis. In statistical hypothesis testing, a Type I error is the rejection of a true null
hypothesis. Thus, we are able to reject the null hypothesis (H0) to accept the alternative
(H1).
To answer the research questions about how the gender of the participants in the
Gamified social network configuration influences privacy behavior (RQ8.3a) and en-
gagement (RQ8.3b), we tested the mean differences between genders taking into ac-
count the variables shown in Table 8.4. Specifically, we ran the Mann-Whitney test
(α = .05), and the results rejected the null hypothesis of similarity only for content
creation and the activity completion dimensions (p-value=< .001). Therefore, signif-
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icant differences were only found for the impact on the participation rates of teenage
users for the gender of the participants regarding content creation and activity partic-
ipation. Thus, RQ8.3b was partially supported only for engagement.
To answer the research questions about how the age of the participants in the gam-
ified social network configuration influences privacy behavior (RQ8.4a) and engage-
ment (RQ8.4b), we tested the mean differences for three groups(12, 13, and 14-year-
olds) taking into account the variables shown in Table 8.4. Specifically, we ran the
Kruskal-Wallis test (α = .05) and the results did not reject the null hypothesis of
similarity (p-value> .05). Therefore, no significant differences were found in the par-
ticipants’ privacy behavior or engagement in the social network by age. Thus, RQ8.4a
and RQ8.4b were not supported.
8.5 Discussion
The integration of gamification instruments in non-game contexts to teach people in
a practical way about dull, tedious or complex tasks is rising in popularity. The pri-
vacy concept, and especially users’ privacy on social networks, is a challenge that is
highlighted in several research works [231, 5, 255]. Therefore, the use of gamification in
the context of social networks to teach users about privacy and privacy mechanisms
of the social network is a perfect match. This combination allows users to be aware of
their privacy, and thus be better able to manage complex scenarios to avoid possible
leaks of information or regrets. In this work, we have assessed the integration of gam-
ification on a social network through the investigation of four research questions. The
aim of these research questions was to measure the effect of gamification on teenage
users regarding the learning of privacy and social network features, privacy awareness,
and social network engagement. PESEDIA is the social network where the gamification
instruments were integrated, which is similar to Facebook and has most of the privacy
mechanisms of Facebook. To do this, we carried out a short-term, one-month experi-
ment where two configurations of the social network PESEDIA were used: one with the
gamification module enabled, and the other without it. The gamified social network
proposed in this work may be relevant and useful for educators who wish to develop
and enhance teenagers’ privacy skills, or for a broader base of aspects related to the
development of digital competences and technology in education.
The direct benefits of using gamification to improve learning have numerous defend-
ers [76, 295], although there are some contexts or features where gamification produces
negative effects [113, 111]. In the context of social networks, previous works such as [72],
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where the combination of gamification instruments with social network instruments
is proposed, defend the extra benefits of this union. However, as far as we know, the
application of social gamification has not been proven on the teenage population nor
with the aim of improving the users’ awareness and privacy-seeking behavior. In our
work, the results suggest that the gamification designed and integrated into PESEDIA
has a positive learning effect on teenagers. They improved their awareness and seeking
behavior of privacy, and their interest in the social network was higher when the gam-
ification module was enabled. Specifically, profile items, general setting options, and
posts had privacy policies that were more appropriate, and the rate of activity and sur-
vey completion was also higher. We did not see any negative effects on teenage users’
behavior due to the use of gamification instruments. Furthermore, the age and gender
of teenagers did not have a relevant effect on how theywere influenced by gamification,
except in the case of male teenagers who created content slightly more actively than
female teenagers. While some studies indicate that females engage more in gamified
courses than males [254], our work has extracted the conclusions for a younger popu-
lation (teenagers). Moreover, our work has also been assessed in a different context (a
social network), where studies like [283] have highlighted that male teens disclose more
information than female teens. However, testing the effect of gamification on social
networks to teach users about privacy should be done by extending the participant
population to include other age ranges.
The way gamification is designed and the instruments used can enhance the learning
effect on people [110]. Although our results showmore awareness of privacy and higher
participation rates by teens when the gamification module is active, we do not know
with certainty which privacy policies are the most appropriate for a publication. The
lack of easy metrics to compute the most appropriate privacy policy for a publication
(i.e., the privacy policy that maximizes the social benefit of the user and minimizes
his/her loss of privacy) makes our goal an estimation between the usage of the privacy
mechanisms and the privacy choice. Therefore, once there is a recognized way of as-
sessing the appropriateness of a privacy policy for users’ publications, it will be possible
to design gamification instruments that focus on improving the privacy policies chosen
for a publication, taking into account all of the factors involved. Some works try to
define the best way to measure these factors and combine them [288, 233, 70]. An in-
teresting next step would be to use them with gamification. Thus, it would be possible
to maximize users’ learning about privacy concepts through gamification instruments.
Other factors to consider are the time when gamification is used and/or its duration,
and what/how many rewards should be designed. In our case, we limited the number
of rewards (i.e., badges and points) for each lesson. Thus, the participants had a pow-
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erful gamification reinforcement at the beginning of each on-site lesson (and during
the course experience) that introduced them to the social networks and accelerated
the learning curve [132]. Once the participants achieved the rewards designed in each
lesson, no more rewards were activated in the same lesson. Thus, after the learning
period (i.e., at the end of each lesson, between lessons, and at the end of the course),
the participants used the social network with the knowledge acquired from the activi-
ties. Other interesting approaches to be considered would be: varying the gamification
time of use to determine the most optimal application time for the participants’ learn-
ing; or adding punishments/rewards for users when theymake bad/good privacy policy
choices (e.g., in cases of sensitive information, or conflicts detected between users, etc.).
It should always be taken into account that there are different types of users with dif-
ferent social network goals [216].
Despite the valuable conclusions extracted, this study has several limitations. First,
the current research was conducted for one month. That is why only a short-term im-
pact on users’ privacy behaviors and social network engagement could be measured.
As we stated above, we do not know the consequences of long-term usage of gamifi-
cation instruments and their impact on users’ behaviors. It could happen that, after
a certain period of time, some users might ignore the knowledge acquired. While the
observed immediate effect of gamification was desirable, future research that extends
the period of usage could be interesting. Second, as we have highlighted in this work,
the lack of easy metrics to measure the appropriate privacy policy for a publication
makes us estimate the privacy-seeking behavior as the usage of the privacy mecha-
nisms plus the privacy choice. Furthermore, we designed our gamification activities
and instruments based on this estimation. Therefore, having a metric that is capable
of measuring the appropriate privacy policy for a publication, we would be able to
effectively design the gamification elements and assess the effect for improving users’
concern, awareness, and seeking behavior on privacy. Finally, the participants con-
sidered for the experiments have a certain age distribution (approx. 12-14 years old).
Therefore, these results cannot be extrapolated to teenage users in general (approx. 12-
18 years old) to obtain a broader view of this group of social network users. In order
to be able to confirm whether the effects observed in this study are extrapolatable to
other populations, we plan to evaluate the performance of gamification for different
populations, that is, a more heterogeneous sample of participants with different age
ranges and nationalities.
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8.6 Conclusion
This research work studied the capabilities of social networks and social gamification
for educational purposes about the concepts of social networks, especially users’ on-
line privacy. We assessed two configurations (with/without gamification), focusing on
teenagers’ learning and engagement with the educational process. We also statistically
compared the two approaches to determine which one provided better results. After a
statistical analysis, the results illustrated the value of social gamification for the teach-
ing/learning of privacy and engagement in OSNs. It has also shown that teenagers us-
ing the gamifiedOSN had behaviors that aremore restrictive in information disclosure
that potentially might reduce actions with negative consequences via practice in a real
environment. For the social gamification configuration, we investigated differences in
teenagers’ learning and engagement taking into account individual characteristics of
the participants such as age and gender. The study explored possible age and gender
differences regarding the social gamification, depicting only a significant difference
for gender (greater for male teenagers than for female teenagers) for the engagement
with the educational process.
Our findings and the gamified social platform proposed in this work may be relevant
and useful for educators who wish to develop and enhance teenagers’ privacy skills, or
for a broader base of aspects related to the development of digital competences and
technology in education.
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In this chapter, the main results achieved by each of the contributions that compose
this thesis are discussed as well as the possible lines for future research. Section 9.1 dis-
cusses the open challenges found in the design of privacy mechanisms, which help users
to choose the elements of online communication during the privacy decision-making
process. Section 9.2 discusses the proposal of privacy risk metrics that calculate the
potential risk raised from information re-sharing users’ actions. These privacy metrics
were tested in experiments using the most popular social network structural topolo-
gies and behavioral models based on epidemics. Section 9.3 discusses the proposal of a
metric that provides a sensitivity value of a social network publication. This proposal
is based on previous papers/approaches that assess the degree of sensitivity of infor-
mation in several contexts such as legal, economic, and social networks. A research
model that assesses the benefit-cost trade-off of users for the elements of online com-
munication (channel, message, and receptors) and their factors is discussed in Section
9.4. Finally, Sections 9.5 and 9.6 describe different approaches for informing and edu-
cating users about their actions on social networks and how these have an impact not
only on the privacy of their information but also on the information of other users.
These privacy tools and mechanisms were integrated into the social network PESEDIA
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and were tested with real users’ activity and interactions.
9.1 Results on open research lines about privacy
Chapter 2 presents a deep review of the advances made on privacy mechanisms and
solutions. The advances of the reviewed papers and articles have been sorted taking
into account the requirement that meet (from the eleven identified requirements). To
help readers to understand these requirements, the whole privacy decision-making pro-
cess was depicted in a picture identifying the communication elements, their factors,
and the potential privacy problems by steps. Furthermore, comparative tables are in-
cluded for each of the requirement sections remarking the properties of the privacy
mechanism solutions analyzed.
The contributions of this paper highlight the requirements that have been less worked
out and/or not yet met. These requirements are 1) the development of metrics for mea-
suring privacy risks; 2) the validation of a realistic behavioral model that can be used
for automatic privacy decisions; 3) the design of privacymechanisms and elements that
inform and educate users about their privacy decisions or about privacy recommen-
dations received; 4) the adaptation of privacy mechanisms to users’ decisions for still
meeting these requirements; 5) the existing gaps in multi-party privacy decisions such
as defining and detecting the real owners of publication content, argumentation to
solve privacy conflicts, etc.; and 6) the creation of new disclosure mechanisms in social
networks with new play rules in privacy policies (e.g., Instagram Stories which content
becomes totally private over time). This thesis work contributes to addressing the first
three (1-3) of these six requirements. By addressing these three requirements, the thesis
contributes to preserving the users’ privacy during single privacy decisions through the
awareness of the value of their data, the consequences/scope of their actions, and most
especially the understanding of the privacy risks.
The rest of the identified requirements remain still open and are part of the future re-
search work. Although there are advances in privacy mechanisms for deciding multi-
party content privacy, there are no tools for detecting which publications have more
than one owner. For example, the photo of a baby, this content could have as many
owners as legal representatives. On the other hand, new social network disclosure
mechanisms like Instagram or WhatsApp Stories with new privacy rules lack of research
on its advances.
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9.2 Results of the definition of a privacy risk metric
Chapter 3 propose a metric based on information flows resulting from re-sharing ac-
tions in social networks to assess the user’s privacy risk. Users are constantly sharing
information on social networks and they are not totally aware of the scope of their
actions. Moreover, not all users have the same perception of risk. In this paper, the
Privacy Risk Score (PRS) metric was proposed in several ways, one as a global network
scopemetric, and the other as a scopemetric by distance levels with the followingmain
contributions:
(i) The PRS is oriented to estimating the reachability of users’ sharing actions in-
stead of being focused on themisalignment of their users’ expected audience with
the actual audience.
(ii) This measure is provided globally and in levels in order to be able to adjust to
the user’s perception of risk.
(iii) The PRS takes into account the paths that the publications follow in the social
network without having to provide the information explicitly by the user.
(iv) Centrality metrics are proposed to provide an approximation of the PRS in so-
cial networking environments where detailed record of the information sharing
activity is not available.
Then, it was empirically tested through simulated experiments and real information
flows on Twitter. The simulated experiments used the most popular network topolo-
gies and epidemic models to understand the dissemination information process and
quantify the scope of users’ actions. Regarding real social information flows, this work
tested the PRS metric using a dataset of information flows based on life cycles of ru-
mors on Twitter.
The results of the experiment proved the validity of the PRS metric for estimating the
users’ scope in the network and the accuracy of estimating users’ scope using global, lo-
cal, and social centrality properties. Global centrality metrics obtain in general good
accuracy results but the main disadvantage of these metrics is the complexity of their
computation (they are not always computationally affordable). Regarding local and
social centrality metrics, their accuracy results showed a better estimation with the
degree local metric for the global PRS metric, while the degree social metric worked
better for the PRS metric by distance levels. Local and social metrics are computa-
tionally affordable and a good approximation when there is no data of information
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flows in the network. The analysis of the PRS metric and the PRS value of users in
the rumors network showed that most users have low PRS values (i.e., values in the
range [0,0.2]). These results match with the conclusions obtained by the paper that
presents the dataset [297]. The results in real social networks confirm that local and
social centrality metrics based on degree perform well in estimating a user’s privacy
risk and could be integrated in social network applications that offer limited access to
information flows.
Chapter 4 presents metrics of privacy risk extending the previous PRS metric based
on friendship layers. The concept of friendship layers allows us to provide information
about user’s privacy risk for different levels of risk perception. This work proposes two
privacy risk metrics, Reachability and Audience. Reachability provides information to
the user about the probability that a message that he/she publishes reaches a specific
friendship layer or a specific number of users in that layer. Audience provides infor-
mation to the user about the percentage of users in a specific layer who are likely to
see a message that he/she published. These newmetrics provide more easy and detailed
explanations that could be shown to users about their privacy risks during privacy de-
cisions. Both privacy metrics were tested through a set of experiments. The effectiveness
centrality metric obtained better results for estimating the privacy metrics, Reachabil-
ity and Audience, than other centrality metrics such as degree or ego-betweenness. Finally,
this work proposes a common regressionmodel based on the effectiveness value of agents
to approximate Reachability and Audience values in different network models.
9.3 Results of the proposed sensitivity metric for social network
publications
Another way of measuring privacy risks is related to the information content dimen-
sion. Considering the sensitivity of the content of a publication in a social network,
Chapter 5 proposes a metric for evaluating the amount of the user’s personal informa-
tion that is revealed. For this study, several works that compute information sensitivity
from different approaches were reviewed. Four different approaches were identified in
the literature review. First, the approach based on law and regulation, which raises as a
result of governments’ limitation to companies’ activities that collect, store, and man-
age personal data. Second, the approach based onmarket valuation, companies values
information as economic resources. Third, the approach based on individuals’ valua-
tion, people are concerned about their information but everyone has a price for which
they would give up their personal information. Finally, the approach based on linguis-
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tics, the same words reveals more or less information according to how generic/specific
words are. In addition to these approaches, we identified a new one that raises from
the OSNs domain. This new approach emerged from the documented reasons for users’
regrets available in the literature. This type of information sensitivity is focused on the
effect of the information on users’ reputation. For example, the use of swearwords
might be inappropriate in some contexts such as family circles. Another example is
posting content with a strong sentiment which caused several cases of high regret. As
a consequence, this work made the following contributions:
(i) Providing a sensitivity value for each information type that might be present in
theOSN domain based on an analysis of values assigned in previous approaches;
(ii) Proposing the representation of the total value of sensitivity for a publication,
taking into consideration that multiple information types could appear in the
same publication.
After the analysis and review of previousworks that deal with the assignment of a sensi-
tivity value to information types, we identified that some information types have small
variability of value among the different works. Categories such as demographics and
human characteristics have a high degree of agreement among works that evaluate this
data as being of low sensitivity. Categories such as medical, legal, and personally iden-
tifiable data categories also have a high degree of agreement, evaluating this data as
being highly sensitive. For information types with less agreement among approaches,
we highlight user behaviors and intentions. These may be valuable to companies, but
the other approaches (laws & regulations, and individuals’ valuation) give them low
sensitive value or they do not even assess the value of these types.
Regarding the proposal of estimating a sensitivity value for each information type, we
decided to accumulate the values of all the works and calculate the mean value for each
information type. We also included new information types from OSNs regrets. The
final sensitivity value of a publication is an added value of all the types of information
included in it. The results of our study showed a high relation between the 196 teenage
users’ perception of risky information with the estimation made using the proposed
metric. Future work in this line that we have considered is the analysis of different
ways of introducing this value to users (e.g., as a monetary value, as a color scale, etc.),
and so testing which representation has a greater effect on users’ behavior.
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9.4 Results on users’ benefit-cost trade-off in privacy decisions
With the goal of understanding the impact of receptors types and sensitivity of mes-
sages on privacy decisions, Chapter 6 develops and tests a research model. Unlike most
of the works that try to analyze the reasons why users share or not information in social
networks, this work tries to understand the interplay of the communication elements
and their properties that end up with disclosure actions. Furthermore, the paper also
tries to explain how the final disclosure action facilitates to building social capital
and/or losing privacy. Once these relationships could be quantified, better strategies
and privacy mechanisms can be designed.
The research model was tested with data from 400 respondents. Their responses were
collected and analyzed using partial least squares modeling. We measure the channel’s
factors with 1) the users’ trust in the OSN provider, and 2) the users’ perceived con-
trol; the message’s factor with 3) the sensitivity of the information; and the receptor’s fac-
tors differentiating between 4) trusted receptors, 5) influencing receptors, and 6) most
common social circles (family members, friends, coworkers, and unknown users).
The findings of this study demonstrated that disclosing personal information to dif-
ferent kinds of users had a significant difference in users’ privacy calculus perception.
Although the social circle of coworkers had a few pieces of evidence of regrets like in the
family case, the study revealed a non-relevant effect on users’ privacy concerns and a
significant positive effect on bonding social capital. This behavior might be explained
by the seeking of job satisfaction and/or the desire of strengthening ties with cowork-
ers, with whomwe spend a great deal of time every day. It is worth to mention that the
social circle of friends had no significant effect on users’ perceptions of benefit or risk.
It could be that the friend social circle has become the most diverse-interpretative of
them (e.g., Facebook collapse other context relationships within it). Moreover, disclos-
ing personal information with influencing receivers had a significantly positive effect
on bridging capital building, while there was an insignificant impact on users’ privacy
concerns. In this regard, users do not perceive risky disclosing their information with
influencing-users. However, if they do not know this user (unknown users) and they
disclose their personal information, the study has been shown that it has a significantly
negative effect on their bonding capital. Taken all together, these findings reveal that
too close relationships (family) or, the flip side, unknown relationships are perceived
by users as none beneficial for users’ privacy/reputation. Future research of this work is
oriented towards the application and validation of our research model in a social net-
work (e.g., in our prototype of social network called PESEDIA). The research model will
be used to automatically compute privacy policies during disclosure decisions in social
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networks. In this regard, we will test our privacy mechanisms based on the validated
model versus other privacy mechanisms considered in the literature.
9.5 Results on nudging users with privacy risk and sensitivity
metrics
Once the above contributions of this Ph.D. thesis measure risks on social networks, in
Chapter 7 several designs of privacy mechanisms that explain to users the potential
consequences of their actions during privacy decisions are presented. The most ap-
propriate way for informing users about the measured risks, assist them, and, in turn,
cause an effect on their behaviors was with the use of soft-paternalistic mechanisms
(i.e., nudges). Recent research showed the great benefits of nudge mechanisms for pri-
vacy context, which do not actually limit users’ ability to choose freely (because of all
options are still available), thus, preserving the users’ freedom of choice.
Previous research had already tested the positive impact of nudge mechanisms regard-
ing privacy decisions. In this work, the individual personalization of the nudge to the
user was tested. Several nudge mechanisms were designed: two kinds of nudge mecha-
nisms for the scope metrics, and another for the information sensitivity metric. For the
scope metric, a visual type nudge (picture nudge) included the users’ profiles pictures of
potential receivers estimated with the scope metrics, while another textual type nudge
(number nudge) included an estimated number of potential receptors. For the sensi-
tivity metric, the sensitivity metric value of the publication was provided to users in a
message such as the following: “The sensitivity value of your publication is XX.The higher this
value, the higher your privacy risk.”. The impact of nudge mechanisms on users’ behaviors
was tested for both types of metrics (scope metric and sensitivity metric) in separate
empirical experiments with teenage participants. We aimed this target population be-
cause they are vulnerable novice/amateur users who are initiating in their usage and
have limited abilities for self-regulation and complex decision-making.
For the experiment with users’ scope metrics, a total of 42 teenage participants com-
pleted the experiment producing 848 privacy decisions. About two-thirds of the pri-
vacy decisions were made using the nudge mechanism. The findings revealed that there
is significant evidence that users’ privacy behavior for posting actions changed when
the nudging mechanisms were activated. Independently of the mechanism used (i.e.,
picture or number nudge), when the nudging mechanisms were activated, the number
of messages published with a private policy (i.e., only me, collections, or friends) was
higher than the number of messages with a public policy. Therefore, this change could
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be driven by the nudges.
For the experiment with the information sensitivity metric, a total of 196 teenage par-
ticipants completed the experiment producing 5880 privacy decisions. Half of the pri-
vacy decisions were made using the nudge mechanism. The findings revealed that the
teenagers of the experiment had some previous knowledge about the sensitivity of the
information, because they chose restrictive privacy policies for the most sensitive posts
when nudges were not activated. The results also showed that nudge messages about
sensitivity had a positive effect on their behavior as well as the sensitivity level shown
on the nudge message. The effect on teenagers’ privacy behavior was more significant
the greater the sensitivity value included in the nudge message. From the results, we
conclude that the teenagers were able to understand the nudge message that contained
information about the sensitivity of their publications. Participants used them to have
less risky behaviors on social networks by choosing more restrictive privacy policies.
For future research in this line, we plan to investigate the behavioral effect of nudges
in a long-term experiment.
9.6 Results of educating teenage users about privacy with social
gamification items
Finally, this thesis work has also investigated the integration of gamification elements
in a social network for improving the users’ understanding of social network features
and users’ privacy. The integration of gamification instruments in non-game contexts
is been used to teach people in a practical way about dull, tedious or complex tasks.
Because privacy matches this definition, the use of gamification in the context of so-
cial networks to teaching users about privacy and privacy mechanisms of the social
network sounds interesting. The contributions of this work (presented in Chapter 8)
are 1) to illustrate the value of social gamification for introducing the social network
features to new users (reducing the “learning curve”) and for learning and promoting
the application of privacy behaviors that prevent users from performing actions that
could have negative consequences; and 2) to explore the effects of social network gami-
fication on teenagers by gender and age. Moreover, the social network PESEDIA is also
a contribution that has allowed us to test and validate the thesis’ hypotheses.
An experiment with 387 participants was made. From them, 178 participants used a
social network without gamification and the rest of the participants (209) used a social
network with gamification. Their actions and activities were monitored tomeasure the
participants’ behavior regarding privacy and engagement. The findings showed that
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the gamification designed and integrated into PESEDIA had a positive learning effect
on teenage participants. They improved their awareness and seeking behavior of pri-
vacy, and their interest in the social network was higher when the gamificationmodule
was enabled. Specifically, profile items, general setting options, and posts had privacy
policies that were more appropriate, and the rate of activity and survey completion
was also higher. We did not see any negative effects on teenage users’ behavior due to
the use of gamification instruments.
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Online social networks are a powerful tool for getting a range of social benefits that
traditional (offline) communication cannot offer. However, social networks are still
not the most secure tools. Specifically, a lot of privacy issues have been reported about
the users’ actions on sharing information and privacy decisions. Therefore, advances
in improving social networks, privacy mechanisms, and, in turn, the users’ privacy de-
cisions are required.
Current research lines in enhancing users’ privacy in social networks have made ad-
vances in proposals of privacy mechanisms/solutions that align users’ preferences to
information sharing decisions in single and multi-party scenarios. All of these propos-
als primarily use automation for recommending privacy policies for privacy setting
items, profile items, and/or sharing actions. Automation allows systems to individ-
ually evaluate information content type, relations strength, social norms, and other
features of social networks to decide in a fine-grained way what users are the most ap-
propriate to have access to a user’s information and activity. However, the last research
works stressed several issues that might detract validity to these proposals. First, the
proposals do not assess the risks of users’ privacy decisions when it has been shown that
users have problems evaluating privacy risks [5]. An example of these privacy risks is
the potential audience that finally has access to users’ information as consequences of
re-sharing actions. Another example is the reported regrets due to sharing too sensitive
information. Second, the proposals do not capture the social idiosyncrasies considered
by users in the real-life, and users’ behavior is far from perfectly rational [117]. Studies
in users’ behaviors regarding information disclosure have been done but none have an-
alyzed the relationship between the different online communication elements and the
costs-benefit in disclosure actions. Finally, users do not understand the privacy recom-
mendations of proposals due to the lack of explanation regarding the privacy solution
computed [93].
In order to enhance the privacy mechanisms, this thesis tackles the following chal-
lenges: (i) the review of the current work and the identification of the most interesting
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aspects to improve privacy decisions; (ii) the proposal of metrics to compute privacy
risks on social networks from the perspectives of over exposition, visibility, and privacy
loss of users in the network; (iii) the analysis of users’ trade-off between costs and ben-
efits in disclosure decisions regarding the factors of the communication elements; and
(iv) the development of privacy mechanisms that explain the potential consequences
and benefits of users’ privacy decisions and raise the users’ concern regarding privacy.
Privacy-preserving mechanisms require an assessment of privacy risks and conse-
quences of users’ actions. Privacy risks that emerged from users’ activity are caused
by the scope of users’ sharing-actions and an over exposition of their information. In
this thesis, how information spread, the visibility of a user’s actions by his/her connec-
tions, and the users’ position in a network has been analyzed to propose a privacy risk
metric. The PRS metric is focused on estimating the potential audience of a sharing-
action. The metric is provided globally and in levels in order to be able to adjust to
the users’ perception of risk. The testing of the proposed PRS metric was made through
experiments with simulated networks based on the most popular behavioral epidemic
models and with a Twitter-sampling social network based on rumors. The findings
proved the validity of the PRS metric for estimating the users’ scope in the network
and the possibility to compute the PRS metric using local and social centrality met-
rics. On the other hand, an information sensitivity metric was proposed based on the
information types and thewording used in publications. Information types have differ-
ent grades of sensitivity because they reveal more or less personal data. The proposed
metric combines work estimations from economical, legislative, linguistical, and indi-
vidual approaches. Experiments with real users showed a correlation between users’
perceptions and the proposed sensitivity metric for real social network publications.
Before using the proposed privacy metrics for recommending possible audiences that
maximizes a specific utility function, this thesis work analyzed the conditions why, dur-
ing disclosure actions, a representative population of 400 social network users makes
the decision to share specific pieces of information (the message) with a particular
user (the receptor). The findings revealed that disclosing personal information with
too close or far social circles computes positively for increasing the users’ privacy con-
cerns, while trusted and influential users compute positively for building the social
capital of transmitter-users.
Finally, this thesis work tested two ways to translate the previous results in privacy
mechanisms that could argue and explain to users’ the consequences of privacy de-
cisions. On the one hand, soft-paternalistic interventions (nudges) that attempt to
influence decision making to improve individual well-being, without actually limiting
users’ ability to choose freely during disclosure actions was tested. Both two privacy
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metrics (the scope metric and the sensitivity metric) were included in nudging pri-
vacy mechanisms and tested with 42 and 196 teenage users, respectively. The results
remarked an impact on users’ privacy behaviors towards more restrictive and safer pri-
vacy policies. As we expected, the empowerment of users via explainable information
had a significant effect on their privacy decisions. On the other hand, this thesis also
tested the effect of integrating gamified elements in a social network and compare the
privacy decisions in both configurations (with and without gamification). The goals
of including gamification in the social network were introducing the social network
features to new users (reducing the “learning curve”), and teaching users in a practical
way about dull, tedious or complex tasks like online privacy. The results of 387 teenage
participants showed the improvement of users’ awareness and their seeking behavior of
privacy while they used the gamified configuration. Furthermore, users’ interest in the
social network was higher when the gamificationmodule was enabled. All of themech-
anisms developed and proposed in this thesis were integrated into the social network
PESEDIA.
The results and contributions of this Ph.D. thesis are important advances in the im-
provement of privacy mechanisms. However, the privacy field in social networks is a
wide area of research and some of the identified challenges are still far to be completely
solved. Moreover, the challenges identified in Chapter 2 that were not addressed in this
thesis work are susceptible to be investigated. One is the adaptability of privacy recom-
mendations through an argued discussion between the privacymechanism and the user
who wants to share a post. In this regard, users might reach an agreed-on privacy so-
lution that preserves their privacy as well as meets their motivations. These agreed-on
privacy solutions could be reached through the use of computational argumentation,
persuasive systems, and the research model developed in Chapter 6. Another challenge
that could be improved is the negotiations/recommendations in multi-party privacy
scenarios. Currently, these negotiations/recommendations are based on the computa-
tion of matching the users’ preferences while solving conflicts on privacy preferences.
However, there is no assessment of the potential privacy risks of users’ decisions and/or
the final privacy solution. Hence, it would be interesting to apply the privacy risk met-
rics developed in this thesis to themulti-party privacy scenarios. Furthermore, it would
also be interesting to show arguments about the privacy risks of co-owners (e.g., via
nudge mechanisms). In this way, the multi-party privacy conflicts might be avoided
instead of trying to reach agreements to users’ conflicts. Finally, interesting propos-
als could be reached by researching and analyzing new privacy mechanisms and new
types of privacy policies like Instagram Stories which content fades with time.
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